Congressional Record, Extension of Remarks by Senator Herbert Lehman, Story of Our Relations With Russia

(Not printed at Government expense) Congressional Record United States PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 82d CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION of America Story of Our Relations With Russia Hon. Averell Harriman Tells Official "In- and to find a way in which the United States, ALLIES AGAINST HITLER Great Britain, and the U. S. S. R. could live side Story" of Yalta; Reports on U.S.- together in peace. The postwar problems There are those who now contend that we U. S. S. R. Relations During World have resulted not from the understandings should not have supported the Soviet armies. reached at Yalta but from the fact that They contend that we should have let Ger- War II Stalin failed to carry out those understand- many and the Soviet Union kill each other ings and from aggressive actions by the off. These people forget the real danger was Kremlin. that Hitler would knock Russia out of the EXTENSION OF REMARKS war. The Germans were only a few miles SENT TO MOSCOW BY FDR from Moscow when I was there in October OF 1941. That year the winter saved the city. HON. HERBERT H. LEHMAN In this statement I have attempted to set I was in Moscow again in August 1942 when forth the manner in which President Roo- the Russians were again facing disaster. OF NEW YORK sevelt sought to achieve his objectives. Ir The supplies from the British and ourselves IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES doing so I have drawn heavily on my per- may have been decisive in helping the Rus- Monday, August 27, 1951 sonal experiences. After being involved in sians to hold Leningrad, to prevent the en- our rearmament program beginning June circlement of Moscow, and to stop the on- Mr. LEHMAN. Mr. President, on 1940, I was sent by President Roosevelt to slaught on Stalingrad and the oil fields of August 17 the Honorable W. Averell Har- London in March of 1941 as his special rep- the Caucasus. With the increased flow of riman made a statement regarding our resentative for assistance to Great Britain. our supplies, by the spring of 1944 the Rus- wartime relations with the Soviet Union, From October 1943 until January 1946, I was sians had been able to throw the Germans Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Prior to back on all fronts. particularly as they concern the agree- this appointment President Roosevelt had These people forget that on June 6, 1944, ments reached at Yalta. This state- sent me on several special missions. The when the Allies landed on the Normandy ment is so informative and so useful for first was in September of 1941, when I went beaches, there were about 60 German Divi- reference by Members of the Congress to Moscow with Lord Beaverbrook as chair- sions in France and the Low Countries, and others interested, that I ask unani- man of the President's special mission to the whereas there were 199 German divisions mous consent that the statement be Soviet Union. In August 1942, I represented and 50 satellite divisions engaged on the printed in the Appendix of the RECORD. President Roosevelt at the first meeting of eastern front. In accordance with Stalin's Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin agreement at Tehran, the Russian armies There being no objection, the state- in Moscow. I was with Secretary of State launched a major offensive on June 22 and ment was ordered to be printed in the Hull at the Moscow conference in October tied down and broke through this formidable RECORD, as follows: 1943. I attended all but one of the con- Nazi force. STATEMENT OF W. AVERELL HARRIMAN, SPECIAL ferences between President Roosevelt' and If we had failed to come to the support ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT, REGARDING Prime Minister Churchill, and all of the con- of the Soviet Union the Germans would OUR WARTIME RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET ferences between the United States, Great have rendered the Russian armies ineffective UNION, PARTICULARLY AS THEY CONCERN THE Britain, and the Soviet Union-Teheran in and would have been able to throw their AGREEMENTS REACHED AT YALTA November 1943, Yalta in February 1945, and full power against an Allied invasion of the I am submitting this statement for use in Potsdam in July 1945. I also attended the Continent. In this case it is doubtful connection with the hearings on the far- meeting between Churchill and Stalin in whether such an invasion could have been eastern situation. My objective is to clarify Moscow in October 1944. I was in San Fran- attempted, and no one can now tell how the confusion that has arisen regarding the cisco for a few weeks during the United Na- long the war with Hitler might have lasted. understandings reached at Yalta by Presi- tions conference in April and May 1945. These tremendous and courageous opera- dent Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill Throughout the war I had innumerable per- tions by the Soviet Army and the fact that with Premier Stalin. sonal talks with Churchill and many discus- Stalin had honored such a vital military Much has been said and written about sions with Stalin. commitment influenced the attitude of Brit- Yalta and its effect on the postwar course of The primary objective of the American ish and American representatives in subse- events. Some people have shown a lack of and British Governments in our relations quent negotiations with the Soviet Union- understanding of our objectives in the con- with the Soviet Union during the war was to and built up favorable opinion for the So- duct of the war and our efforts during the keep the Soviet Army as an effective fighting viet Union among the people of the United war to lay a foundation for a peaceful post- force against Hitler. We sought to do this States and the other western allies. war world. Others appear to have profited through the shipment of essential supplies In addition to maintaining the Soviet from hindsight. Still others--for reasons and through the coordination of our mili- Union as an effective fighting ally against best known to themselves-have distorted tary strategy. Supplies began to flow Hitler, it was our objective to encourage the and perverted the facts to a point where their shortly after the discussions Lord Beaver- Soviet Union to join in the war against statements have little or no basis in reality. brook and I had with Stalin in Moscow in Japan at the earliest possible date. Because As a result, a myth has grown up that what September 1941. The principal strategic of their ambitions in the east, there was President Roosevelt and Prime Minister talks took place when Churchill visited never any doubt in my mind that the So- Churchill did at Yalta has led to our postwar Moscow in August 1942 and at Teheran in viets would attack the Japanese in Man- difficulties with the Soviet Union. This myth churia in their own due time. The ques- November 1943. At this latter conference, is without foundation in fact. tion was whether they could come in early Stalin was informed of our plans to land The discussions at Yalta and the under- enough to be of any help to us and to save standings reached there were an integral part in France, and he undertook to attack American lives. I raised the subject with of our negotiations with the Soviet Union shortly after we got ashore in order to pre- Stalin as early as August 1942. He told me throughout the war to bring the desperate vent the Germans from diverting divisions then that it was his intention to come into struggle to a victorious and early conclusion from the eastern front to the west. the Pacific war when he was in a position 965404--40209