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    "title": "National Security Council Report 112, Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense on Formulation of a United States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments",
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    "ocrText": "The President MLT(PSF/NSC)977\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 112\nCOPY NO. 1\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE\nHARRY S.TRUMAN ARCHIVES \"NATIONAL RECORDS AND LIBRARY\non\nU.S. GOVERNMENT\nFORMULATION OF A UNITED STATES POSITION WITH RESPECT\nTO THE REGULATION, LIMITATION AND BALANCED REDUCTION\nOF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS\nJuly 6, 1951\nWASHINGTON\nDECLASSIFIED\n2.15.79\nAC NARS, Date 4-17-79\nTOP SECRET\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNSC 112\nTOP SECRET\nJuly 6, 1951\nNOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\nto the\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\non\nFORMULATION OF A UNITED STATES POSITION\nWITH RESPECT TO THE REGULATION, LIMITATION AND\nBALANCED REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS\nReferences: A. NSC 79\nB. Senior NSC Staff Project, \"Conditions\nfor a Peaceful Settlement With the\nUSSR\", listed in the current NSC\nStatus of Projects\nThe enclosed memorandum by the Secretaries of State and Defense and\nits attached report on the subject, prepared pursuant to Reference\nB by a State-Defense working group as part of the NSC 79 project,\nare submitted herewith at their request for consideration by the\nNational Security Council and will be scheduled on the agenda of an\nearly Council meeting.\nAttention is invited to the fact that the enclosure recommends that:\na. The basic principles contained in paragraph 6, Part V and the\n\"Conclusions\" contained in paragraph 7, Part VI. of the attached re-\nport, be approved as the basis for the development of detailed\nUnited States positions for use in any negotiations which may be\nundertaken in connection with a proposal for a system of regulation,\nlimitation and balanced reduction of armaments and armed forces; and\nb. In the event of the approval of the enclosure as recommended\nabove, an interdepartmental group, representing appropriate depart-\nments and agencies, be established to develop such detailed United\nStates positions.\nAccordingly, it is recommended that, if the above recommendations\nare adopted, the enclosed report be submitted to the President for\nconsideration with the recommendation that he approve the above\nrecommendations and direct their implementation by all appropriate\nexecutive departments and agencies of the U. S. Government under\nthe coordination of the Secretary of State.\nJAMES S. LAY, JR.\nExecutive Secretary\ncc: The Secretary of the Treasury\nThe Director of Defense Mobilization\nNSC 112\nTOP SECRET\nTEP SECRET\nCOPY\nJuly 6, 1951\nMEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY.\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nSUBJECT: Report to the National Security Council on\nthe Formulation of a United States Position\nwith Respect to the Regulation, Limitation\nand Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and\nArmaments.\nThere is forwarded herewith a report on the \"Formulation of a\nUnited States Position with Respect to the Regulation, Limitation\nand Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments\". This report\nwas prepared by a State-Defense working group, and has received the\napproval of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and\nthe Joint Chiefs of Staff.\nTt is requested that this report be submitted for early consid-\neration by the National Security Council. It is essential that the\nUnited States Government come to a formulation of its policy for the\nregulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and\narmaments, including disclosure and verification of such armed\nforces and armaments, for two reasons:\n(1) As a result of the President's address to the United Na-\ntions on October 24, 1950, the United Nations is at work\nputting together its Commission on Conventional Armaments\nand its Commission on Atomic Energy. At the next session\nof the General Assembly this subject will inevitably be an\nactive one and it is important that the United States\nshould maintain its leadership and initiative. In this\nconnection we must also expect either that the U.S.S.R.\nmay put forward some disarmament proposals for which we\nshould be prepared, or that groups in Congress, now ac-\ntive, may advance proposals.