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b. Organization. (See Chart - Appendix B) Theoretically the supreme power of the Japan Communist Party resides in the National Party Congress which meets annually. When not in session, the Congress is represented by a twenty-five-member Central Committee which the former elects. Sup- plementary to the Central Committee is the Central Committee Candidate Pool whose ten members are similarly elected and whose function it is to fill any vacancies that may occur in the Central Committee. Actually, superior even to the Central Committee is the Supreme Council, top policy organ of the JCP, whose very existence is concealed from most Party members. Of the nine members, the names of only six are to be found on the Central Committee. A Control Committee is responsible for Party discipline. Real executive power, however, lies in the Political Bureau of nine members and the five-man Secretariat with the former making all important Party decisions and the latter handling routine administration. The Political Bureau and the Secretariat supervise the activities of some sixteen departments into which the work of the Central Headquarters is broken down. The Party's bureaucratic structure has a chain of command from the Central Committee through 9 Regional Committees to 46 Prefectural of Metropolitan Com- mittees, to the District Committees, the Squads and the Groups. Far-reaching struc- tural reorganization took place after the 6th National Party Congress of December 1947. A major innovation was the introduction of the Regional Committee to the chain of command in an effort to improve local leadership, liaison between Headquarters and the lesser committees, and possibly to decentralize command looking forward to the possible future necessity of going underground. Behind the JCP's activities is a complex organization of men who have qualified for their present positions of leadership through long experience in Communist tactics and a belief in their ideology, unfaltering even through long imprisonment. The lead- ership is aggressive, well trained, and hardened. Of the 53 members of the JCP head- quarters all but five have been behind bars; seven have had experience and training in the USSR and 13 are graduates of university-level institutions. The close inter- locking relationship of the membership on upper level committees makes for a tight, well disciplined organization and for smooth coordination. The top level leadership rests in the hands of the "Big Three": TOKUDA Kyuichi, NOZAKA Sanzo, and SHIGA Yoshio. All three are members of the Supreme Council, the Central Committee, and the Political Bureau. TOKUDA and NOZAKA are members of the Secretariat and each of the three heads up at least one of the Central Headquarters' departments. JCP policy is very largely controlled by these three who have retained their top positions through the reshuffling of officials at headquarters. The JCP obtains its financial life blood for carrying on its countless activities from illegal as well as legal sources. In this legal bracket there are the customary membership fees, subscriptions to various publications, and the donations of sympa- thizers. On the local level, party members have organized business concerns from which the profits are deposited in the Party coffers. Should the firm plan to engage in the blackmarket, the organizers will ostensibly divorce themselves from the JCP in 4

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    "ocrText": "b.\nOrganization. (See Chart - Appendix B)\nTheoretically the supreme power of the Japan Communist Party resides in the\nNational Party Congress which meets annually. When not in session, the Congress is\nrepresented by a twenty-five-member Central Committee which the former elects. Sup-\nplementary to the Central Committee is the Central Committee Candidate Pool whose\nten members are similarly elected and whose function it is to fill any vacancies that may\noccur in the Central Committee. Actually, superior even to the Central Committee is\nthe Supreme Council, top policy organ of the JCP, whose very existence is concealed\nfrom most Party members. Of the nine members, the names of only six are to be found\non the Central Committee. A Control Committee is responsible for Party discipline.\nReal executive power, however, lies in the Political Bureau of nine members and the\nfive-man Secretariat with the former making all important Party decisions and the\nlatter handling routine administration. The Political Bureau and the Secretariat\nsupervise the activities of some sixteen departments into which the work of the Central\nHeadquarters is broken down.\nThe Party's bureaucratic structure has a chain of command from the Central\nCommittee through 9 Regional Committees to 46 Prefectural of Metropolitan Com-\nmittees, to the District Committees, the Squads and the Groups. Far-reaching struc-\ntural reorganization took place after the 6th National Party Congress of December 1947.\nA major innovation was the introduction of the Regional Committee to the chain of\ncommand in an effort to improve local leadership, liaison between Headquarters and\nthe lesser committees, and possibly to decentralize command looking forward to the\npossible future necessity of going underground.\nBehind the JCP's activities is a complex organization of men who have qualified\nfor their present positions of leadership through long experience in Communist tactics\nand a belief in their ideology, unfaltering even through long imprisonment. The lead-\nership is aggressive, well trained, and hardened. Of the 53 members of the JCP head-\nquarters all but five have been behind bars; seven have had experience and training\nin the USSR and 13 are graduates of university-level institutions. The close inter-\nlocking relationship of the membership on upper level committees makes for a tight,\nwell disciplined organization and for smooth coordination. The top level leadership\nrests in the hands of the \"Big Three\": TOKUDA Kyuichi, NOZAKA Sanzo, and SHIGA\nYoshio. All three are members of the Supreme Council, the Central Committee, and\nthe Political Bureau. TOKUDA and NOZAKA are members of the Secretariat and each\nof the three heads up at least one of the Central Headquarters' departments. JCP\npolicy is very largely controlled by these three who have retained their top positions\nthrough the reshuffling of officials at headquarters.\nThe JCP obtains its financial life blood for carrying on its countless activities\nfrom illegal as well as legal sources. In this legal bracket there are the customary\nmembership fees, subscriptions to various publications, and the donations of sympa-\nthizers. On the local level, party members have organized business concerns from\nwhich the profits are deposited in the Party coffers. Should the firm plan to engage\nin the blackmarket, the organizers will ostensibly divorce themselves from the JCP in\n4"
}