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ENCLOSURE "C"
REACTIONS ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST
1. GENERAL.
All the free nations of Europe and the Near East are extremely apprehensive of
further Soviet aggression, internal or external. All are keenly aware of their own pres-
ent weakness and the immediate presence of overwhelming Soviet power. They realize
that the only restraint on the USSR is fear of the potential strength of the United States.
All are eager for evidence of a real and firm determination on the part of the United
States to support their continued independence by military as well as economic means,
if need be. The assurance of security which only the United States could afford them
is indispensable to international stability and economic recovery. But all fear that
the United States may precipitate an armed conflict with the USSR for which neither
the United States nor they were prepared and in the course of which they would surely
be overrun. This apprehension tempers their desire for a forceful demonstration of US
determination. All would welcome, however, both a substantial increase in actual US
military power and a forward movement of US forces into a strategic position in which
there could be no danger of a collision with Soviet forces but from which they could
render immediate support.
2.
COURSE A.
Increased US economic and financial aid to Greece might arouse in other countries
some jealous anxiety lest greater appropriations for Greece meant less for themselves.
Other states dependent on US aid would watch closely the implementation of the US
program in Greece for indications of the extent to which compromise of national SOV-
ereignty would be concomitant with acceptance of extraordinary assistance. All would
be in some degree susceptible to Soviet propaganda on that point, but such propaganda
could have important effect only if US interference in Greece resulted in a conspicuous
forfeiture of Greek confidence, good will, and cooperation.
3.
COURSE B (1).
Except as it might be momentarily mistaken for the beginning of Course B (2), the
dispatch of a US token force to Greece would have little effect in other countries.
4.
COURSE B (2).
The employment in Greece of "all presently available US forces" would arouse wide-
spread fear of imminent armed conflict between the United States and the USSR. This
apprehension would be relieved when war did not ensue, and as the situation in Greece
was stabilized it would be succeeded by new confidence in the effectiveness of US support.
Except in Turkey, however, there would be continuing concern regarding the commit-
ment in Greece of "all available" US forces.
5.
COURSE B (3).
A US strategic build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean (without the commitment of
US forces in Greece) would have a generally reassuring and stabilizing effect in Europe
11
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nENCLOSURE \"C\"\nREACTIONS ELSEWHERE IN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST\n1. GENERAL.\nAll the free nations of Europe and the Near East are extremely apprehensive of\nfurther Soviet aggression, internal or external. All are keenly aware of their own pres-\nent weakness and the immediate presence of overwhelming Soviet power. They realize\nthat the only restraint on the USSR is fear of the potential strength of the United States.\nAll are eager for evidence of a real and firm determination on the part of the United\nStates to support their continued independence by military as well as economic means,\nif need be. The assurance of security which only the United States could afford them\nis indispensable to international stability and economic recovery. But all fear that\nthe United States may precipitate an armed conflict with the USSR for which neither\nthe United States nor they were prepared and in the course of which they would surely\nbe overrun. This apprehension tempers their desire for a forceful demonstration of US\ndetermination. All would welcome, however, both a substantial increase in actual US\nmilitary power and a forward movement of US forces into a strategic position in which\nthere could be no danger of a collision with Soviet forces but from which they could\nrender immediate support.\n2.\nCOURSE A.\nIncreased US economic and financial aid to Greece might arouse in other countries\nsome jealous anxiety lest greater appropriations for Greece meant less for themselves.\nOther states dependent on US aid would watch closely the implementation of the US\nprogram in Greece for indications of the extent to which compromise of national SOV-\nereignty would be concomitant with acceptance of extraordinary assistance. All would\nbe in some degree susceptible to Soviet propaganda on that point, but such propaganda\ncould have important effect only if US interference in Greece resulted in a conspicuous\nforfeiture of Greek confidence, good will, and cooperation.\n3.\nCOURSE B (1).\nExcept as it might be momentarily mistaken for the beginning of Course B (2), the\ndispatch of a US token force to Greece would have little effect in other countries.\n4.\nCOURSE B (2).\nThe employment in Greece of \"all presently available US forces\" would arouse wide-\nspread fear of imminent armed conflict between the United States and the USSR. This\napprehension would be relieved when war did not ensue, and as the situation in Greece\nwas stabilized it would be succeeded by new confidence in the effectiveness of US support.\nExcept in Turkey, however, there would be continuing concern regarding the commit-\nment in Greece of \"all available\" US forces.\n5.\nCOURSE B (3).\nA US strategic build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean (without the commitment of\nUS forces in Greece) would have a generally reassuring and stabilizing effect in Europe\n11\nTOP OECRET"
}