\n(2) It may well be desirable, possibly before the next session\nof the General Assembly of the United Nations, and possib-\nly in connection with other proposals for the solution of\nEast-West problems in Europe and Asia, as contemplated in\nthat part of the NSC 79 project dealing with the develop-\nment of conditions for a peaceful settlement with the\nNSC 112\n- 1 -\nTOP SECRET\nSECRET\nUSSR. for the United States publicly to put forward pro-\nposals relating to the regulation, limitation and bal-\nanced reduction of armed forces and armaments.\nTherefore it is deemed important that the National Security\nCouncil give this matter urgent study. The attached report is\nsubmitted as a basis on which the United States can formulate its\npolicy and prepare proposals.\nIn the event of approval by the National Security Council of\nthis report as a basis for such proposals, it is recommended that\nan inter-departmental group, representing appropriate departments\nand agencies of the Government, be established to develop detailed\nUnited States positions for use in any negotiations which may be\nundertaken pursuant to the proposals.\n/S/ DEAN ACHESON\nThe Secretary of State\n/S/ G. C. MARSHALL\nThe Secretary of Defense\nInclosure - 1\nDUMAN\nAND LIBRARY\nNSC 112\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nREPORT OF THE STATE-JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF WORKING GROUP\nON THE FORMULATION OF A BASIS FOR U. S. POSITIONS\nTO BE TAKEN VIS-A-VIS U.S.S.R.\nI. The Problem\n1. Under its terms of reference, the State-Joint Chiefs of\nStaff Working Group was directed to study two problems: (1) a\nbasis for the U. S. position on the matter of disclosure and veri-\nfication of armed forces and armaments, including the criteria for\nverification which the U. S. would require and permit; (2) the man-\nner in which the existing level of armed forces and armaments can\nbest be presented in its relation to the causes of international\ntensions in Europe.\nII. Purpose\n2. The purpose of this study is the establishment of a founda-\ntion upon which positions may be built which would, if accepted by\nthe Soviet Union, be acceptable to the U. S. or, if rejected by the\nSoviet Union, be advantageous to the U. S. and the Western Powers\nfor their propaganda value. The urgency of establishing such a\nfoundation arises in large measure as a result of the meetings now\nbeing held in Paris preliminary to a possible Council of Foreign\nMinisters meeting of the U. S., USSR, U. K. and France.\nIII. Nature of the Report\n3. The study of the Working Group is contained in two papers\nattached hereto as Annexes \"A\" and \"B\". Annex \"A\" deals with the\nproblem of disclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments\nNSC 112\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nand Annex \"B\" deals with the presentation of material relating to\nthe existing level of armed forces and armaments in relation to the\ncauses of international tensions in Europe.\nIV. The Working Group and its Consultation with Other Agencies\n4. At the State-Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting of 15 March\n1951, it was agreed that a Working Group from the Department of\nState and from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization would be\ndirected to study the problems described above and to report to\nthe State-Joint Chiefs of Staff conferees on these matters. In\naddition to the four members originally designated, the Working\nGroup invited Mr. Frank Nash of the Office of the Secretary of\nDefense to participate in the study, and he has attended most of\nthe meetings. Mr. Nash is also the U. S. Representative on the\nU. N. Commission on Conventional Armaments, and has a broad knowl-\nedge of the field under study.\n5. As authorized by its terms of reference, the Working Group\nhas consulted with the Atomic Energy Commission /AEC/ and the Cent-\nral Intelligence Agency /CIA7 and through the latter with the in-\ntelligence branches of the various departments and agencies which\nparticipate in the work of the CIA. Consultation with the AEC was\narranged through Mr. LeBaron and the Military Liaison Committee and\nthe Working Group had assistance from Brigadier General Herbert B.\nLoper and Brigadier General Alvin R. Luedecke in this matter. Con-\nsultation with the CIA was arranged through Mr. Paul H. Nitze and\nNSC 112\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe Working Group was able to discuss the problem at length with\nvarious CIA officials. Material secured as a result of such con-\nsultations is on file in the Department of State and in the Joint\nChiefs of Staff Secretariat.