Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "334342264",
    "label": "National Security Council Report 73/3, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on  the Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/334342264"
}

{
    "id": "334342264",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/334342264",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "National Security Council Report 73/3, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on  the Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in the Light of the Korean Situation",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/334342264",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750645/750645-08-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750645/750645-08-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750645/750645-08-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 32,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/334342264",
    "naId": 334342264,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 22,
            "logicalDate": "1950-08-22",
            "month": 8,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 32,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750645/750645-08.pdf",
    "mediaId": "9265383f5b4741c7",
    "ocrText": "The President\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 73/3\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nTHE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES\nIN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\nAugust 22, 1950\nDECLASSIFIED\nWASHINGTON\nE. O. 11632, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC - letter, 5.572\nBy NLT ML , NARS Date 5.27.77\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 73/3\nTOP SECRET\nAugust 22, 1950\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES\nIN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\n-\nReferences: A. NSC 73 Series\nB. NSC Actions Nos. 337, 331, 315 and 308b\nC. Memos for the NSC from Executive Secretary,\nsame subject, dated August 9 and 16, 1950\nThe enclosed report on the subject, a revision of NSC 73/2,\nprepared by the NSC Staff in the light of reference Council\nactions and reports, is submitted herewith for consideration\nby the National Security Council and the Secretary of the Treas-\nury at the next regularly scheduled Council meeting on Thursday,\nAugust 24.\nIt is recommended that if the Council adopts the enclosure\nit be submitted to the President for consideration with the\nrecommendation that he approve the Conclusions contained therein\nand direct their implementation by all appropriate executive\ndepartments and agencies of the U. S. Government.\nIt is requested that special security precautions be taken\nin the handling of this report.\nJAMES S. LAY, Jr.\nExecutive Secretary\nCC: The Secretary of the Treasury\nDECLASSIFIED\nB. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC letter, 5.5.77\nNSC 73/3\nBy NLT HC , NARS Date 5.27.37 TOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nDRAFT\nREPORT BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nTHE POSITION AND ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES\nWITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FURTHER SOVIET MOVES\nIN THE LIGHT OF THE KOREAN SITUATION\nTHE PROBLEM\n1. To estimate possible further Soviet moves and assess and\nappraise the position and actions of the United States with respect\nthereto in the light of the Korean situation.\nANALYSIS\nIntroduction\n2. In determining our position and our actions in the present\ncrisis we must bear in mind that the fundamental objective of the\nUnited States is to maintain the integrity and vitality of its free\nsociety and the measure of world order necessary thereto. This in-\nvolves the willingness to fight for that objective if necessary.\nAlthough a global war has not necessarily begun in Korea and may\nnot eventuate, the U. S. has nevertheless been engaged in a crucial\nstruggle for some time involving political, economic and military\nfactors. As the aggressor continues his policy of expansion, we\nmust accept the possibility of local conflicts and must devise the\nright policies, diplomatic and military, to meet these aggressions.\nThe military capabilities of the United States are not adequate to\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nletter, 5:57\nBy NLT. ML NARS Date 5-27-77\nNSC 73/3\nTOP SECRET\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nits current commitments and responsibilities. As a deterrent, and\nalso in preparation for possible eventualities, the degree of our\nmilitary readiness should therefore be increased as a matter of the\nutmost urgency. We should also by means short of war build up the\nmilitary strength of the free world and step up the implementation\nof a political, economic, and psychological offensive against the\nUSSR.\n3. These actions which the United States with its allies\nshould now be taking to regain the initiative, to deter further ag-\ngression, and to increase our ability to defeat aggression, are not\nincluded in this report, although their critical importance should\nnot be overlooked. The present situation requires many such meas-\nures, some of which are now being undertaken. Others are under\nstudy and will be the subject of subsequent recommendations, includ-\ning those which will flow from NSC 68. These measures should be\ntaken regardless of future Soviet actions so long as the USSR re-\ntains its present capabilities and intentions to threaten the se-\ncurity of the United States.