Memorandum from Admiral William D. Leahy to the Secretary of Defense

NCT(PSFluse) 313 TOP SECRET COPY THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DECLASSIFIED Washington 25, D. C. State Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979 we LTR. 12-11-fo E,Q. 12065, Sec. 3-402 10 March 1948 PROJEST art 94.21 By NLT 4c NARS, Date p.4+1 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: "NATIONAL SERVICE" SUBJECT: : The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy Govere in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participa- tion in the Italian Government by Legal Means. In accordance with your informal request, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have studied a draft report prepared by the National Security Council staff entitled, "Position of the United States with Respect to Italy in the Light of the Possibility of Communist Participation in the Government by Legal Means" (NSC 1/3) forwarded by you on 8 March 1948 and scheduled for consideration by the National Security Council on 11 March 1948. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this paper to the extent pos- sible in the very brief time available, and have limited their comments to those portions having apparent major military implications. With reference to the conclusion in paragraph 9 a to the effect that the United States should strengthen its military position in the Mediterranean area, little action, except increase of our Mediterranean naval force, could be taken that would not involve actual stationing (with prior political arrange- ments) of United States forces either in Italy or its islands or on some other foreign territory such as Malta or Tripoli. As for forces available, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would reiterate the following comment made in their memorandum to you dated 19 February 1948 in connection with their study of NSC 1/2: " The United States could strengthen its naval and air forces in the Mediterranean area outside of Italy ithout dan- gerously lowering its available reserve of such forces. However, deployment of ground forces in the same area would require com- mitment of part or all of our reserve in this category, a reserve which, in view of our extended military position, is already dan- gerously low. This should not be done unless a partial mobiliza- tion is undertaken to enable the United States to have available a comparatively large, trained strategic reserve with which to re- inforce units outside the United States if required. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the over-all world situation, of which that in Italy is only a part, dictates the necessity for strengthen- ing immediately the potential of our National Military Establishment. Some form of compulsory military service is essential if timely and effective strengthening of our potential is to be achieved, since this is the only method short of mobilization which can produce desired results without long delay. The foregoing does not exclude the desirability of Universal Military Training but it is only from the long-range point of view that initiation of such training will be useful. for SECRET