Memorandum from Averell Harriman, Talk with President Auriol

WCT(ASF-5057)265 DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 State Dept Guidelines, March 6, 1982 maded wit 72-17 By nc NLT, Date 4.18.14 TALK WITH PRESIDENT AURIOL. (Ambassador Bonnet present most of the time.) Saturday, March 31, 1951; 4.00 p.m. at the Embassy. The conversation began with an exchange of amenities in which Auriol explained again his principal purpose of getting people in the United States to appreciate the real vigor of France, and I congratulated him on the value of his visit. He then said that he wanted to talk to me about the USSR. During the period we were building up our military forces, he considered we should gain time through diplomacy. I told him I agreed in principle, but I assumed that he did not mean appeasement or that we should be deviated from the vigorous steps necessary to build military strength. I explained that I had found that whenever the Soviets violently objected to what we were doing, it usually was the very action that was most important for us to take. I said it seemed clear that in the conversations of the four Deputies, and later at the Foreign Ministers meeting, the principal Soviet objective was to split the Allies, reduce the speed of rearmament, and block the bringing of Germany into the European armies. I felt sure that he understood this danger, and applauded the French for the steps they were taking through the Schuman Plan, and now through their leadership in bringing the Germans into the continental defense arrangements. I suggested, however, that they were being a bit too technical on the military details of these arrangements, and expressed the hope that they would not let rather narrow political concepts interfere with practical military arrangements. and THED President Auriol then launched into a denunciation of the Germans as strongly nationalistic and revengeful. He explained the . is ARCHIVER 'NATIONAL SERVICE* RECOROS AND history of the 20's in rather a narrow way and said that the Germans could not be trusted. He said that even the German Socialist Party was strongly nationalistic, particularly Schumacher, and that if we rearm the Germans, they might well bring on war in their desire for a unified Germany. As David Bruce had warned me this would be his attitude and had suggested that I take the opportunity to discuss the German question with him, I told him that I did not quite agree with his analysis of the 20's; that there had been mistakes on the part of the Allies. I did believe, however, that the Germans would follow positive action; that with all of the confused pressures on the Germans perhaps the strongest today was the desire to be associated with the West; that if the Western countries brought them into what Churchill called "an honorable association", this might well become the foundation of German policy The clear fact was, however, TOr SECRET