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{
    "localId": "213875772",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 20, A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Appraisal of the Degree  and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation",
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    "id": "213875772",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875772",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 20, A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of Defense on Appraisal of the Degree  and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/213875772",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 12,
            "logicalDate": "1948-07-12",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1948
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{
    "seq": 5,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750595/750595-07-005.jpg",
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    "ocrText": "ARCHIVES \"INATIONAL RECOROS AND 3\nTOP OBCRET\nEs\nSERVICE\"\nnon-military character, military estimates should be adjusted to accord with this\nsituation. Not only the general size of the military budget, but also the par-\nticular purposes toward which it is directed, should be responsive to these con-\nditions. They may materially affect decisions as to whether we should conc en-\ntrate all funds available for military purposes on the strengthening of our own\nforces or should allocate a portion thereof for the equipping of the forces of\nour probable Allics. For example, if time permits, it might prove more econom-\nical, or strategically sounder, to devote a certain percentage of such funds to\nthe armament of forces of the Western Union 8 untries rather than to employ the\nsame amounts to create additional divisions of our own. While a decision in\nthis regard would naturally involve political as well as military considera-\ntions, such a decision cannot be made without the appraisa] of risks and the\ndetermination of objectives to which I have referred. The sane considerations\nwill influence the relative emphasis which is to be placed in our military budget\non the creation of regular divisions in being, as opposed to a longer range pro-\ngram for the strengthening of our civilian components; the amount to be set aside\nfor the augmentation of our war reserve; the rate at which we stockpile materials;\nthe importance of instituting negotiations for military bases overseas, and even\nthe location of such bases; the desirability and urgency of joint military plan-\nning with other nations; the direction to be followed in our research and devel-\nopment programs; and many other sinilar factors. Moreover, with the heavy and\ncontinuing impact of scientific progress on the art of warfare, it is important\nto reach some conclusions as to whether we should primarily shape our forces for\nthe kind of war which might be fought tomorrow or for the possibly very different\nform of conflict which night occur if hostilities should break out some five or\nten years hence.\nI think it is desirable to bring the foregoing generalizations into the\ncontext of the immediate present. I assume that within the next decade, no coun-\ntry other than Russia, and no likely combination of countries which did not in-\nclude Russia or expect her active support, would be likely to undertake a war di-\nrected against the United States. It does not follow, of course, that some coun-\ntry, or combination of countries, will not niscalculate the risks and, by taking\nsone aggressive action or precipitating some local conflict, create a situation\nin which the United States might be required to use military force to protect its\nown security or to prevent a breakdown in world order. It therefore becomes im-\nportant to appraise, as best we can, the likelihood of some of the following de-\nvelopments: An aggressive war by Russia; a conflict precipitated by some miscal-\nculation on the part of Russia or one of her satellites; Communist expansion\nthrough power diplomacy, through the creation of internal dissension and civil\nstrife, or through political terrorism and propaganda; the outbreak of a major\nwar as a result of some eruption in one of the *tinder-box\" areas of the world.\nUntil these risks are appraised and their nature defined, and until a deternina-\ntion has been made as to the best nethods of renoving or meeting then, no logical\ndecisions can be reached as to the proportion of our resources which should be\ndevoted to nilitary purposes, nor as to the character of forces which the mili-\ntary establishment should seek to foster and support, both hero and in friendly\ncountries.\nNSC 20\n- 2 -\nTOR"
}