\nV. Basic Principles with Respect to the Regulation\nof Armaments and Armed Forces\n6. In their approach to the problem, the Working Group recog-\nnized that a system of disclosure and verification is but one facet\nof the larger problem of the regulation of armaments and armed\nforces. The Working Group agreed to the following principles as\nessential to the establishment of a basis for the development of\nUnited States positions on the matter:\na. In the light of the present world situation the secur-\nity interests of the United States demand that the first step\nin the field of regulation of armaments and armed forces be\nachievement of international agreement on at least the general\nprinciples involved;\nb. International control of atomic energy is inseparably\nrelated to international regulation of armed forces and all\nother forms of armaments; and\nc. The international control of atomic energy must be\nbased on the United Nations Plan or some no less effective\nplan.\nNSC 112\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP\nVI. Conclusions\n7. Subject to the acceptance of the basic principles outlined\nin Section v, above, the Working Group has concluded that:\na. A system of disclosure and verification of armed forces\nand armaments logically would be the first step in the imple-\nmentation of an agreed international program for the regula-\ntion, limitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and\narmaments;\nb. The system of disclosure and verification must be on\na continuing basis;\nc. Disclosure and verification should be applicable to\nall armaments, including atomic, and all types of armed forces\nincluding para-military, security, and police forces;\nd. To protect the security interests of the U. S., dis-\nclosure and verification should be carried out stage by stage,\nwith appropriate provisions for proceeding to the next stage\nonly when previous stages have been satisfactorily concluded;\ne. To protect the security interests of the U. S., dis-\nclosure and verification should begin with the relatively\nless sensitive information and proceed to the information\nwhich is more sensitive:\n(1) With respect to atomic energy, the phasing might\nstart first with raw materials, proceed to processing\nplants and facilities for producing fissionable materials\nand finally include weapons and weapon fabrication facil-\nities;\nNSC 112\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n(2) With respect to armed forces and other weapons,\nthe phasing should probably begin with a count of police,\nsecurity, and para-military forces (including their re-\nserve components) together with the types and amounts of\ntheir materiel in service and in reserve, and proceed to\ninspection of regular army, navy, and air forces together\nwith the types and amounts of their materiel in service\nand reserve;\nf. A program for the regulation, limitation and balanced\nreduction of armed forces and armaments (including internation-\nal control of atomic energy), of which disclosure and verifica-\ntion would be a step, could not depend in the foreseeable fu-\nture on the existence of an international force separate and\napart from national armed forces, and therefore should not in-\nvolve the balanced reduction of existing armed forces and arm-\naments to the level which the mere maintenance of internal\nsecurity would require;\ng. Under a program for the regulation, limitation and bal-\nanced reduction of armed forces and armaments (including inter-\nnational control of atomic energy), the United States must un-\nder present world conditions rely on the willingness of the\nparticipating nations to continue the plan or on the capabil-\nity and willingness of the United States and states cooperat-\ning with it to deal with violations if any occur;\nNSC 112\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOD SECRET\nh. Because of the complexity of the matter and since no\nempirical formula has yet been devised for the determination\nof national armed forces to which nations will agree, it prob-\nably will be necessary, prior to the implementation of any part\nof the program which has to do with the actual regulation, lim-\nitation or reduction of armed forces or armaments, to develop\nthe precise nature of the program and to reach agreement re-\ngarding the program by detailed negotiations;\ni. A program should call for the regulation, limitation\nand balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments to a\nlevel which would decrease substantially the possibility of\na successful initial aggression and thereby increase the\nchances that armed aggression would not be resorted to in\nfurtherance of national objectives;\ni. If armed force can be so limited that resort to its\nuse as an instrument of national policy would be much less\nlikely, the conflict between the intentions of the West and\nthe Soviet orbit might be resolved through other means;\nk. A program for the regulation, limitation and balanced\nreduction of armed forces and armaments should be open for\nadherence to all states and initially it must include those\nstates whose military resources are so substantial that their\nabsence from the program would endanger it. In any event, the\nSoviet European satellites and Communist China must be included;\n1. A program for the regulation, limitation and balanced\nreduction of armed forces and armaments would have to provide\nNSC 112\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nfor the administration of adequate safeguards by competent\ninternational authority with appropriate status, rights and\npowers.