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    "localId": "294549314",
    "label": "Memorandum from Charles Murphy to David Lloyd, David Bell, Richard Neustadt, George Elsey, and Kenneth Hechler, with Attachment",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum from Charles Murphy to David Lloyd, David Bell, Richard Neustadt, George Elsey, and Kenneth Hechler, with Attachment",
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    "seq": 13,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "- 12 -\nkeep their eyes and ears open and their powder dry. If this road\nis closed, then the choice for the Soviet leaders and for us lies\nbetween their enforced political and territorial retreat from their\npresent positions--either by their own action under external pressure\nor through an internal change--and a general war.\nThis does not necessarily mean that war is inescapable. It may\nwell be. But it should be, at least on our part, an act of desperate\nlast resort, and only after all honorable means of avading it are\nexhausted. If this is to be done, there are certain requirements that\nmust be met by the United States and by the free world as a whole.\nIncidentally, the same requirements are imposed upon us if the final\nsolution is to be war, irrespective of whether war results because the\nSoviet leaders are in fact communist crusaders or merely willful and\nambitious men, unwilling or unable to retreat from their present\npositions. These requirements may be summed up as follows:\n1. The American position on how far we are prepared to go and\nin what direction must be clearly and firmly formulated.\n2. A complete understanding must be reached between us and our\nprincipal allies.\n3. Adequate military strength must be created in the United\nStates and in the free world as a whole.\n4. Every effort must be made to convince the Soviet leaders\nthat they are, in fact, confronted by a superior force and a firm\ndetermination to use that force if necessary.\n5. While we should always be ready to talk to the Russians,\nwe must not expect any tangible results unless they take the initiative,\neither directly or indirectly, and offer convincing evidence that they\nmean business. Attempts on our part to initiate peace talks can at"
}