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-2- # 240, July 17, 3 p.m., from Tehran
and ourselves to prevent. I told him quite bluntly that
while such a happening would be unfortunate for the free
world it would be the end of his country.
He appears obsessed with the idea of eliminating completely
British Oil Company operations and influence within Iran,
though willing to sell oil to them. I told him we could not
associate ourselves with any p: oposal that treated the British
with such lack of consideration. I emphasized the importance
of free world solidarity and declined to believe a way could
not be worked out by which Iran could get the essential
benefit of British help for production and distribution and
yet preserve the desire for control of Iranian resources and
the elimination of the political influence which he considers
the AIOC had exercised. (I will send further details of
this conversation when the notes are written up).
I reiterated the immediate necessity for a emporary arrange-
ment by which oil could begin to move promptly. Then there
would be time to work out a. permanent solution. In reply to
his request I agreed to consider with Grady whether we could
make a suggestion for such a modus vivendi which might be
acceptable to both parties.
In spite of Mosadeg's cordial attitude, I am gravely concerned
over his rigid and adamant position, not only in regard to his
objectives but also to the precise and impractical manner in
which he is determined to attain them.
The Shah seemed more vigorous than I expected. He is relieved
that there is nothing basically wrong with his physical con-
dition, and he has regained his strength following the opera-
tion. He discussed the situation calmly, explained that un-
less a solution could be worked out with Mosadeq a very grave
situation will be created, particularly since it would be dif-
ficult or impossible to replace the Mosadeq Govt unless there
is a complete change of attitude in the country towards him
and his program.
DOH
Em
I will have a full talk with Grady today and decide what our
G
next move should be. There is a slight possibility that Levy's
23
conversations with the Iranian officials may weaken Mosadeg's
confidence that he can "go it alone" without British coopera-
pago
tion in some form.
MEV
GRADY
828J
T2 x
DU:CER
Note: Read by Mr. Kitchen (SS) 12:50 p.m., 7-17-51, TEM.
Debocations
eso.
TOP OBCAET
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"ocrText": "-2- # 240, July 17, 3 p.m., from Tehran\nand ourselves to prevent. I told him quite bluntly that\nwhile such a happening would be unfortunate for the free\nworld it would be the end of his country.\nHe appears obsessed with the idea of eliminating completely\nBritish Oil Company operations and influence within Iran,\nthough willing to sell oil to them. I told him we could not\nassociate ourselves with any p: oposal that treated the British\nwith such lack of consideration. I emphasized the importance\nof free world solidarity and declined to believe a way could\nnot be worked out by which Iran could get the essential\nbenefit of British help for production and distribution and\nyet preserve the desire for control of Iranian resources and\nthe elimination of the political influence which he considers\nthe AIOC had exercised. (I will send further details of\nthis conversation when the notes are written up).\nI reiterated the immediate necessity for a emporary arrange-\nment by which oil could begin to move promptly. Then there\nwould be time to work out a. permanent solution. In reply to\nhis request I agreed to consider with Grady whether we could\nmake a suggestion for such a modus vivendi which might be\nacceptable to both parties.\nIn spite of Mosadeg's cordial attitude, I am gravely concerned\nover his rigid and adamant position, not only in regard to his\nobjectives but also to the precise and impractical manner in\nwhich he is determined to attain them.\nThe Shah seemed more vigorous than I expected. He is relieved\nthat there is nothing basically wrong with his physical con-\ndition, and he has regained his strength following the opera-\ntion. He discussed the situation calmly, explained that un-\nless a solution could be worked out with Mosadeq a very grave\nsituation will be created, particularly since it would be dif-\nficult or impossible to replace the Mosadeq Govt unless there\nis a complete change of attitude in the country towards him\nand his program.\nDOH\nEm\nI will have a full talk with Grady today and decide what our\nG\nnext move should be. There is a slight possibility that Levy's\n23\nconversations with the Iranian officials may weaken Mosadeg's\nconfidence that he can \"go it alone\" without British coopera-\npago\ntion in some form.\nMEV\nGRADY\n828J\nT2 x\nDU:CER\nNote: Read by Mr. Kitchen (SS) 12:50 p.m., 7-17-51, TEM.\nDebocations\neso.\nTOP OBCAET"
}