Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "225249258",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Appendices to ORE 58-48, The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East (To Cairo) Prior to 1950",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249258"
}

{
    "id": "225249258",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249258",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Appendices to ORE 58-48, The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East (To Cairo) Prior to 1950",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249258",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875478/875478-05-01.jpg",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875478/875478-05-01.jpg",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875478/875478-05-01.jpg",
    "imageCount": 50,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249258",
    "naId": 225249258,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 27,
            "logicalDate": "1948-10-27",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1948
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 39,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875478/875478-05-39.jpg",
    "mediaId": "1a185d926aee836e",
    "ocrText": "POLITICAL APPENDIX\nCONCLUSIONS\nPolitical considerations do not favor a Soviet decision to overrun Western Europe\nand the Near East prior to 1 January 1950.\nThis conclusion is based principally on the following considerations:\n1.\nOccupation of Western Europe and the Near East would vastly increase Soviet\nsecurity and administrative problems, and would create serious political instability\nthroughout the Soviet orbit in the event of war.\n2.\nThe traditional Communist methods of subversion and infiltration, which are less\ncostly and involve less risk than military action, still offer substantial possibilities for\ncontinued achievement of Soviet objectives.\negremo\n,moltlaoggo\nDISCUSSION\n1. OUTLINE OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INFLUENCING A SOVIET DECISION TO OVERRUN\nWESTERN EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST BEFORE JANUARY 1, 1950.\na.\nWithin the USSR.\nAdvantages.\n(1) If it were possible to perpetuate the myth that the USSR was about to\nbe attacked, the war might have the effect of unifying the Soviet people behind their\ngovernment.\n(2) The arrival of consumers' goods from Western Europe would serve to\nplacate to some extent dissatisfaction among the Soviet people with the war.\n(3) Easy initial victories of Soviet troops would enhance national pride and\nthus raise morale of the Soviet people.\nDisadvantages.\n(1) The resultant global conflict would place the entire Soviet system at\nstake in a war to the finish at a time when the USSR is inferior to the West in potential\nmilitary power.\n(2) Preparation for such an attack would serve to increase discontent among\nthe Soviet people since Soviet industrial production would have to be increasingly\ndiverted to military rather than consumer's purposes.\n(3) The war would risk creating popular discontent within the USSR and\nwould strain an already war-weary people.\n(4) The war would make the task of internal security control within the\nUSSR more difficult since the demand for trained security forces elsewhere in Europe\nwould be so great.\n(5) The war would risk mass desertions from the Soviet Army and might\npave the way for anti-Soviet guerrilla action by Ukrainians and other Soviet peoples.\n39"
}