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SDORENT
=2= #955 June 28, 2 pomog from New Delhi
4. I told Bajpai that in my opinion support by GOI
of
resolution as published did not necessarily involve GOI
in US decisions re Formosa and Indochina. I hoped that
in talking with Prime Minister or with Cabinet he would
bear in mind essence of problem was whether now that UN
was faced with clear=cut armed aggression, India would
display sufficient moral courage approve action which
would cause aggressors realize they would not be permitted
by free nations of world to force one by one various peoples
of Asia and Europe under their domination. I was never
more
proud of being a servant of Government of US than I was
today. After having just gone through one terrible war,
US in spite of its ardent desire to remain at peace had taken
courageous step for purpose, not of defending its own terri-
tory but of showing aggressors and world at large that it
took its UN obligations seriously. Would Indians in years
to come be proud of stand taken by their government if latter
failed even to vote for a resolution which was the logical
sequence to one already supported by it branding North Korea
as an aggressor.
5. Bajpai visibly somewhat shaken said GOI had no military
forces to send to Korea. I said that although I was talking
with instructions I was convinced and I was sure after giving
some thought to subject he also would be convinced that every
nation which supported resolution would not be expected
furnish armed assistance. I went on to point out that hesi-
tation and wavering at this historic moment might encourage
aggressors to go on with an aggressive program which would
inevitably result in world war. Positive and speedy action
by GOI would have tremendous influence among all peoples
of Asia. Hesitation on part GOI might well strengthen those
elements in Asia which were endeavoring confuse issue and
prevent any effective action on part UN. Issue was not
between two power blocs but aggressor and UN.
6. Bajpai promised discuss matter further with Nehru. I said
that if Prime Minister would care to talk it over with me
I
would be at his disposition at any time.
7. Referring to our conversation June 27 (EMBTEL 943,
June 27) I told Bajpai it was clear that element of time
had prevented my government from discussing resolution of
June 27 without previous consultation with GOI. Carefully
planned North Korean invasion was moving so rapidly that there
was no time for consultation with other governments. Similarly
the President had been compelled to issue his statement on
TRUNAN
June 27
to
SEORED
Co.
may
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"ocrText": "SDORENT\n=2= #955 June 28, 2 pomog from New Delhi\n4. I told Bajpai that in my opinion support by GOI\nof\nresolution as published did not necessarily involve GOI\nin US decisions re Formosa and Indochina. I hoped that\nin talking with Prime Minister or with Cabinet he would\nbear in mind essence of problem was whether now that UN\nwas faced with clear=cut armed aggression, India would\ndisplay sufficient moral courage approve action which\nwould cause aggressors realize they would not be permitted\nby free nations of world to force one by one various peoples\nof Asia and Europe under their domination. I was never\nmore\nproud of being a servant of Government of US than I was\ntoday. After having just gone through one terrible war,\nUS in spite of its ardent desire to remain at peace had taken\ncourageous step for purpose, not of defending its own terri-\ntory but of showing aggressors and world at large that it\ntook its UN obligations seriously. Would Indians in years\nto come be proud of stand taken by their government if latter\nfailed even to vote for a resolution which was the logical\nsequence to one already supported by it branding North Korea\nas an aggressor.\n5. Bajpai visibly somewhat shaken said GOI had no military\nforces to send to Korea. I said that although I was talking\nwith instructions I was convinced and I was sure after giving\nsome thought to subject he also would be convinced that every\nnation which supported resolution would not be expected\nfurnish armed assistance. I went on to point out that hesi-\ntation and wavering at this historic moment might encourage\naggressors to go on with an aggressive program which would\ninevitably result in world war. Positive and speedy action\nby GOI would have tremendous influence among all peoples\nof Asia. Hesitation on part GOI might well strengthen those\nelements in Asia which were endeavoring confuse issue and\nprevent any effective action on part UN. Issue was not\nbetween two power blocs but aggressor and UN.\n6. Bajpai promised discuss matter further with Nehru. I said\nthat if Prime Minister would care to talk it over with me\nI\nwould be at his disposition at any time.\n7. Referring to our conversation June 27 (EMBTEL 943,\nJune 27) I told Bajpai it was clear that element of time\nhad prevented my government from discussing resolution of\nJune 27 without previous consultation with GOI. Carefully\nplanned North Korean invasion was moving so rapidly that there\nwas no time for consultation with other governments. Similarly\nthe President had been compelled to issue his statement on\nTRUNAN\nJune 27\nto\nSEORED\nCo.\nmay"
}