\nGeneral\n4. It is a tenet of communism that war between communist and\nnon-communist countries is inevitable. This conviction is a basic\npremise in the determination of Soviet policy, although history has\nshown that Russia can be influenced to delay action or retreat from\nlocal objectives if strongly opposed. The Kremlin is determined\nNSC 73/3\n- 2 --\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. mise 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nUD\nletter,\n55D\nBy NUT- HC NARS Date 5.27.17\nTOP SECRET\nfirst to protect and to preserve its regime in Russia and second to\npromote world communism. The USSR is the implacable enemy of the\nUnited States and the non-communist world. Therefore, the degrada-\ntion, weakening and ultimate destruction of the United States are\nessential to the attainment of the aims of the USSR.\n5. In assessing the danger of further aggressive moves directed\nby the USSR, it is essential to take into account estimated Soviet\nmilitary capabilities and, in so far as possible, to assess Soviet\nintentions. The USSR has the military capability to occupy any coun-\ntry on its periphery, to invade Western Europe and the Near and Mid-\ndle East, to make direct attacks upon the United Kingdom and Alaska\nand upon shipping, and to reinforce the communist military effort in\nthe Far East. The USSR also has the capability of initiating lim-\nited-scale air attacks on the United States and Canada. The USSR is\nnot, however, believed to have at the present time the capability of\npreventing the United States from carrying out an atomic attack. On\nthe other hand, the USSR may have the capability of reducing our in-\ndustrial potential. The USSR, by provoking insurrections and satel-\nlite armed actions simultaneously on many fronts, and without openly\ncommitting its own forces, would confront the United States and its\nallies with the following alternatives: abandoning positions of\nvital political and strategic importance, committing and dissipating\navailable strength on the many fronts chosen by the USSR, or under-\ntaking global war.\nNSC 73/3\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (B)\nasc letter, 5.5.77\nBy NUT. HC NARS Date 5-27-77\nTOP SECRET\n6. Given these capabilities, which have existed for some time\nand are progressively increasing, an attempt must be made, in the\nlight of the Korean situation, to analyze and evaluate further\npossible short-range moves by the USSR. This is a short-term\nanalysis which attempts to scan only a period two or three months\nahead, although the long-range possibilities cannot be ignored.\n7. The opening of hostilities in Korea could conceivably mean\nthat the Kremlin intends to embark on any one or a combination of\nthe following courses of action:\na. To initiate global war.\nb. To employ Soviet forces, alone or with satellite forces,\nin isolated or piecemeal attacks against local and limited ob-\njectives, not designed to bring on global war.\nc. To inspire further aggression using only satellite\nforces, but not using USSR armed forces.\nd. To probe U. S. determination and military effectiveness.\nPossibility of Global War\n8. It has been our estimate that the Kremlin did not intend to\nengage in a major war and might be deterred from initiating such a\nwar in the future if confronted with sufficient political, economic\nand military strength designed to force the retreat of Russian com-\nmunism. This estimate has not necessarily been invalidated by the\nevents of the past few weeks, which are consistent with the follow-\ning interpretation:\nNSC 73/3\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC\nOSD-letter, April 12, 1974 5-5-77\nNARS Date 5.27.77\nTOP SECRET\na. In causing the attack to be launched in Korea, the Krem-\nlin did not intend to bring about a global war and did not ex-\npect, although militarily prepared for, United States military\ninvolvement in Korea. The probable aim of the Kremlin was\nsimply to gain control of the entire Korean peninsula and thus\nto strengthen materially its strategic position in Northern\nAsia with global political and military results.\nb. The Kremlin seems to have calculated its moves with a\nview to keeping the responsibility of the Soviet Government un-\nengaged and its own military forces uncommitted.\n9. On the other hand, the events of the past few weeks could\nbe interpreted as the first phase of a general Soviet plan for global\nwar. Should the Kremlin in fact be desirous of or reconciled to a\nglobal war, of which the Korean situation is the first phase, the\nfollowing considerations might govern its actions in the near future:\na. The Kremlin might be disposed to forego any action which\nit calculated would provoke global war until such time as the\nUnited States had reached the point of maximum diversion and\nattrition of its forces-in-being without involvement of the\nmilitary forces of the Soviet Union, or until it had developed\nits atomic striking capabilities to the point which it deemed\ndesirable for a general attack on the West. As long as we are\nbeing forced to commit ever greater increments of our forces-\nin-being in Korea, the Kremlin might not hasten the outbreak of\nNSC 73/3\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC\n5-5-77\nI\nletter,\nBy NLT NC . NARS Date 5.27.77\nTOP SECRET\ngeneral hostilities since the USSR would be increasing its own\ncapabilities as those of the U. S. diminished. This could\nchange, however, at the point where the Kremlin estimated that\nour maximum weakness had been reached, and that further passage\nof time leading to the material strengthening of the relative\nposition and military posture of the United States would not\nwork to Soviet advantage.