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    "localId": "183568239",
    "label": "Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman",
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    "title": "Telegram from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman",
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    "seq": 3,
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET SECURITY INF ORMATION\n=3 em ACTEL 28, November 30, 10 p.m. from Rome.\nthe establishment of a European defense force. There\nis\na general Peeling among Foreign Ministers that the project\nis not going well, that the French chairmanship of the\ndiscussions is weak and confused, and that the people making\nplans for establishment of the force are making a theoretical\napproach to the problem without regard to political and\nparliamentary realities in Europe. Both Stikker and Van\nZeeland are extremely worried along these lines. De Gasperi\nseems prepared to go much farther towards a transfer of\nsubstantial sovereignty in the hands of central European\norganizations,\nAlthough Adenauer did not raise the question, his key advisers\nindicated to us in Paris their concern that present plans\nof the French led to a half-way solution which would not work\nwithout complete federation in Europe. They indicated on\ntheir part that they were ready to go all the way to federa-\ntion. In this situation the French, deeply divided at home\nand unsure of Parliamentary approval, seem uncertain as to\nwhich way to move. The problem is further complicated for\nSchuman in that there are two completely opposite views\nheld in French circles as to the proper approach to Germany.\nIn general the Foreign Office clings to its view that Germany\nis a major threat of the future and must continue to be bound\nby restrictions of an occupational nature while those French-\nmen working on creation of a common force in Europe are con-\nvinced that there must be real equality given Germany Dr the\nwhole effort will fail.\nI spoke to Schuman privately about this range of problems\nand\nmaking it very clear that in our judgment these negotiations\nmust be completed by the end of the year and success or failure\nregistered by that time. T assured Schuman that we con-\nsidered the European defense communit, formula to be the best\nmethod of obtaining Germany's participation but that I had\nserious doubts that agreement could be reached unless pegotia-\ntions were taken up by the Ministers themselves, particularly\nsuch matters as the establishment of common budget and common\nproduction program. This has been arranged. I am asking\nBruce to furnish me without delay with actual texts now\nunder negotiation at Paris and for all other information that\nmay allow us to takre a still more active toole than we have\nheretofore in an effort to guide this complex project to early\nrealization.\nEden shares my view that we must move quickly or face possible\ncomplete stalemate on the creation of a European defense\nforce. He asked my view as to whether we thought it would\nhelp if they took a more active role and was considering, I\nbelieve, possibility that British forces on the Continent\ncould be placed inside the common force through some arrangement.\nI said that\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION"
}