Memorandum from Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter to President Harry S. Truman

ER086 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D.C. with 29 June 1948 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT The Cominform resolution denouncing Marshal Tito and the other top Yugoslav Communists may represent a desperate attempt by the Kremlin to discipline Tito and restore strict international Communist control over the more nationalist Yugoslav Communist Party. For the first time, the Kremlin has been obliged to discipline a national Communist Party which controls all the instruments of power in the state. Normal Communist Party channels apparently have proved inef- fectual and the Kremlin has been forced to the distasteful necessity of airing publicly a loviet-Satellite disagreement. Moreover, through its public denunciation of Tito, the USSR has confronted Yugoslavia with the immediate necessity of determining its future relationship with the Soviet bloc. Although the possibility exists that Tito and his associates are in Soviet custody and that the Cominform resolution was designed to explain his fall from power and complete the destruction of his prestige, the best available information indicates that Tito and his clique are still in control in Yugoslavia. It is unlikely that the Kremlin would have called upon the Cominform if it could have disposed of Tito from within. Moreover, such a coup within the Yugoslav Com- munist Party would probably not have been preceded by any publicity. In determining their reaction to the Cominform action, the accused Yugoslav Communists are faced with the realization that they can make no statement which will permanently heal the breach between them and the Kremlin. Complete admission of guilt by Tito and his lieutenants would not only do little toward lessening the Kremlin's determination eventually to eliminate them but would probably accel- erate the process. On the other hand, Tito is probably reluctant to risk at this time a complete break with the Kremlin by flatly denying ARCHIVES the Cominform accusations. Consequently, Tito's most probable immediate reaction will be GOMER to issue a temporizing statement in order to postpone a final decision. In the interim, Tito can be expected to (1) take steps to consolidate his position within Yugoslavia; (2) extend cautious feelers to deter- mine Western reaction if Yugoslavia should withdraw from the Soviet bloc; DECLASSIFIED Authority NLT- 76.15 SECRET By He NLT Date 10.4.72