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{
    "localId": "225249554",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 17-49, The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the United States and the USSR",
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    "id": "225249554",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 17-49, The Strategic Importance of the Far East to the United States and the USSR",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249554",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 4,
            "logicalDate": "1949-05-04",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1949
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{
    "seq": 7,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "TOR SECRET\n-X9\nLotiduob\nSUMMARY\nto\nIn the event of war between the US and the USSR, the major objective of each\npower will be destruction of the other's war-making potential. The Far East, lying\nat great distances from the heart of both powers' war-making centers, while not seem-\ningly of vital importance to either under continued circumstances of peace, will develop\nincreasing strategic significance to both in the event of war. Upon the outbreak of\nhostilities prior to 1953, the region's significance cannot be of initial decisive importance:\nfirst, because of the distance consideration; second, because the Far East's considerable\nresources will not have been fully exploited, developed and integrated with the home-\nland war complex of either the US or the USSR; and third, because of prior stockpiling\nof essential raw materials primarily available in the Far East. However, should all\nthe major components of the Far East's own self-contained war potential become con-\ntrolled and exploited by either power, the region's strategic importance would become\ngreat. Indeed, under the conditions of a prolonged war, a USSR-controlled Far East\nmight even prove decisive.\nThe USSR, in its drive for world domination, can be expected to continue its\npresent attempts at expansion and consolidation in Eurasia by all means short of direct\ninvolvement of Soviet armed forces in an attempt to attain eventual decisive military\nsuperiority over the US in intercontinental warfare. Continued Soviet aggrandize-\nment might precipitate open hostilities with the US before the USSR has achieved\nthis decisive superiority, as would be the case if war occurred prior to 1953. There\nis grave danger that the USSR, with its vast territory and preponderant military\nmanpower for employment in Eurasia, might well survive and successfully absorb an\ninitial major US offensive against European USSR and thus achieve at least an in-\ntermediate stalemate. Under such conditions, and if the Soviet Union had established\neffective control over the Far East by occupation of key areas either in peacetime or in\nthe war's early phases, the USSR would be in a position to exploit a self-sufficient Far\nEastern war-making complex in addition to its own European industrial and military\nestablishment. This combination could provide the USSR with the capability for de-\ncisive action in global war against the US.\nIn the event of war prior to 1953, it is probable that Australia, New Zealand, the\nPhilippines, Ceylon, Japan and southern Korea would favor the US, although southern\nKorea's active contribution in the war would be restricted to guerrilla operations.\nAlthough Siam, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan would desire neutrality, they would\nchoose, with varying degrees of hesitancy, to support the US in preference to the USSR.\nThe position of China and its border areas (except Tibet, a few limited areas of the\nsouthwest and possibly Taiwan) will be pro-Soviet; northern Korea, as well, will support\nthe USSR. Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia will remain areas of mixed orientation\nin which the conflict between European colonial control and Far Eastern nationalism\nmight prevent their effective exploitation regardless of local preferences for either the\n5\nTOP SLCRET\nor"
}