Central Intelligence Agency Report, Advance Copy, Special Estimate Number 20, The Probable Consequences of Certain Possible U. S. Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China and Korea
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OCR Page 1 of 953817-m
TOP SECRET
NLT(PSF-KAREB)
SECURITY INFORMATION
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
anything
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
15 December 1951
ADVANCE COPY
SPECIAL ESTIMATE # 20
THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA
THE PROBLEM
To estinate (a) the effect on Communist China of certain
possible US courses of action, and (b) the Communist reaction
to these courses of action.
ESTINATE
1. Expansion of the Korean War by Imposition of a UN Embargo
on Shipping and Exports to Communist China
a. A UN embargo on shipping and exports to Communist
China, if effective, could reduce Communist Chinese seaborne
The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State,
the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Joint Staff parti-
cipated with the Central Intelligence Agency in the preparation
of this estimate. All members of the Intelligence Advisory
Committee concurred in this estimate on 15 December 1951
DECLASSIFIED
C.I.A. LTR.
Project NLT 77-35 77.41
FOP SECRET
By NLT- He
NARS, Date 6.4-L0
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