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POTENTIAL FOR COMMUNIST DEVIATION FROM SOVIET CONTROL
Inherent in the structure of international Communism are certain
vulnerabilities that contain a potential for deviation from Soviet control.
Among these are the contradictions of Moscow's demands of the national
Communist Party; disillusionment when members realize the truth about
Communist objectives and methods; personal rivalries among the leaders;
and the contradiction of national leaders adulated by their followers but
treated as lackeys by Moscow.
The majority of the people in the satellites are intensely national-
istic and resent the domination of the Kremlin and the Communist
Governments. Although this is a potential weakness, there is no evidence
that it would give rise to further successful nationalist deviations on
Titoist lines, nor would it produce effective resistance to a Soviet war
effort unless the war were going badly for the Soviet Union and the dis-
affected elements were given guidance and support from the West.
In the long run the Tito heresy makes it easier for dissident party
elements in other countries to question the Kremlin's leadership. How-
ever, outside Yugoslavia, the conditions necessary for successful defec-
tion (a Communist apparatus relatively free from physical Soviet contro
and accessible to western powers) exist only in China, Albania, and
perhaps Indochina. Unfortunately, in the case of the Red Army-"liberated'
European satellites, where revolts might be most dangerous, direct
Soviet Control is most complete.
Moscow may also face possible revolts in some parties of the non-
Communist world, but it can always create a "loyalist" group to compete
with the rebels. The possibility that revolts might simultaneously gain
mass support in several countries, and begin to snowball thr oughout the
Communist world is slight.
In sum, Moscow's over-all control of international Communism has
not been impaired by the Tito revolt, and, for the foreseeable future,
there is little prospect that it will be impaired.
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"ocrText": "Chart]1\nPOTENTIAL FOR COMMUNIST DEVIATION FROM SOVIET CONTROL\nInherent in the structure of international Communism are certain\nvulnerabilities that contain a potential for deviation from Soviet control.\nAmong these are the contradictions of Moscow's demands of the national\nCommunist Party; disillusionment when members realize the truth about\nCommunist objectives and methods; personal rivalries among the leaders;\nand the contradiction of national leaders adulated by their followers but\ntreated as lackeys by Moscow.\nThe majority of the people in the satellites are intensely national-\nistic and resent the domination of the Kremlin and the Communist\nGovernments. Although this is a potential weakness, there is no evidence\nthat it would give rise to further successful nationalist deviations on\nTitoist lines, nor would it produce effective resistance to a Soviet war\neffort unless the war were going badly for the Soviet Union and the dis-\naffected elements were given guidance and support from the West.\nIn the long run the Tito heresy makes it easier for dissident party\nelements in other countries to question the Kremlin's leadership. How-\never, outside Yugoslavia, the conditions necessary for successful defec-\ntion (a Communist apparatus relatively free from physical Soviet contro\nand accessible to western powers) exist only in China, Albania, and\nperhaps Indochina. Unfortunately, in the case of the Red Army-\"liberated'\nEuropean satellites, where revolts might be most dangerous, direct\nSoviet Control is most complete.\nMoscow may also face possible revolts in some parties of the non-\nCommunist world, but it can always create a \"loyalist\" group to compete\nwith the rebels. The possibility that revolts might simultaneously gain\nmass support in several countries, and begin to snowball thr oughout the\nCommunist world is slight.\nIn sum, Moscow's over-all control of international Communism has\nnot been impaired by the Tito revolt, and, for the foreseeable future,\nthere is little prospect that it will be impaired."
}