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OCR Page 1 of 2WLTCPSF-KORED) 16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON
June 27, 1950
T
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
KOREA
We have advised the North Atlantic Treaty countries
as well as India, the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, and Indochina that the President has ordered US air and sea
forces to give cover and support to the forces of the Republic of Korea.
The Foreign Offices of those countries are being informed by our mis- -
sions that under the present circumstances Communist occupation of
Formosa would directly threaten the security of the Pacific area and of
US forces performing necessary and legitimate functions in that area.
As a consequence the Foreign Offices are being told of the President's
decision to order the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa
and to see that the Chinese Government in Formosa ceases all sea and
air operations against the mainland. The President has also directed
that military assistance to the Philippines and to French and associated
states forces in Indochina be expedited. The President's decisions are
being conveyed personally to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.
We have directed our Embassy in Moscow to make
an approach to the Soviet Foreign Office, calling its attention to the
serious situation in Korea and asking the USSR to use its influence with
North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces immediately.
While we recognize the disadvantages of involving Soviet prestige more
directly in Korean aggression, we incline to the view that, as long as
the Soviets can utilize their satellites to take aggressive action without
serious danger of becoming involved themselves, they will be likely to
employ this device with increasing boldness. If on the other hand it can
be made clear to the USSR that aggressive action by satellites risks
involving its own prestige directly, the Soviets may be more cautious
in pushing this tactic to the extreme. We also feel that prompt and
explicit exposure of Soviet responsibility for the present clear-cut
aggression in Korea should go far toward destroying the effectiveness
of the Kremlin's "peace offensive.'
DECLASSIFIED
s
TRUMAN
SWORET
E. o. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
Dept. of Amp.9.1973 11-8-77
State letter,
SERVICE
PROJECT NLT 77-37
Es
By NLT- IVE NARS Date 1-17-78
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