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TOP SECRET SECURIT INFORMATION de AMD us -2- There is attached our analysis and appraisal of the situation. It is the result of long and careful study and I should be much interested to know whether it is in accord with your own views. Whether or not we are agreed on all details of this analysis and appraisal I feel sure that we are agreed on the necessity of dealing immediately with the second part of the problem since, for the reasons stated above, unless negotiations are started soon there will be none at all. The first thing that seems to be needed is an opening play which will con- vince Egypt, as we are convinced, that the UK seriously desires to discuss all outstanding issues with a view to their early solution. We understand that the text of the joint statement which Sir Ralph Stevenson has recently been authorized to negotiate has been rejected by the Egyptians as a means of starting negotia- tions. It seems to us that to have the desired effect any statement would have to be more forthcoming, particularly with respect to the Sudan. As an alternative to a statement, the thought has occurred to me that it might be possible to suggest agreement on an agenda which on one hand will cover the elements desired by the Egyptians, but which on the other does not give away the UK position. Such an agenda could be made public jointly in a simple statement to the effect the two governments have agreed to begin immediate negotiations on the points listed with common resolve to reach agreement as quickly as possible. Perhaps an agenda including the points listed below might accomplish the purpose. 1. Arrangements for the assumption by Egypt of responsibility for the CZ Base in the interest of its DEF and the protection of the Suez Canal. 2. Arrangements for the provision of assistance to Egypt in fulfilling such responsibility. 3. Arrangements for the withdrawal of Brit forces from the CZ, including the TOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET SECURIT INFORMATION\nde\nAMD\nus\n-2-\nThere is attached our analysis and appraisal of the situation. It is the\nresult of long and careful study and I should be much interested to know whether\nit is in accord with your own views. Whether or not we are agreed on all details\nof this analysis and appraisal I feel sure that we are agreed on the necessity\nof dealing immediately with the second part of the problem since, for the reasons\nstated above, unless negotiations are started soon there will be none at all.\nThe first thing that seems to be needed is an opening play which will con-\nvince Egypt, as we are convinced, that the UK seriously desires to discuss all\noutstanding issues with a view to their early solution. We understand that the\ntext of the joint statement which Sir Ralph Stevenson has recently been authorized\nto negotiate has been rejected by the Egyptians as a means of starting negotia-\ntions. It seems to us that to have the desired effect any statement would have to\nbe more forthcoming, particularly with respect to the Sudan. As an alternative\nto a statement, the thought has occurred to me that it might be possible to\nsuggest agreement on an agenda which on one hand will cover the elements desired\nby the Egyptians, but which on the other does not give away the UK position.\nSuch an agenda could be made public jointly in a simple statement to the effect\nthe two governments have agreed to begin immediate negotiations on the points\nlisted with common resolve to reach agreement as quickly as possible. Perhaps\nan agenda including the points listed below might accomplish the purpose.\n1.\nArrangements for the assumption by Egypt of responsibility for the CZ\nBase in the interest of its DEF and the protection of the Suez Canal.\n2. Arrangements for the provision of assistance to Egypt in fulfilling such\nresponsibility.\n3. Arrangements for the withdrawal of Brit forces from the CZ, including the\nTOP SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION"
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