Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman

ER 025 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. 24 June 1948 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 1. The meeting in Warsaw of Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and the Foreign Ministers of the satellite states allegedly to discuss the effects of, and a reply to, the London Six-Power Agreement on Western Germany apparently stems from the need to create an Eastern bloc into which Eastern Germany could be economically, if not politi- cally, fitted to match the western power inclusion of Western Germany in the European Recovery Program. From the formality of the meeting; from the rank of the delegates; and from the comparative publicity attending the gathering, some declaration of importance may be expected at its conclusion. For psychological and political reasons, the inten- tions of the USSR warrant some "explanation" in advance to the satellites and a later public announcement of satellite approval. 2. At present three courses of action in Germany, or a combination of the three, are open to the USSR. Before adopting any of these courses, the USSR will probably announce the formation of an Eastern bloc to defend itself against aggression from a resurgent Germany as established by the western powers. The Soviet action in Germany could be: a. Announcement of an intention to permit the Germans to create a provisional government for Eastern Germany; b. An attempt to open negotiations in order to delay s. TRUMAN immediately further western action and to impede German contri- ARCHIVES AND of bution to ERP and eventually to achieve the overall unification of Germany through an accommodation with the western powers; or Es SERVICE" C. Immediate establishment of a purportedly independent East German state with propaganda pretension of being the restoration of the Reich. 3. The degree of consolidation now reached would permit the USSR to lay the foundations for a provisional government, in such forms as a "democratic" constitution and "free elections". While a provisional government in the Soviet Zone would not increase the economic benefits to the USSR, it would balance the scale of political developments in Germany permitting the Soviet Union to save face in any further negotiations. DECLASSIFIED Authority NLT- 76-15 By HCC NLT Date 10-4-77 SECRET