\nm. A proposal for an international system of phased dis-\nclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments,\nincluding atomic, as the first step in implementation of a\nprogram for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction\nof armed forces and armaments (including international control\nof atomic energy), with adequate safeguards, would be advan-\ntageous to the United States if accepted by the USSR and would\nbe advantageous to the United States for its propaganda value\neven if rejected by the USSR.\nn. Data on existing levels of armed forces and armaments\ncan be presented to indicate the relation of such levels of\narmed forces and armaments to the causes of international ten-\nsions in Europe.\nVII. Recommendations\n8. It is the recommendation of the Working Group that:\na. This study be forwarded by the Department of State-\nJoint Chiefs of Staff Conferees, through appropriate channels,\nto the National Security Council for consideration as the basis\nfor the development of a United States position on regulation,\nlimitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and arma-\nments, including disclosure and verification of military\nNSC 112\n- 9 -\nTOR SECRET\nSECRET\nforces; and for the manner of presentation of the level of\narmaments in its relation to causes of existing international\ntensions in Europe; and\nb. The Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Confer-\nees recommend to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of\nDefense, respectively, that in the event of approval of this\nstudy an interdepartmental group, representing appropriate\ndepartments and agencies of the Government, be established\nto develop detailed United States positions for use in any\nnegotiations which may be undertaken in connection with a\nproposal for a system of regulation, limitation and balanced\nreduction of armaments and armed forces.\nNSC 112\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nANNEX \"A\"\nTHE QUESTION OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION OF ARMED FORCES\nAND ARMAMENTS AND THE FORMULATION OF A BASIS FOR U.S.\nPOSITIONS TO BE TAKEN VIS-A-VIS U.S.S.R.\nI. Introduction\n1. The discussions at the preliminary conference of deputies\nin Paris convened to arrive at an agreed agenda for a Four Power\nForeign Ministers Conference point up the need for a development\nof U. S. positions on a number of outstanding issues. These issues\ninclude such specific political questions as Germany and Austria as\nwell as the general causes of tension in Europe. The excessive size\nof the armed forces of the Soviet Union and its satellites is symp-\ntomatic of these tensions. The wide range of these issues indicates\nthat the U. S. will be confronted with the necessity of developing\nbroad proposals with respect to armed forces and armaments in order\nto assist in the possible settlement of specific political issues.\nII. Object\n2. The object of this Annex is to establish a basis for the\nU. S. position on the matter of disclosure and verification of\narmed forces and armaments, including the criteria for verification\nwhich the U. S. would require and permit.\nIII. Purpose\n3. The purpose of this Annex is the establishment of a founda-\ntion upon which positions may be built which would, if accepted by\nthe Soviets, be acceptable to the U. S., or if rejected by the So-\nviets, be advantageous to the U. S. and the Western Powers for their\npropaganda value.\nIV. Facts Bearing on the Problem\n4. This Government has formally supported proposals for a\n\"one-time\" census and verification of armed forces and conventional\narmaments. The U. N. resolution embodying such proposals treated\ncensus and verification as necessary first steps toward regulation,\nlimitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.\nThis resolution, however, was vetoed in the Security Council by the\nU.S.S.R..\nNSC 112\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n5. While the U. S. has not advanced specific proposals for\nthe regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces\nand non-atomic armaments, the President reaffirmed this Government's\nsupport of this general principle in his address to the General As-\nsembly of the U. N. on 24 October 1950.\n6. This Government has advanced and supported in the U. N.\nspecific proposals for the international control and regulation of\natomic energy which, when fully implemented, would make effective\nthe elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments. These\nproposals were embodied in what has come to be known as the U. N.