Ask the Scholar
Page 23 of 60
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
T OP SECRET
17
Union, it is estimated that the USSR can pro-
It should be emphasized that the Soviet
duce approximately 1 million tons of synthetic
Union is in a position to reduce forcibly its
liquid fuels with which to supplement its cur-
civilian petroleum consumption in a manner
rent availability of POL.
inconceivable for application in the United
(2) Satellites.
States. If judged by Western standards, pres-
There are only two areas of Eastern Europe
ent Soviet production of refined products is
outside the USSR where synthetic petroleum
insufficient to meet the increasing require-
products are manufactured. The synthetic
ments of its expanding economy; but severe
gasoline plant at Most in Czechoslovakia was
restrictions on civilian and industrial con-
originally designed by the Germans during
sumption allow the Soviet Union to balance
World War II to produce one million tons of
approximately its supply and minimal re-
gasoline a year by means of hydrogenation of
quirements. In this sense, the minimum re-
local coal. Estimates of present output range
quirements have been met which are not neces-
from 10-50 percent of capacity. The most
sarily the amounts which the Soviet Govern-
recent information places it at 20-25 percent.
ment would desire.
In the Soviet Zone of Germany there are
Such rationing measures serve a dual pur-
six important and several smaller synthetic
pose as prescribed by economic and military
plants. In 1944, the six plants had an aggre-
considerations. From an economic point of
gate capacity of 2,270,000 metric tons. In
view, strict allocations are designed to meet
1947, after bomb damage and dismantling, the
only the essential industrial needs and to
total capacity was 1,000,000 metric tons. It
eliminate gradually marginal consumers.
is estimated that only 60 percent of this capac-
From the military viewpoint, control of alloca-
tions enables the Soviets to have additional
ity is being utilized at this time.
Of the five synthetic plants in Poland (four
supplies of refined products for their particu-
in the Polish-administered zone of Germany)
lar needs as well as to stockpile greater quan-
tities.
none is in operation at present. All were
damaged during World War II and what was
The various indices of industrial require-
left was for the most part dismantled. How-
ments derived in this report are based mainly
ever, efforts are being made by the Polish Gov-
on the prewar relationship between domestic
ernment to rebuild the hydrogenation plant at
consumption and the extent to which the
Dwary near Oswiencine. It is believed this
principal consumers of petroleum products
refinery will not begin operating until 1950.
have been rehabilitated and expanded. The
In addition, it has been rumored that both
indices established for 1940 and 1944, together
Albania and Yugoslavia have plans for develop-
with the postwar conditions of the principal
ment of a synthetic oil industry.
consumers, were projected into 1949, as indica-
tive of the probable consumption pattern for
4. Requirements and Consumption.
that year.
a. Methods.
The conclusions in this section of the report
The Soviets will be relatively self-sufficient
are intended to serve primarily as indices of
in 1949 and their position is expected to im-
the trend of Soviet postwar petroleum con-
prove progressively as crude oil production in-
sumption. The methods and assumptions
creases and the refining plants are modernized.
used were largely reflected by the following
Thus far, strict control over the supply of
fundamental factors:
petroleum and refined products has prevented
(1) prewar trends in petroleum production
shortages which would effectively impair the
and consumption of refined products;
Soviet plans for economic development. The
(2) expected growth of the principal con-
Soviet Union is continuing to adhere to an al-
sumers;
location system which has allowed for careful
(3) postwar expansion of the petroleum in-
scheduling of available supply of refined prod-
dustry;
ucts to meet the essential needs of principal
(4) continued imports from satellites; and
consumers within the Soviet economy.
(5) continued control over allocations.
is
TOP SECRET
.
