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for N -2-# 276, July 19, Noon from Tehran as above, but the oil deal would be difficult considering Mosadeq's rigidity In answer to his question I pointed out new operating company of Iran registry owned by British and perhaps other previous customers (consisting mostly of European subsidiaries of AIOC held solely or jointly with other international oil companies) could be organized to act for a fee as agent to Iran National Oil Company for operation of oil fields and refinery. Also a long-term contract with AIOC for sale of oil might be made at substantial discount from market. I told him bluntly that whatever the form of arrange ment the oil companies in total would have to obtain equiva- lent of 50 percent of the net receipts. This point we dis- cussed at considerable length. I believe he understands clearly reasons and indicated that Iran Govt's ob jective should be to sell largest volume of oil possible to produce maximum income regardless of percentages. Wednesday afternoon I was invited to meet separately the Presi- dents of Senate and of Majlis with a group of members of both Houses. At meeting with Senators over half of membership, about 35, were present. Following several cordial and flowery speeches of welcome and expressions of respect for President Truman, I spoke at some length. After expressing US great interest in Iran and President Truman's personal concern over present controversy and free world solidarity, I presented forceably the economic dangers of loss of their oil industry. I told them now that they had attained their political objec- tives through nationalization laws they must combine reason with enthusiasm and protect their oil income as a basis for economic development. From questions that followed I gained impression that they understood implications of what I had said. Individuals expressed privately to me their concern that the govt was being too rigid and had made mistake in re jecting oil company's last proposal out of hand. Several asked for further personal talks. Ma jlis group consisted of about dozen. Most of them made speeches to me of cordial but general nature. I said much the same as I had to Senate. The meeting was more formal and I could not (rpt not) appraise their reaction except for feeling that they all hoped that in some manner my mission would be successful. I am seeing Ala Thursday morning and Shah in afternoon Also the mixed oil commission is calling 0 on me later. I plan to see Mosadeq following day. I hope 23 that some influence will by then have been brought to bear on him form my various talks. My ob jective will be to in- duce him to agree to immediate govt to govt talks with British PEV and acquiesce to a British Cabinet Minister's visit to Tehran. If he should agree, regarding which I am not (rpt not) at present optimistic, he cannot make rigid conditions of prior acceptance by TOP SECKET 21016

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    "ocrText": "for\nN\n-2-# 276, July 19, Noon from Tehran\nas above, but the oil deal would be difficult considering\nMosadeq's rigidity In answer to his question I pointed out\nnew operating company of Iran registry owned by British and\nperhaps other previous customers (consisting mostly of\nEuropean subsidiaries of AIOC held solely or jointly with other\ninternational oil companies) could be organized to act for a\nfee as agent to Iran National Oil Company for operation of\noil fields and refinery. Also a long-term contract with AIOC\nfor sale of oil might be made at substantial discount from\nmarket. I told him bluntly that whatever the form of arrange\nment the oil companies in total would have to obtain equiva-\nlent of 50 percent of the net receipts. This point we dis-\ncussed at considerable length. I believe he understands\nclearly reasons and indicated that Iran Govt's ob jective should\nbe to sell largest volume of oil possible to produce maximum\nincome regardless of percentages.\nWednesday afternoon I was invited to meet separately the Presi-\ndents of Senate and of Majlis with a group of members of both\nHouses. At meeting with Senators over half of membership,\nabout 35, were present. Following several cordial and flowery\nspeeches of welcome and expressions of respect for President\nTruman, I spoke at some length. After expressing US great\ninterest in Iran and President Truman's personal concern over\npresent controversy and free world solidarity, I presented\nforceably the economic dangers of loss of their oil industry.\nI told them now that they had attained their political objec-\ntives through nationalization laws they must combine reason\nwith enthusiasm and protect their oil income as a basis for\neconomic development. From questions that followed I gained\nimpression that they understood implications of what I had\nsaid. Individuals expressed privately to me their concern\nthat the govt was being too rigid and had made mistake in\nre jecting oil company's last proposal out of hand. Several\nasked for further personal talks.\nMa jlis group consisted of about dozen. Most of them made\nspeeches to me of cordial but general nature. I said much\nthe same as I had to Senate. The meeting was more formal\nand I could not (rpt not) appraise their reaction except for\nfeeling that they all hoped that in some manner my mission\nwould be successful. I am seeing Ala Thursday morning and\nShah in afternoon Also the mixed oil commission is calling\n0\non me later. I plan to see Mosadeq following day. I hope\n23\nthat some influence will by then have been brought to bear\non him form my various talks. My ob jective will be to in-\nduce him to agree to immediate govt to govt talks with British\nPEV\nand acquiesce to a British Cabinet Minister's visit to Tehran.\nIf he should agree, regarding which I am not (rpt not) at\npresent optimistic, he cannot make rigid conditions of prior\nacceptance by\nTOP SECKET\n21016"
}