\nPlan. This Plan, though vetoed by the U.S.S.R. in the Security\nCouncil, was approved by an overwhelming majority of the members\nof the United Nations.\nV. Aspects of the Problem of Inspection and Verification\n7. The proposals formulated by the U. S. and introduced in\nthe U. N. relating to census and verification of conventional arma-\nments and armed forces contemplated reports by each participating\nnation as of an agreed date. Such reports were to cover (a) the\nregular armed forces, military and para-military forces subject to\nnational control, such as border guards, internal security forces,\nmilitia and gendarmerie, as well as reserve components of those\nforces in organized groups; and (b) categories of materiel, in ser-\nvice and in reserve, necessary to provide adequate knowledge of the\nexisting level of conventional armaments. Materiel in the research\nor development stage was specifically excluded. Such proposals in-\ndicated that the problem was essentially one of disclosure and in-\nspection to verify the disclosure. The Working Group believes that\nthe term \"census\" is misleading unless it is understood to mean dis-\nclosure and a system of inspection to verify such disclosure.\n8. It is the view of the Working Group that disclosure of the\nsize and nature of armed forces and armaments as of a particular\ndate on a \"one-time\" basis and the subsequent verification of such\ndisclosure would, in the light of the present world situation, no\nlonger be meaningful unless it were undertaken as a step in a pro-\ngram of international regulation of armed forces and armaments.\nSuch a program, if approved, would provide substantive measures to\nreduce tensions and increase stability in the world. The relation-\nship between disclosure and regulation was recognized in the U. N.\nresolution in which disclosure and verification were linked with\nthe regulation of armaments.\n9. If the question of inspection to verify disclosure is con-\nsidered as the first step in the implementation of a program for\nthe regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces\nand armaments, it becomes apparent that the mere disclosure of the\nNSC 112\n- 12 -\nTOP STORET\nlevel and nature of armed strength on a particular date is inade-\nquate. The system of disclosure and verification by a competent\ninternational authority must be on a continuing basis. In fact,\na continuing system of disclosure and verification will be neces-\nsary in order to provide a body of information for use in the pro-\nlonged negotiations that will be required to complete the details\nof a plan after agreement on the principles for regulation, limita-\ntion and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments has been\nreached. The Working Group feels strongly that, in present circum-\nstances, such a system of disclosure and verification should not be\nundertaken except in this context.\nVI. The Relevance of Inspection and Verification\nto Broad Proposals for the Reduction of Tensions\n10. The U. S. is handicapped in negotiating with the U.S.S.R.\nby the disparity of armed forces and armaments in Europe. If the\nU. S. is in a position to make proposals with respect to regulation,\nlimitation, and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments,\nin which the initiation of a continuing system of inspection to\nverify disclosure is the necessary first step, then the U. S. could\nmake concurrent proposals for acceptable solutions to such outstand-\ning political problems as Germany and Austria. The proposals for\nspecific political settlements would be conditioned upon agreement\nto such a plan for the regulation, limitation, and balanced reduc-\ntion of armed forces and armaments.\nVII. The Nature of a System of Disclosure, Inspection and\nVerification which would be Acceptable to the U. S.\n11. Extent of the Disclosure. The proposals already formulated\nin the U. N. provide for the extent of the disclosure of armed\nforces, including para-military and security forces, and the con-\nventional armaments of such forces. There remain the questions of\nincluding police in the forces to be disclosed and of extending the\ndisclosure to include atomic and other weapons which have not been\npreviously included under the existing U. N. proposals.\n12. It is the view of the Working Group that police forces\nshould be included in the disclosure and verification. The exist-\ning proposals supported by the U. S. in the United Nations already\ncover para-military forces subject to national control, such as\nborder guards, internal security forces, militia and gendarmerie\nas well as reserve components of those forces in organized groups.