Page data
- Page
- 23
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- 4c9b531cbbc9c4f9
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 225249727
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "225249727",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249727",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 24-49, The USSR Petroleum Industry",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249727",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875482/875482-02-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875482/875482-02-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875482/875482-02-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 60,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "225249727",
"label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 24-49, The USSR Petroleum Industry",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249727"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "225249727",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249727",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 24-49, The USSR Petroleum Industry",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249727",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875482/875482-02-01.jpg",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875482/875482-02-01.jpg",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875482/875482-02-01.jpg",
"imageCount": 60,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249727",
"naId": 225249727,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 5,
"logicalDate": "1950-01-05",
"month": 1,
"year": 1950
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 23,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875482/875482-02-23.jpg",
"mediaId": "4c9b531cbbc9c4f9",
"ocrText": "T OP SECRET\n17\nUnion, it is estimated that the USSR can pro-\nIt should be emphasized that the Soviet\nduce approximately 1 million tons of synthetic\nUnion is in a position to reduce forcibly its\nliquid fuels with which to supplement its cur-\ncivilian petroleum consumption in a manner\nrent availability of POL.\ninconceivable for application in the United\n(2) Satellites.\nStates. If judged by Western standards, pres-\nThere are only two areas of Eastern Europe\nent Soviet production of refined products is\noutside the USSR where synthetic petroleum\ninsufficient to meet the increasing require-\nproducts are manufactured. The synthetic\nments of its expanding economy; but severe\ngasoline plant at Most in Czechoslovakia was\nrestrictions on civilian and industrial con-\noriginally designed by the Germans during\nsumption allow the Soviet Union to balance\nWorld War II to produce one million tons of\napproximately its supply and minimal re-\ngasoline a year by means of hydrogenation of\nquirements. In this sense, the minimum re-\nlocal coal. Estimates of present output range\nquirements have been met which are not neces-\nfrom 10-50 percent of capacity. The most\nsarily the amounts which the Soviet Govern-\nrecent information places it at 20-25 percent.\nment would desire.\nIn the Soviet Zone of Germany there are\nSuch rationing measures serve a dual pur-\nsix important and several smaller synthetic\npose as prescribed by economic and military\nplants. In 1944, the six plants had an aggre-\nconsiderations. From an economic point of\ngate capacity of 2,270,000 metric tons. In\nview, strict allocations are designed to meet\n1947, after bomb damage and dismantling, the\nonly the essential industrial needs and to\ntotal capacity was 1,000,000 metric tons. It\neliminate gradually marginal consumers.\nis estimated that only 60 percent of this capac-\nFrom the military viewpoint, control of alloca-\ntions enables the Soviets to have additional\nity is being utilized at this time.\nOf the five synthetic plants in Poland (four\nsupplies of refined products for their particu-\nin the Polish-administered zone of Germany)\nlar needs as well as to stockpile greater quan-\ntities.\nnone is in operation at present. All were\ndamaged during World War II and what was\nThe various indices of industrial require-\nleft was for the most part dismantled. How-\nments derived in this report are based mainly\never, efforts are being made by the Polish Gov-\non the prewar relationship between domestic\nernment to rebuild the hydrogenation plant at\nconsumption and the extent to which the\nDwary near Oswiencine. It is believed this\nprincipal consumers of petroleum products\nrefinery will not begin operating until 1950.\nhave been rehabilitated and expanded. The\nIn addition, it has been rumored that both\nindices established for 1940 and 1944, together\nAlbania and Yugoslavia have plans for develop-\nwith the postwar conditions of the principal\nment of a synthetic oil industry.\nconsumers, were projected into 1949, as indica-\ntive of the probable consumption pattern for\n4. Requirements and Consumption.\nthat year.\na. Methods.\nThe conclusions in this section of the report\nThe Soviets will be relatively self-sufficient\nare intended to serve primarily as indices of\nin 1949 and their position is expected to im-\nthe trend of Soviet postwar petroleum con-\nprove progressively as crude oil production in-\nsumption. The methods and assumptions\ncreases and the refining plants are modernized.\nused were largely reflected by the following\nThus far, strict control over the supply of\nfundamental factors:\npetroleum and refined products has prevented\n(1) prewar trends in petroleum production\nshortages which would effectively impair the\nand consumption of refined products;\nSoviet plans for economic development. The\n(2) expected growth of the principal con-\nSoviet Union is continuing to adhere to an al-\nsumers;\nlocation system which has allowed for careful\n(3) postwar expansion of the petroleum in-\nscheduling of available supply of refined prod-\ndustry;\nucts to meet the essential needs of principal\n(4) continued imports from satellites; and\nconsumers within the Soviet economy.\n(5) continued control over allocations.\nis\nTOP SECRET\n."
}