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The main element of weakness in the Government's position is the fact that it is a coalition government and that one part of the coalition--the small but essential Afrikaner Party-is showing signs of parting company with the rest on the constitu- tional issue of native representation and on the distribution of power within the coa- lition. A minor element of weakness is the increasing payments deficit with dollar areas, which forced the imposition in early November of limited import controls and naturally caused some shortages, price increases, and patches of unemployment. The inevitability of such controls had for some time been recognized by responsible opinion and the Opposition did not make a political issue of their imposition; but the depletion of the Union's reserves of gold and hard currency continues, and Smuts has already started trying to pin the label of "a depression Government" on the Cabinet. Should serious economic difficulties ensue, the Opposition might then effectively exploit the situation with the argument that the Government's political behavior had shaken the confidence of businessmen at home and abroad. The growing rift between Malan and Havenga is, however, the more immediate threat. With the known antagonism between Malan and the Afrikaner Party's second most powerful figure, van Rensburg, the alliance has always been an uneasy one. From the very beginning of the Government Havenga consistently refused overtures for closer relations between his party and the Nationalists; and in early December he indicated publicly that the two parties were unable to reach agreement on the alloca- tion of seats for contesting the provincial elections in March. A few days earlier Havenga had announced in a major speech that he would oppose any Government effort to reduce the political status of "coloureds" and natives by a simple majority vote in the Union Parliament, rather than by the two-thirds vote required by the South Africa Act for the alteration of its "entrenched clauses." Havenga's political bargaining position is at present a strong one. Generally regarded in South Africa as a man of prime-ministerial calibre, and holding with his party's nine votes the balance of power in the present Parliament, he is now on record as favoring in general the Nationalists' popular racial policy but opposing the particular implementation of it which has roused the fears of the British element that their status also might be altered by mere majority vote. His stand on this important issue, which was taken only after some months of consideration, is reported already to be winning him support in Natal, where much of the British element favors a repressive racial policy because of the Indians. His chances of reaching an accord with Smuts' United Party were, moreover, fortuitously increased by the death on 3 December of J. C. Hofmeyr, the Party's liberal leader who most obviously stood in the way of any such deal. As Parliament gathered for the session opening on 21 January, political develop- ments seemed destined to take one of the three following lines: (1) Appeasement of Havenga by Malan-presumably at the price of greater in- fluence within the Government for the Afrikaner Party-at least until the provincial elections in March provide a test of public sentiment. This would presumably mean continuation of the Government's present program except for the particular imple- 11

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    "ocrText": "The main element of weakness in the Government's position is the fact that it is\na coalition government and that one part of the coalition--the small but essential\nAfrikaner Party-is showing signs of parting company with the rest on the constitu-\ntional issue of native representation and on the distribution of power within the coa-\nlition. A minor element of weakness is the increasing payments deficit with dollar\nareas, which forced the imposition in early November of limited import controls and\nnaturally caused some shortages, price increases, and patches of unemployment. The\ninevitability of such controls had for some time been recognized by responsible opinion\nand the Opposition did not make a political issue of their imposition; but the depletion\nof the Union's reserves of gold and hard currency continues, and Smuts has already\nstarted trying to pin the label of \"a depression Government\" on the Cabinet. Should\nserious economic difficulties ensue, the Opposition might then effectively exploit the\nsituation with the argument that the Government's political behavior had shaken the\nconfidence of businessmen at home and abroad.\nThe growing rift between Malan and Havenga is, however, the more immediate\nthreat. With the known antagonism between Malan and the Afrikaner Party's second\nmost powerful figure, van Rensburg, the alliance has always been an uneasy one.\nFrom the very beginning of the Government Havenga consistently refused overtures\nfor closer relations between his party and the Nationalists; and in early December\nhe indicated publicly that the two parties were unable to reach agreement on the alloca-\ntion of seats for contesting the provincial elections in March. A few days earlier\nHavenga had announced in a major speech that he would oppose any Government\neffort to reduce the political status of \"coloureds\" and natives by a simple majority vote\nin the Union Parliament, rather than by the two-thirds vote required by the South\nAfrica Act for the alteration of its \"entrenched clauses.\"\nHavenga's political bargaining position is at present a strong one. Generally\nregarded in South Africa as a man of prime-ministerial calibre, and holding with his\nparty's nine votes the balance of power in the present Parliament, he is now on record\nas favoring in general the Nationalists' popular racial policy but opposing the particular\nimplementation of it which has roused the fears of the British element that their status\nalso might be altered by mere majority vote. His stand on this important issue,\nwhich was taken only after some months of consideration, is reported already to be\nwinning him support in Natal, where much of the British element favors a repressive\nracial policy because of the Indians. His chances of reaching an accord with Smuts'\nUnited Party were, moreover, fortuitously increased by the death on 3 December of\nJ. C. Hofmeyr, the Party's liberal leader who most obviously stood in the way of any\nsuch deal.\nAs Parliament gathered for the session opening on 21 January, political develop-\nments seemed destined to take one of the three following lines:\n(1) Appeasement of Havenga by Malan-presumably at the price of greater in-\nfluence within the Government for the Afrikaner Party-at least until the provincial\nelections in March provide a test of public sentiment. This would presumably mean\ncontinuation of the Government's present program except for the particular imple-\n11"
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