\nb. The Kremlin might undertake immediate and simultaneous\nattack in all possible theatres of action.\nC. Such attack could be accompanied or immediately fol-\nlowed by a direct attack upon the continent of North America,\nsince a Soviet attack upon United States territory as well\nas upon its armed forces abroad is a Soviet capability.\nd. In view of the advantages of surprise and of the desir-\nability for an enemy of the United States to strike a serious\nblow at the North American industrial potential, the possibil-\nity must be constantly borne in mind that the Kremlin might now\ndecide to initiate global war by a direct surprise attack upon\nthe territory of the United States before taking the actions\nreferred to in a or b above.\n10. Global war could come in one of three ways: (a) by Soviet\ndesign; (b) by a progression of developments growing out of the pres-\nent situation; or (c) by a miscalculation on the part of either the\nU.S. or the USSR. If there were evidence justifying the assumption\nNSC 73/3\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNR\nletter,\n5.5.77\nBy NLT. HC. NARS Date 5.27.77\nTOP SECRET\nof immediate global war by Soviet design, the only course for the\nUnited States would be full preparation at full speed. While not\nruling out the possibility that global war is imminent, it is not\nyet a sufficient certainty to be the assumption on which U. S. action\nshould be based. The present question is one of the degree of\npreparation we should undertake to improve our ability to meet any\nof the eventualities treated in this paper. Our efforts should be\nurgently directed toward preventing global war from developing and\ntoward increasing our war capabilities.\nIsolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces\nto Achieve Local Objectives not Designed to Bring on Global War\n11. USSR action in regard to Korea, and its employment of sat-\nellite forces there, should be regarded not as an isolated phenome-\nnon but possibly as part of a general plan which might involve cor-\nrelated action in other parts of the world. A danger of direct com-\nmitment of Soviet forces is in Korea itself where actual conflict is\nin progress between the United States and a Soviet satellite. A suc-\ncessful repulse of the North Korean invasion would not merely restore\nthe status quo. United States troops would be back in force in South\nKorea, and a build-up of military strength in certain of the non-\ncommunist areas of the Far East would have taken place.\n12. The Kremlin might be prepared to accept in varying degrees\nthe risks of a general conflict by launching local armed attacks in\norder to attain objectives regarded as of importance to the Soviet\nUnion. Without automatically starting global war by attacking Amer-\nNSC 73/3\n- 7 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNIC\n5.5.77\nletter,\nBy NLT NC NARS Date 5.27.77\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nE. O. NSC 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nletter,\n5.5.77\nBy NI.T. NC , NARS Date 5.27-77\nican troops or a country covered by the North Atlantic Treaty, the\nprincipal areas where actual Soviet forces could be employed for a\nlocal purpose are Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Greece, Afghanistan,\nPakistan, or Finland. In addition to any one or more of these\nlocal operations, the Soviets would still be capable of conducting\nwith surprise important operations simultaneously in Germany and\nAustria, in the Near, Middle and Far East, and against the United\nKingdom and the North American continent. Soviet forces are al-\nready deployed in sufficient strength to give them the military\ncapability to act in many areas. The following specific comments\napply to: Iran, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Finland, Afghanistan,\nand Pakistan.\na. In the case of Iran, it is possible but not proba-\nble that the Soviet Government would regard the risk of\ngeneral war as relatively small while at the same time the\nacquisition of the Near Eastern oil fields and the conse-\nquent domination of the European economy which would result,\nand the reduction of a threat to the Baku oil region of the\nSoviet Union, are important Soviet objectives. Overt USSR\nattack on Iran would in fact give rise to the risk of global\nwar.\nb. In the case of Turkey, the control of the Turkish\nStraits and the approaches to the eastern Mediterranean\nrepresent very important military considerations from the\npoint of view of Soviet defense as well as a traditional\nand deep-seated Russian objective. The denial of Soviet\nNSC 73/3\n-8-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC\nletter,\n5.5.77\nBy NLT HC , NARS Data 5.27.77\ncontrol of the Turkish Straits is vital to the security\ninterests of the United States. Therefore, a direct USSR\nattack on Turkey would involve serious risk of precipitating\nglobal war.\nC. In the case of Greece, the control of the Pelopon-\nnesus and the Greek Islands would present to the USSR very\nimportant military and political advantages. Geographically,\nGreece is a salient through the ring of non-communist states\nwhich enclose the Soviet hegemony, and its possession would\nprovide to the USSR access to the Mediterranean Sea as well\nas a strategic position with respect to the Eastern Medi-\nterranean, the Near East, and the Dardanelles. Direct USSR\nattack upon Greece would probably precipitate global war\nbecause of the political commitments and military and senti-\nmental associations of the United Kingdom and the United\nStates with Greece.