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TOP SECRET - 20 - The President interjected that the Russians were very skillful at this sort of thing. They knew how to hold long talks, while they went right ahead and did what they wanted to. He cited Soviet activi- ties in Hungary and Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries. Mr. Acheson recalled the situation in 1949, when the Russians asked England, France and the United States to delay setting up the Bonn Government while a four-power meeting was going on. We had been firm then and refused to delay. We must be firm again and keep moving forward. Mr. Acheson said that we should move along on an even course, making such agreements as we can with the Germans, and not delaying because of the possibility or actuality of four-power talks. We cer- tainly should not bring anything to a halt pending the outcome of talks with the Russians. Mr. Parodi said that if the four-power meeting were successful, we should all want to look again at the problem of arming Germany. Mr. Acheson said that he could not conceive of anything the Russians might suggest at a four-power meeting that really would be of any value. He could not foresee any Russian concession we could accept. Of course, if by some long chance, the Russians altered their entire present policy toward the West, obviously all of us would re- consider many of our policies. He would agree with Mr. Parodi on TRUMAN NATIONAL ARCHIVES & REVENUE RECORDS ADMIN." GOVERNMENT SEORE

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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n- 20 -\nThe President interjected that the Russians were very skillful\nat this sort of thing. They knew how to hold long talks, while they\nwent right ahead and did what they wanted to. He cited Soviet activi-\nties in Hungary and Bulgaria and other Eastern European countries.\nMr. Acheson recalled the situation in 1949, when the Russians\nasked England, France and the United States to delay setting up the\nBonn Government while a four-power meeting was going on. We had been\nfirm then and refused to delay. We must be firm again and keep moving\nforward. Mr. Acheson said that we should move along on an even course,\nmaking such agreements as we can with the Germans, and not delaying\nbecause of the possibility or actuality of four-power talks. We cer-\ntainly should not bring anything to a halt pending the outcome of\ntalks with the Russians.\nMr. Parodi said that if the four-power meeting were successful,\nwe should all want to look again at the problem of arming Germany.\nMr. Acheson said that he could not conceive of anything the\nRussians might suggest at a four-power meeting that really would be\nof any value. He could not foresee any Russian concession we could\naccept. Of course, if by some long chance, the Russians altered their\nentire present policy toward the West, obviously all of us would re-\nconsider many of our policies. He would agree with Mr. Parodi on\nTRUMAN\nNATIONAL\nARCHIVES &\nREVENUE\nRECORDS\nADMIN.\"\nGOVERNMENT\nSEORE"
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