White House Press Release, Statement by President Harry S. Truman

INVEDIATE RELEASE IMMEDIATE RELEASE IMMEDIATE RELEASE November 2, 1952 THINK STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT **NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE In recent days, the position taken by the various departments of this Government in 1947, 1948 and 1949 with respect to the withdrawal of United States troops from Korea has been made the subject of partisan political debate. Many untrue accusations are being made with reference to the decision of this Government to withdraw our troops from Korea. In order that the public may have access to the facts, I have determined that a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, dated September 26, 1947, and its enclosure, which have hereto- fore been classified as Top Secret, should be declassified. Copies of these documents accordingly are attached to this statement. The significance of this memorandum of September 26, 1947, and its importance to the subsequent developments of our policy concerning Korea have been made clear in my statement of October 27, 1952. Follow- ing the military appraisal expressed in this memorandum, this Government proposed to the United Nations in 1947 that elections be held in Korea looking toward the establishment of a united Korea and the withdrawal of all occupation forces. A resolution to this effect was adopted at the General Assembly of the United Nations, November 14, 1947. This memorandum of September 26, 1947, was relied upon in the formulation of United States policy with respect to Korea in the National Security Council both in 1948 and in1949, when the entire situation was reviewed in the light of then existing conditions, and the decision to complete the withdrawal of United States troops was confirmed. At that time, as I pointed out in my statement of October twenty-seventh, the advice of our military establishment was that, in spite of the obvious risks, the withdrawal of United States troops was justified. I would not have released this document nor brought these facts before the public if the Republican candidate for President, who was Chief of Staff of the Army and a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1947, had not in his campaign misrepresented the contents of this memorandum and made intemperate and unjustified attacks upon the civilian agencies participating in our decisions with respect to Korea. Begin- ning in his speech of September twenty-second in Cincinnati, and on various occasions thereafter, culminating in his speech in Detroit on October twenty-fourth, the Republican candidate sought to create the false impression that our civilian officials were solely responsible for our decisions with respect to Korea and that they were guilty of blundering, if not of something worse. As I pointed out in my remarks in Cincinnati on October thirty-first, our decisions with respect to Korea, like many other decisions in our struggle for peace, involved both military and diplomatic factors and were reached through the honest cooperation of both military and civilian officials. False and malicious attacks upon the loyalty and judgment of either the military or civilian officials who were involved in these crucial decisions are inexcusable and a re extremely damaging to the proper conduct of the Government. As President, I feel it my duty to protect the men who are engaged in this crucial work from such attacks. In releasing these documents, I wish it understood that there is no intention to criticize the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the work of the military establishment in these critical matters. Indeed, I believe that releasing these documents will indicate the justification for their views. I hope that the release of these documents will set this controversy at rest, and will in some measure protect those who have not been able to protect themselves in this debate because of their official positions, and because of the secrecy classification which must necessarily cover a great deal of their work.