\nd. Re-establishment of Soviet control over Yugoslavia\nwould bring definite military advantages to the USSR. At\nthe same time, the Kremlin would have to weigh the political\nadvantages of eliminating a dangerous source of communist\nheresy against the political disadvantages of a Soviet armed\nassault on a communist regime, which would tend to deepen\nrather than heal the disruptive effect of independent ten-\ndencies in the communist parties in the free world. Unless\nsuch an assault were quickly successful, the repercussions\nthroughout the foreign communist parties would be harmful\nNSC 73/3\n-9-\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC\nletter,\n5.5.77\nBy: NLT- , NARS Date 5.27.77\nto the Kremlin's prestige and control of the international\ncommunist movement. Success in Yugoslavia would enable the\ncommunists to renew guerrilla operations against Greece\nfrom Yugoslavia as well as from Bulgaria and Albania. Di-\nrect USSR attacks on Yugoslavia would include a risk of in-\nvolving the Western Powers and might lead to global war.\ne. Occupation of Finland, while completely within\nSoviet capabilities, would undoubtedly encounter fierce\nand continued Finnish guerrilla resistance, which might\nrender Finland less useful to the USSR for the immediate\nfuture than the present state of Soviet-Finnish relations.\nf. Afghanistan and Pakistan are of strategic value\nto the USSR because of their geographical position. Af-\nghanistan could be occupied with little effort. An attack\non Pakistan would require much more effort and would incur\nserious risk of global war because of Pakistan's member-\nship in the British Commonwealth.\n13. Unless the Kremlin is willing to accept global war it\nwill not commit Soviet armed forces to action in Germany and\nAustria.\nSoviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces\n14. The USSR might gain considerably from a policy of\ninitiation of piecemeal attacks by present or created satellite\nforces against Yugoslavia, Iran, Greece, Turkey, or other states\naround the Soviet periphery. Further, it might be distinctly\nto the political and military advantage of the USSR to involve\nNSC 73/3\n-10-\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nB. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC\n-\nSSD-letter,\n5-5-77\nBy NLT- HC , NARS Date 5.27.77\nthe allied nations progressively in conflict without a declaration\nof war on the part of the USSR or without commitment of its\nmilitary forces. Such action might leave the allies with the al-\nternative of fighting an undeclared war, or of being open to the\ncharge of aggression by initiating a declaration of war. None of\nthese areas is one in which the USSR particularly needs the advan-\ntage of surprise. Furthermore, the military and political capa-\nbilities of the USSR and its satellites are so great as to permit\nit to direct piecemeal action against isolated areas while still\nretaining the capability of strategic surprise. A progressive\nseries of piecemeal attacks from the periphery of the USSR would\nconfront the United States and its allies with the issue of global\nwar.\n15. It is presently estimated that Rumania, Bulgaria and\nHungary, collectively do not possess the capabilities for a suc-\ncessful assault on Asiatic Turkey, although they could overrun\nportions of European Turkey. Even with military assistance and\nleadership from the USSR comparable to that provided the North\nKoreans, it is estimated that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary could\nnot successfully attack Asiatic Turkey. A satellite attack on\nYugoslavia is a possibility. A resumption of fighting in Greece\nis also a possibility.\n16. The use of Polish and Czechoslovakian troops is always 8\nmilitary possibility in any action in Europe. However, withdrawal\nof large numbers of troops from Poland and Czechoslovakia might re-\nquire the employment of other forces to maintain the present\nNSC 73/3\n-11-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC\n5.5.77\nletter,\nBy BILT. HC , NARS Date 5.27.77 --\ncommunist regime.\n17. The use of the East German para-military forces\nagainst allied troops in Germany is another possibility. It is\ndoubtful that this force would undertake a direct attack on any\nof the western zones. Such an attack could not easily be under-\ntaken without directly involving the Soviet Union. If all or a\nlarge part of this force were sent into the western sectors of\nBerlin it might overcome the small forces of the western powers\nthere. Such overt action by the East German police force would\nagain be difficult without directly involving the Soviet\nmilitary authorities. The East German forces might be useful\nto the Soviet Union in connection with a blockade of Berlin.\n18. Further use of the Chinese communists, including the\nemployment of organized Chinese communist forces against South\nKorea and Southeast Asia, is a strong possibility. They are\nthe only satellite forces in Asia which could commit major acts\nof aggression. The Chinese communists are anxious to control\nFormosa (including the Pescadores) and have announced their de-\ntermination to do so regardless of U. S. decisions or actions.\nWhile an early attack on Formosa is a continuing possibility,\nits success would be doubtful unless accompanied by a collapse\nof the Nationalist forces and regime. The United States is\nproceeding with steps designed to enhance the defensive capa-\nbilities of the Chinese Nationalists (NSC 37/10).