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ARCHIVES SERVICE" ATIONAL AND
of the gases from the blast furnaces for the purposes of other
industries and the simplification of steel production by close
coordination of blast furnaces, converters, and rolling mills,
accentuated this evolution. In the decades preceding World War I
it became advantageous to "make the coal walk to the iron, ff i.e.,
to send the Ruhr coal to Lorraine and to produce steel in the
district of the Minette deposits, instead of vice versa as had been
done before. When World War I broke out, all the big trusts from
the Ruhr, the Thyssen, Stinnes, Kloeckner, Haniel (Gute Hoffnung-
shuette) and others, had erected huge steel mills in Lorraine.
But for the outbreak of hostilities, this development, in the
long run, might have led to the disappearance or, at least to a
strong decrease in importance of the steel plants in the Ruhr which
would have been economically the best solution.
(b) The loss by the Reich of World War I and the reconquent,
by the French, of Alsace-Lorraine, reversed this development.
Angry at seeing its French competitors getting hold, for a farthing,
of the German-erected steel plants in Lorraine, the German steel
industry abandoned all thoughts of bringing about a sound economic
cooperation between Lorraine and the Ruhr. Instead, it renewed the
former policy of " duplicating" the efforts of Lorraine to an ex-
tent which challenged French hostility and which caused the French
to occupy the Ruhr in order to smash their competitors in Germany
and to enforce German deliveries of coal without which Lorraine
found it hard to exist. When the French, under Anglo-Saxon
pressure, finally evacuated the Ruhr (1924) the Germans continued
their policy of duplicating the French effort, notwiths tanding the
economic dangers which ensued. "In order to compensate for the
Lorraine plants which had been lost to France, " says a U.S.
Government report on this matter 1
"the German Government subsidized the construction of new
plants in the Ruhr. At the same time inflation was a direct
invitation to invest in equipment as a protection against
devaluation of money. - Accompanying plant expansion was
an extensive centralization of financial and technical
control. It was during the years of the German inflation
or immediately afterwards that the present superconcentra-
tion in a few major combines was carried out. At the out-
break of the second World War, 12 combines were responsible
for more than 90% of the German steel output
"
Both cartelization and the duplication of effort by the German
and West European steel industries, in complete disregard of the
market for steel products 2 received an enormous impulse by the
afflux of U.S. credits in the years preceding 1929.
1. F.E.A. Report called TIDC Project 15a, of July 15,1945, p.35
2. The realization, by all concerned, that the technical facilities
for producing steel in Europe had by far outgrown the market, led
to the foundation of the European steel cartel, in the middle of
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"ocrText": "- 2 -\nARCHIVES SERVICE\" ATIONAL AND\nof the gases from the blast furnaces for the purposes of other\nindustries and the simplification of steel production by close\ncoordination of blast furnaces, converters, and rolling mills,\naccentuated this evolution. In the decades preceding World War I\nit became advantageous to \"make the coal walk to the iron, ff i.e.,\nto send the Ruhr coal to Lorraine and to produce steel in the\ndistrict of the Minette deposits, instead of vice versa as had been\ndone before. When World War I broke out, all the big trusts from\nthe Ruhr, the Thyssen, Stinnes, Kloeckner, Haniel (Gute Hoffnung-\nshuette) and others, had erected huge steel mills in Lorraine.\nBut for the outbreak of hostilities, this development, in the\nlong run, might have led to the disappearance or, at least to a\nstrong decrease in importance of the steel plants in the Ruhr which\nwould have been economically the best solution.\n(b) The loss by the Reich of World War I and the reconquent,\nby the French, of Alsace-Lorraine, reversed this development.\nAngry at seeing its French competitors getting hold, for a farthing,\nof the German-erected steel plants in Lorraine, the German steel\nindustry abandoned all thoughts of bringing about a sound economic\ncooperation between Lorraine and the Ruhr. Instead, it renewed the\nformer policy of \" duplicating\" the efforts of Lorraine to an ex-\ntent which challenged French hostility and which caused the French\nto occupy the Ruhr in order to smash their competitors in Germany\nand to enforce German deliveries of coal without which Lorraine\nfound it hard to exist. When the French, under Anglo-Saxon\npressure, finally evacuated the Ruhr (1924) the Germans continued\ntheir policy of duplicating the French effort, notwiths tanding the\neconomic dangers which ensued. \"In order to compensate for the\nLorraine plants which had been lost to France, \" says a U.S.\nGovernment report on this matter 1\n\"the German Government subsidized the construction of new\nplants in the Ruhr. At the same time inflation was a direct\ninvitation to invest in equipment as a protection against\ndevaluation of money. - Accompanying plant expansion was\nan extensive centralization of financial and technical\ncontrol. It was during the years of the German inflation\nor immediately afterwards that the present superconcentra-\ntion in a few major combines was carried out. At the out-\nbreak of the second World War, 12 combines were responsible\nfor more than 90% of the German steel output\n\"\nBoth cartelization and the duplication of effort by the German\nand West European steel industries, in complete disregard of the\nmarket for steel products 2 received an enormous impulse by the\nafflux of U.S. credits in the years preceding 1929.\n1. F.E.A. Report called TIDC Project 15a, of July 15,1945, p.35\n2. The realization, by all concerned, that the technical facilities\nfor producing steel in Europe had by far outgrown the market, led\nto the foundation of the European steel cartel, in the middle of"
}