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7. Mr. Malik in reply merely stated that there was no difference between the United States proposal and the present situation since United States troops stationed in Japan after the treaty would be in effect the same as United States troops remaining in occupation. 8. Mr. Malik then returned to the question of territories and said that since the Surrender Terms speci- fied that the four main islands of Japan and "other small islands" as determined by the Allied Powers would remain under Japanese sovereignty he failed to understand the United States proposal with regard to a trusteeship over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands since those islands were a part of the "other small islands" referred to in the Terms of Surrender. There had been express agreement regarding the islands to be detached, i.c. Kuriles, Pescadores and Formosa. Mr. Dulles replied that our proposal was as set out in the memorandum. 9. Mr. Dulles said that it was our hope that the treaty would be signed by all the nations represented on the Far Eastern Commission but that if any failed to participate it was our intention to proceed anyway pro- viding the Japanese were willing to negotiate a separate peace. 10. Mr. Malik evidently misunderstood the above statement and asked if the Japanese were to determine the procedure which would be adopted by the Allied Powers. Mr. Dulles said no, but that it was not our intention to coerce the Japanese into signing a treaty which would not be signed by all the nations on the Far Eastern Commission. He said that we had not yet made up our minds as to the procedure which should be adopted and that we would prob- ably do that after we had gotten the reactions of the other nations to our initial proposals. 11. Mr. Malik asked if we had yet received any answers to our proposals and on being informed that we had not said that he too would have to wait until after he had given further consideration to our proposals. 12. Mr. Dulles then said that he hoped very much that we would be able to produce a treaty which the Soviet Union and the United States could both sign and that he felt that if the Soviet Union were really desirous of tak- ing a step which would lead to a relaxation of the tensions -3-

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Page context
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    "ocrText": "7. Mr. Malik in reply merely stated that there\nwas no difference between the United States proposal and\nthe present situation since United States troops stationed\nin Japan after the treaty would be in effect the same as\nUnited States troops remaining in occupation.\n8. Mr. Malik then returned to the question of\nterritories and said that since the Surrender Terms speci-\nfied that the four main islands of Japan and \"other small\nislands\" as determined by the Allied Powers would remain\nunder Japanese sovereignty he failed to understand the\nUnited States proposal with regard to a trusteeship over\nthe Ryukyu and Bonin Islands since those islands were a\npart of the \"other small islands\" referred to in the Terms\nof Surrender. There had been express agreement regarding\nthe islands to be detached, i.c. Kuriles, Pescadores and\nFormosa. Mr. Dulles replied that our proposal was as set out in the\nmemorandum.\n9. Mr. Dulles said that it was our hope that\nthe treaty would be signed by all the nations represented\non the Far Eastern Commission but that if any failed to\nparticipate it was our intention to proceed anyway pro-\nviding the Japanese were willing to negotiate a separate\npeace.\n10. Mr. Malik evidently misunderstood the above\nstatement and asked if the Japanese were to determine the\nprocedure which would be adopted by the Allied Powers. Mr.\nDulles said no, but that it was not our intention to coerce\nthe Japanese into signing a treaty which would not be\nsigned by all the nations on the Far Eastern Commission.\nHe said that we had not yet made up our minds as to the\nprocedure which should be adopted and that we would prob-\nably do that after we had gotten the reactions of the\nother nations to our initial proposals.\n11. Mr. Malik asked if we had yet received any\nanswers to our proposals and on being informed that we had\nnot said that he too would have to wait until after he had\ngiven further consideration to our proposals.\n12. Mr. Dulles then said that he hoped very much\nthat we would be able to produce a treaty which the Soviet\nUnion and the United States could both sign and that he\nfelt that if the Soviet Union were really desirous of tak-\ning a step which would lead to a relaxation of the tensions\n-3-"
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