\n19. Chinese communist attack on the islands near China\nheld by the Nationalists can be expected to continue.\nNSC 73/3\n-12-\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC\nOilD\nletter,\n5.5.77\nBy NLT. WC . NARS Date 5.22.77\n20. Chinese communists, in addition to an attack on Formosa,\nhave the military capability to enter directly the Korean war\nand to initiate military action against Indochina or Burma or\nTibet. Any or all of these actions are possible. A move against\nTibet may be expected.\n21. Chinese communists have the military capability to\ncapture Macao and Hong Kong. Civil disorder, subversion, and\nsabotage, appear to be the more likely actions, particularly\nin Hong Kong, since these could in all probability eventually\nachieve the objective without military involvement.\n22. The capabilities of the Chinese communists outlined\nabove contribute to the over-all capabilities of the USSR since\nany major military success by these forces in the Far East, with\nthe consequent political results, adds security to the Soviet\neastern flank and lessens the probability that the Soviet may\nhave to fight on two fronts simultaneously.\n23. Considerable numbers of Japanese prisoners remain under\nSoviet control and constitute a potential for infiltration of\nJapan should conditions in that country invite such action. The\ndiversion of U. S. occupation forces from Japan to Korea, the\nlack of Japanese defense forces, and the inadequacy of Japanese\npolice, present a dangerous situation which must be kept under\nreview.\nProbable Non-Military Moves by the USSR\n24. The USSR will undoubtedly direct communist parties\nand stooge groups abroad to embarrass us in every eonceivable\nNSC 73/3\n-13-\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nE. O. 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNSC letter, 5-5-77\nBar MLT. HC , NARS Date 52777\nway. Intensified communist subversive or revolutionary activity\nmight fully engage local military resources throughout Asia, as\nwell as involve additional United States and allied military\nresources.\n25. The following examples will provide cases in point.\nCurrent conditions in Iran, though improving, still provide wide\nopportunities for subversive and communist infiltration, particu-\nlarly for attempted seizure of the government by the communist-\ndominated Tudeh Party. In addition, guerrilla operations fos-\ntered by the Soviets might be successful in Azerbaijan. The\ntesting of our firmness in other areas may take every form known\nto communist ingenuity. Provocations and annoyances may occur,\neven up to and including an attempt to reimpose the Berlin block-\nade or to blockade Vienna. If any weakness or hesitation on the\npart of the United States is encountered anywhere it will be in-\nstantaneously exploited by the communists to undermine confidence\nin and support of the United States everywhere.\n26. In addition, the USSR may well seek to create division\nin the UN membership with respect to the police action in Korea\nby playing upon hopes of a peaceful settlement, creating the im-\npression that major concessions to the UN position may be forth-\ncoming, or even by offering such concessions in a context in which\nthe USSR would gain substantial though perhaps not immediately\nobvious advantages if such a settlement were made. If the UN\nforces were to be dislodged from the peninsula the theme of\naccepting a fait accompli would certainly be played for all it\nNSC 73/3\n-14-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nis worth. It is also to be anticipated that the USSR will make\nevery effort to exploit the division between the United States\nand other non-communist powers on the issue of Formosa. In\ngeneral there will also no doubt be a continuance of the peace\noffensive designed both to divide the U. S. and its allies and\nto create in the latter domestic division between elements\ndetermined to resist Soviet aggression and elements which lack\nsuch determination. The United States must also be alert to\nthe possibilities of sabotage and subversion in this country.\nDECLASSIFIED\nB. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nNCT\nOur\nletter,\n5-5-77\n4a alr. NARS Date 52777\nNSC 73/3\n-15-\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nCONCLUSIONS\nE. O. NCT 11652, letter, Sec. 3(E) 5-5-77 and S(D) or (2)\nPart I\nBy NLT. NARS Date 5.27.77\nPossible Further Soviet Moves\nin the Immediate Future\nPossibility of Global War\n27. Since 1945 the USSR has continued materially to increase\nits capability to wage global war. Even though there is no conclu-\nsive indication that the USSR intends to launch a global war at this\ntime, the danger of Soviet resort to war, either deliberately or by\nmiscalculation, may have been increased by the Korean war. Even an\nimmediate solution of the Korean crisis would not obviate this dan-\nger.\nIsolated Use of Soviet Forces Alone or With Satellite Forces\nto Achieve Local Objectives not Designed to Bring on Global War\n28. There is as yet no conclusive evidence that the Soviet\nGovernment has or has not decided to commit its forces, alone or\nwith satellite forces, in isolated or piecemeal attacks against\nlocal and limited objectives, without intending to bring on global\nwar. However, if a decision should be made to use USSR forces in\nthis manner, action could be taken with varying degrees of risk in\nany of the following areas: Finland, Korea, the Near and Middle\nEast, and the Balkans.\nSoviet-Inspired Aggression Using Satellite Forces\n29. Use of European and Asiatic satellite military forces\nagainst a variety of objectives is a possibility for the immediate\nfuture.