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Restricted Chart9 SOVIET VULNERABILITIES Soviet capability to prosecute successfully its struggle against the US contains a number of vulnerabilities. The USSR is immediately most vulnerable in its control over its expanding empire; opposition of the subject state, as a state, to the master state; opposition of peoples against unrepresentative and alien satellite governments; conflict within the national Communist parties; and possible satellite party deviations. Internally the Soviet Union must guard against popular dissatisfaction caused by such things as the low standard of living, harsh labor laws, repressive administrative measures, and police brutality. The persist- ent desire of the peasant to own his own land and his discontent with collectivization are another major source of unrest. Further, the lack of freedomfor intellectuals and the basic antagonism of minority groups (40%) are potentially troublesome, as are individual and factional strug- gles within the Communist hierarchy. Finally, the discrepency between Soviet myths of a Communist Utopia and Soviet reality threatens the effectiveness of Sovietpropaganda Revelations of Soviet escapees and disillusioned foreign Communists, and the exposure of Soviet methods by Marshal Tito indicate that inte- sified efforts on the part of the US might produce further effects. The Soviet Union, however, has shown acute awareness of these vulnerabilities and has taken necessary precautions. These vulnerabili- ties cannot be expected spontaneously to produce results. They are, however, of such nature as to suggest that systematic exploitation through external pressure might bring about a weakening in the Soviet power position and possibly a reversal in Soviet policies. Restricted

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    "ocrText": "Restricted\nChart9\nSOVIET VULNERABILITIES\nSoviet capability to prosecute successfully its struggle against the\nUS contains a number of vulnerabilities.\nThe USSR is immediately most vulnerable in its control over its\nexpanding empire; opposition of the subject state, as a state, to the\nmaster state; opposition of peoples against unrepresentative and alien\nsatellite governments; conflict within the national Communist parties;\nand possible satellite party deviations.\nInternally the Soviet Union must guard against popular dissatisfaction\ncaused by such things as the low standard of living, harsh labor laws,\nrepressive administrative measures, and police brutality. The persist-\nent desire of the peasant to own his own land and his discontent with\ncollectivization are another major source of unrest. Further, the lack\nof freedomfor intellectuals and the basic antagonism of minority groups\n(40%) are potentially troublesome, as are individual and factional strug-\ngles within the Communist hierarchy.\nFinally, the discrepency between Soviet myths of a Communist\nUtopia and Soviet reality threatens the effectiveness of Sovietpropaganda\nRevelations of Soviet escapees and disillusioned foreign Communists,\nand the exposure of Soviet methods by Marshal Tito indicate that inte-\nsified efforts on the part of the US might produce further effects.\nThe Soviet Union, however, has shown acute awareness of these\nvulnerabilities and has taken necessary precautions. These vulnerabili-\nties cannot be expected spontaneously to produce results. They are,\nhowever, of such nature as to suggest that systematic exploitation through\nexternal pressure might bring about a weakening in the Soviet power\nposition and possibly a reversal in Soviet policies.\nRestricted"
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