Memorandum for the Ambassador

A pril 7, 1946 MEMORANDUM FOR THE A MBASSADOR The following are my suggestions as to how intelli- gence coverage can best be effected in Buenos Aires and Argentina as a whole: I think that the whole situation should be changed from its present set-up, that is the abolishment of the "Legal A ttachet and assistants, and clerks, etc, and that through a gradual process they should be replaced with people who have legitimate state department titles such as second secretary, third secretary, economic advisors, etc. I think that open personnel, that is open agents should be maintained at an absolute minimum. From my own experiences, and having visited the Buenos A ires office, I am of the opinion that seven open agents are sufficient to handle the work. With regard to open clerks, another problem is presented however. The office in Buenos Aires maintains all of the intelligence files of the Embassy, , which includes the filing and indexing es of all the military, navy, and embassy reports regarding intelligence. In view of this fact, I think that to run ARCHIVES AND to the office in an efficient manner it will be neressary RECORDS N SERVICE" to have approximately twelve clerical employees. It is my opinion that most of the work to be done in A rgentina should be done by an undercover organization completely divorced from the organization in the Embassy. It will be necessary to maintain contact with the Embassy however through a prearranged system of "cut outs" and fake mail drops. In this regard, it is of primary im- portance that only the best !covers" be obtained and that the men working in these covers be thoroughly trained in them, and be permitted to transact business for them. Efforts should be made to establish these undercover men in the principal cities throughout the provinces, such a S Rosairo, Cordoba, Tucaman, Bahia Blanca and possibly Mendoza. A great bulk of the work in Buenos Aires proper should also be performed by undercover men. A nother item of utmost importance should be the fact tha t all personnel of the Embassy should be specifically instructed to under no circumstances indicate that the open personnel are attached to another government agene y. One of the open agents should be designated to conduct all in- terviews of individuals who volunteer information of an intelligenc e nature. It would probably be better to have one of the Embassy officers who has served for some time