\nNSC 73/3\nTOP SECRET\n-16-\nDECLASSIFIED\nL.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (ii)\nTOP SECRET\nNSC\nGSD letter, 5.5.71\nthe MLT HC , NARS Date 5.27.77\na. An immediate possibility is the use of Chinese commun-\nist forces in Korea and against Formosa. The prevention of an\ninvasion of Formosa is primarily the responsibility of CINCFE\nemploying the United States Seventh Fleet and appropriate air\nforces. The success of an early attack on Formosa would be\ndoubtful unless accompanied by the collapse of the Nationalist\nforces and regime.\nb. In addition, depending upon developments in the world\nsituation, the USSR might inspire aggression by satellite forces\nagainst Western Germany (including Berlin), Austria, Yugoslavia,\nGreece, Turkey, Tibet, Burma, Indochina, Hong Kong, and Macao.\nProbable Non-Military Moves by the USSR\n30. We must also expect a variety of Soviet efforts to achieve\nvictories by subversive action and tactical maneuvers in the \"peace\noffensive\" to keep us off balance, to divert our attention, to waste\nour resources, to test our firmness, and to split the free world.\nPart II\nU.S. Actions to Counter Further\nSoviet Moves in the Immediate Future\nGeneral\n31. The Korean war is only an additional and more acute mani-\nfestation of the chronic world situation resulting from the Kremlin\ndesign for world domination through the international communist con-\nspiracy. This situation requires many measures designed to enable\nthe free world to regain the initiative, to deter further aggression,\nNSC 73/3\nTOP SECRET\n-17-\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nB. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (B)\nNSC\nletter,\nBy NARS Date 5.22.77\nand to increase ability to defeat aggression if it occurs. Some of\nthese measures are now being undertaken. Others are under study and\nwill be the subject of subsequent recommendations, including those\nwhich will follow from NSC 68. These measures should be taken regard.\nless of future Soviet action so long as the USSR retains its present\ncapabilities and intention to threaten the security of the United\nStates.\n32. The United States should as rapidly as possible increase\nthe build-up of its military and supporting strength in order to\nreach at the earliest possible time and maintain for as long as neces-\nsary a level of constant military readiness adequate to support U.S.\nforeign policy, to deter Soviet aggression, and to form the basis for\nfighting a global war should war prove unavoidable. The program for\nthe increased military stature and preparedness of the U.S. should\nproceed without regard to possible temporary relaxation of inter-\nnational tension and without regard to isolated instances of aggres-\nsion unless the latter provide evidence of the imminence of war,\nwhich would call for full preparation at full speed.\n33. The United States should urgently press forward to obtain,\nthrough appropriate channels, knowledge or understandings as to the\nwillingness of United Nations members to hold Russia responsible at\na proper time within the structure of the United Nations, for satel-\nlite aggression.\n34. Pending the fundamental policy decisions, now under study,\non which U.S. action to meet further Soviet moves should be based,\nthe United States should take the action set forth in the following\nNSC 73/3\nTOP SECRET\n-18-\nTOP SECRET\nparagraphs in response to such further Soviet or Soviet-inspired\nmoves as may occur in the next two or three months.\nUSSR or Soviet-Inspired Aggression\n35. In the event of an overt attack by organized USSR\nmilitary forces against the territory or armed forces of the\nUnited States, the immediate action of the United States should\nbe to react to the attack in accordance with existing directives,\nand to proceed with full preparation at full speed to meet the\nsituation created. In the event of any attack covered by the\nterms of the North Atlantic Treaty, which includes attack in\nGermany and Austria, the United States would respond in accord-\nance with its obligations under that Treaty.\n36. In case of other overt aggression by organized USSR\nmilitary forces, or in case of further Soviet-inspired aggression\nin Europe, and depending upon the nature of the aggression and\nthe country attacked, the United States in common prudence would\nhave to proceed on the assumption that global war is probably\nimminent. Accordingly, recognizing that its response will vary\nwith circumstances and should be subject to the specific con-\nsideration of detailed cases set forth in paragraph 37 below,\nthe United States should immediately:\na. Make every effort in the light of the circumstances\nto localize the action, to stop the aggression by political\nmeasures and to ensure the unity of the free world if war\nnevertheless follows. These measures should include direct\ndiplomatic action and resort to the United Nations with the\nobjectives of:\nDECLASSIFIED\nE, O. NSC 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (1)\nletter,\nNSC 73/3\nBy MLT NARS Date 5-27-77 TOP SECRET\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET\n(1) In the case of Soviet-inspired overt aggres-\nsions, accelerating measures to identify the true source\nof the aggression in order that at a time most advan-\ntageous to the United States, the Soviet Union itself\ncould be exposed as the aggressor.\n(2) Making clear to the world United States prefer-\nence for a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon\nwhich the United States would, in concert with other\nmembers of the United Nations, accept such a settlement.