Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman

top SECRET NLTCPSF-INTHER. 240 Copy / of 2 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP 2430 E STREET NW. WDI. WASHINGTON 25, D. C. 2 January 1948 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The formation on 24 December of the "Provisional Democratic Government of Free Greece" is the first of several successive steps which the USSR could take to gain control in Greece. The announce- ment of the new Government could be followed in turn by (1) maximum propaganda exploitation of the Markos regime with the aim of increas- ing Greek Communist morale and effectiveness and weakening the re- sistance of the Greek people and their confidence in the ability of the US-supported Greek Government to achieve victory in the Civil War; (2) recognition of the regime by one or more of the Satellites and increased overt assistance to the guerrillas by the Satellites; and (3) Soviet recognition and overt Soviet assistance. Each of these steps would improve Communist capabilities for assuming power in Greece, but they would proportionately involve the Satellites and/or the USSR in increasing risk of US or UN counter-action. Mere propaganda exploitation of the regime entails the least risks but offers questionable prospect of effecting substantial improvement in the Communist military position. Recognition by one or more of the Satellites would provide a convenient means for increasing reinforcement of the guerrillas TRUNAN both in arms and personnel. Such aid could be represented by Soviet propaganda as comparable to US aid under the Truman Doctrine. The opportunity afforded for quibbling over which of the two governments is truly representative of the Greek people would enable the USSR to veto application of the UN Charter provisions regarding acts of ag- gression or threats to peace. Moreover, as a preliminary step, rec- ognition could be accorded by Albania which is neither a member of the UN nor included in the Balkan Peace Treaties and is technically still at war with Greece. Such steps, however, would involve definite risks. A collapse of the Markos regime after it had been recognized would be a damaging blow to international Communist prestige. Recognition by Yugoslavia or Bulgaria might provoke US or UN censure or action. In- creased overt Satellite support could conceivably résult in such strong Western reaction las to precipitate a general war. DECLASSIFIED Autko: ily NLT- 76-15 By HC NLT Date 10.4.77 TOP SECRE