\n(3) Consulting with members of the United Nations\nregarding their willingness to join with the United\nStates in military opposition, if necessary, to the\naggression.\nIn addition, the United States should give consideration to the\npossibility of a direct approach to the highest Soviet leaders.\nb. Consult with selected allies to perfect coordination\nof plans.\nC. Place itself in the best possible position to meet\nthe eventuality of global war, and therefore prepare to\nexecute emergency war plans; but should, in so far as it has\nany choice, enter into full-scale hostilities only at the\nmoment and in the manner most favorable to it in the light\nof the situation then existing.\nd. While minimizing United States military commitments\nin areas of little strategic significance, take action with\nreference to the aggression to the extent and in the manner\nbest contributing to the implementation of United States\nDECLASSIFIED\nO. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (2)\nNSC\nNSC 73/3\nOSD letter, 5.15.77\nTOP SECRET\n- 20 - By NLT- , NARS Date 5.27.77\nTOP SECRET\nnational war plans.\n37. Specific immediate actions to be taken in general\naccordance with paragraph 36:\na. In the event of overt attack by organized USSR\nmilitary forces against:\n(1) Finland or Afghanistan: The United States\nshould itself take no military action in these countries\nto oppose the aggression. The emphasis of the action\ntaken would be placed upon political and psychological\nmeasures, which, in the case of Afghanistan would include\nefforts to induce Pakistan and India to take a leading\nrole.\n(2) Yugoslavia: The United States should imple-\nment existing policy (NSC 18/4) pending a review of\nthat policy, with the purpose of denying to the USSR\neffective control of this country.\n(3) Greece or Turkey: The United States should\nprovide accelerated military assistance to Greece or\nTurkey and deploy such United States forces to the\nsupport of those countries as can be made available\nwithout jeopardizing United States national security.\nIn the case of Turkey the United States should urge\nthe United Kingdom and France to give full support under\nthe Anglo-French-Turkish mutual assistance pact, and\nshould make every effort to obtain the support of Tur-\nkey by the Moslem world including Pakistan.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) - (A)\nNC OSD letter, 5.5.77 1974\nNSC 73/3\nBy N.T. LT.HC NARS Date 5.27.77 TOP SECRET\n- 21 -\nTOP SECRET\n(4) Iran: The United States should initially\nrely on the United Kingdom for principal responsibility\nto assist Iran in meeting the aggression, should en-\ndeavor to induce Pakistan and India to take a leading\nrole, and should deploy such forces to the Near and\nMiddle East and the Persian Gulf areas as can be made\navailable without jeopardizing United States security\nor its ability to implement emergency war plans.\nb. In the event of Soviet inspired satellite aggres-\nsion against Yugoslavia or Greece the United States should\ntake the same action as if the attack were directly by\nSoviet forces, as called for in sub-paragraphs (2) and (3)\nunder a. above.\n38. In the event of any new single overt act of aggression\nby Soviet satellite armed forces in the Far East, the United\nStates, subject to specific consideration of detailed cases set\nforth in paragraphs 39-41 below, should:\na. Attempt to localize the conflict.\nb. Take all possible countermeasures short of seriously\nimpairing the ability to execute emergency war plans.\nC, Seek the support of its allies and take appropriate\nsteps in the UN.\nd. Concurrently recognize the increased strain on\nthe fabric of world peace arising from a further act of\naggression following on the Korean episode.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O, NSC 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nOSD letter, 5:577\nNSC 73/3\nBar INSULT AC , NARS Date 5.27.77 TOP SECRET\n- 22 -\nTOP SECRET\n39. Formosa. Specific actions to be taken in general\naccordance with paragraph 38: In the event of a Chinese Communist\nattack on Formosa or the Pescadores, the United States should re-\npel the assault in accordance with existing directives but should\nnot permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist\nChina. In any event, U. S. ground forces should not be committed\non Formosa. In the event the Chinese Communists succeed in de-\nfeating the Chinese Nationalist forces, the United States, bearing\nin mind its desire to avoid general war with Communist China,\nshould review the situation to determine its further action and\nto decide whether to cease all military operations against the\nChinese Communists.\n40. Korea. Specific actions to be taken in general accord-\nance with paragraph 38:\na. In the event that North Korean forces, alone or\nplus such reinforcements as may covertly be brought into\naction, are powerful enough to compel the withdrawal of UN\nforces Korea;\n(1) The South Korean Government should be evacuated\nfrom the Korean mainland and established at an appro-\npriate place in the area, if practicable.\n(2) The United States should, while preparing for\nthe possible consequences, and at the time most advan-\ntageous to it, seek to secure agreement in the UN on\ncharging the USSR with direct responsibility for the\naction of its satellite. The United States should then\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. NSC 11652. Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (ii)\nNSC 73/3\nletter, 5.805.77\nTOP SECRET\n- 23 - By NLT He NARS Date 5-27-77\nTOP SECRET\nmake every effort to concert its actions with the UN,\nwithout prejudicing its inherent right to act in self-\ndefense either individually or collectively under Art.\n51 of the Charter.\n(3) If the UN fails to hold the USSR responsible\nfor the aggression of the North Koreans, no further\naction should be taken at that time to regain Korea,\npending a review of the situation.\n(4) If the UN decision holds the USSR responsible\nfor the aggression of the North Koreans, the United\nStates should:\n(a) make clear to the world its preference\nfor a peaceful settlement and the conditions upon\nwhich the United States would, in concert with\nother members of the United Nations, accept such\na settlement.\n(b) recognizing the increased strain on the\nfabric of world peace, take all possible counter-\nmeasures, short of seriously impairing ability to\nexecute emergency war plans, to continue to local-\nize the conflict and to induce the withdrawal of\nthe aggressors, possibly including a direct approach\nto the highest Soviet leaders.\n(c) prepare to execute emergency war plans,\nbut, in so far as it has any choice, enter into\nfull-scale hostilities only at the moment and in\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (R)\nNSC 73/3\nNSC OSD letter. 5.5.77\n- 24 - Be M.T. He NARS Date 5.27.77 TOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe manner most favorable to it in the light of\nthe situation then existing.\nb. In the event of the overt use of organized Chinese\nCommunist forces in Korea:\n(1) The United States should not permit itself to\nbecome engaged in a general war with Communist China.\n(2) As long as action by UN military forces now\ncommited or planned for commitment in Korea offers a\nreasonable chance of successful resistance, such action\nshould be continued and extended to include authority\nto take appropriate air and naval action outside Korea\nagainst Communist China. The latter action should be\ncontinued pending a review of U. S. military commitments\nin the light of conditions then existing to determine\nfurther U. S. courses of action.\n(3) If the withdrawal of the UN forces from\nKorea becomes necessary as a result of Chinese Communist\nintervention the United States should take the actions\nset forth in sub-paragraph a (1), (2), (3), and (4) of\nthis paragraph, as applicable.\n41. Other Far Eastern Areas. Specific actions to be taken\nin general accordance with paragraph 38:\na. In the event of Chinese communist aggression against\nChinese inshore islands, Tibet, or Macao, the United States\nshould take political action but would not expect to take\nmilitary action.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nNSC OSD letter, 5.5.77\nNSC 73/3\nBy MLT- Ac NARS Date 5-27-77 TOP SECRET\n- 25 -\nTOP SECRET\nb. If such aggression were directed against Burma, the\nUnited States acting through the British, should accelerate\nits assistance to that government and endeavor to induce\nstates in the neighborhood of Burma to commit ground forces\nto resist the aggression.\nC. If such aggression were directed against Hong Kong\nthe United States should consider furnishing relief assistance\nto the British and such military assistance as may be appro-\npriate in the light of our own military commitments and\ncapabilities at that time.\nd. In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese\ncommunist forces against Indochina, the United States should\nnot permit itself to become engaged in a general war with\nCommunist China but should, in concert with the U. K., support\nFrance and the associated states, and accelerate and expand\nthe present military assistance program.\nNon-Military Moves by the USSR\n42. Berlin Blockade. In the event the USSR re-imposes the\nBerlin blockade, the United States should react at once since the\nmaintenance of our position in Berlin is of great importance to\nthe interests of the United States. The matter should be immediately\nreferred to the United Nations. Although the re-establishment of\nthe full-scale airlift would be militarily unsound and is impracti-\ncable under present conditions, a partial airlift should be\nestablished by the United States, the United Kingdom, and any\nother states able and willing to contribute pending the completion\nof a study now under way regarding the DECLASSIFIED measures to be taken to meet\nE, O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and S(D) or (E)\nNSC OSD letter, 5:577\nNSC 73/3\n- 26 - By MLT. HC , NARS Date 522-77-OP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nsuch a situation.\n43. Vienna Blockade. In the event the USSR should impose\na blockade of Vienna, the establishment of a full-scale airlift\nwould be militarily unsound and is impracticable under present\nconditions. The United States should implement existing policy\n(NSC 38/6) to the extent feasible, utilizing a partial airlift\nto be established by the United States., the U. K., and and any\nother nations able and willing to contribute.\n44. Iran. In the event of internal subversion leading\ntoward the establishment of a communist-dominated government in\nIran, the United States should:\na. Accelerate its assistance to the legitimate Iranian\nGovernment.\nb. Consider seeking an agreement in the UN on charging\nthe USSR with direct responsibility for conditions in Iran.\nC. Endeavor to induce neighboring states to commit\nground forces to assist the legitimate Iranian Government.\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) $ (ii)\nNSC OSD letter, 5.577\nBy MLT. NC NARS Date 5.22.77\n.\nNSC 73/3\nTOP SECRET\n- 27 -\nTOP SECRET\nNSC"
}