\nBecause of the nature of the Soviet system, police forces of all\nkinds must be regarded as part of its military forces and will have\nto be included in a system of disclosure and inspection, since it\nwill be almost impossible to distinguish between police and the\nNSC 112\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\ncategories already covered in the U. N. proposals. The U. S. will\nsuffer no disadvantage from the disclosure of its police forces\neven down to the municipal level, while the information which would\nbe gained and disclosed about the police system in the U.S.S.R.\nwould be of great value in exposing the forces required to perpet-\nuate the Soviet system. Such a disclosure would in itself be a\nmajor alteration in the Soviet system.\n13. With respect to atomic energy, the Working Group has con-\nsulted with the Atomic Energy Commission* and the intelligence\nagencies represented on the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Com-\nmittee.*\n14. The AEC has advised the Working Group that the U. N. Plan\nis the best plan yet developed for the regulation and control of\natomic energy. Apart from a plan for regulation and control, how-\never, the AEC believes that a system of disclosure and verification,\n\"if it included rights of inspection comparable with those of the\nUnited Nations plan for control of atomic energy and if it were\ncarried out in stages, could work to the advantage of the U. S.\"\nThe Commission has also advised the Working Group that \"if the\ncensus and verification were to be the first steps toward eventual\ncontrol of atomic energy, it would be in our interest to have a\nsystem of inspection provide as high a degree of accuracy as pos-\nsible with respect to atomic facilities, present production rates\nand capacity, and existing stocks of fissionable material\", al-\nthough there would be some advantage \"to the U. S. from even in-\ncomplete information on important Russian production facilities.\"\nWith respect to research and development activities, the Commission\nadvised that it would appear to be neither desirable nor feasible\nto include them.\n15. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, which ad-\ndressed itself to the intelligence aspects of the problem of includ-\ning atomic energy in a system of disclosure and verification, con-\ncluded that the U. S. should gain considerably from the inspection\nof mines, fissionable material production facilities and current\nweapon stockpile, but that as inspection becomes detailed, the U. S.\nwould have little to gain and the U.S.S.R. would gain important in-\nformation from the technical point of view. The Committee also con-\ncluded, as did the Commission, that it would be neither desirable\nnor feasible to include research and development activities in a\nsystem of disclosure and verification.\n* Those represented are the Departments of State, Army, Navy and\nAir Force, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Central Intel-\nligence Agency.\nNSC 112\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n16. The Phasing of Disclosure and Verification. As indicated\nabove, it would be dangerous to the security of the U. S. to under-\ntake the disclosure of information concerning its armed forces and\narmaments, including atomic, and to engage in a system of inspec-\ntion to verify such disclosure unless the disclosure and the veri-\nfication were phased in such a way that the U. S. would be protected\nin the event of a serious violation or a collapse of the system.\nThe Working Group believes that one of the important advantages from\na phased and continuing system of disclosure and verification is the\nopportunity over a period of time to test the good faith of the\nparties. The mere agreement to enter into such a system would give\nno assurance that the Soviet Union would actually carry it out in\nfull or at all; thus the insistence upon completing each step of a\nphase before proceeding to the next would provide the U. S. with a\nsafeguard on the exchange of information. At the same time, it\nwould provide a continuing check on Soviet intentions. The U. S.\ncannot afford to assume that the Soviet Union would continue to\nlive up to the agreement through all of its stages, but as the var-\nious stages were reached and passed the U. S. would have reason to\nincrease its confidence in continued good faith. If the Soviet\nUnion agreed to such a system of disclosure and verification and\nbegan to carry it out, a fundamental alteration would have been\nachieved which might eventually lead to profound changes within\nthe Soviet Union.\n17. With specific reference to atomic energy, the Working Group\nwas advised by the Atomic Energy Commission that an orderly proced-\nure for staging the disclosure and verification would \"start first\nwith raw materials, proceed to processing plants and facilities for\nproducing fissionable materials and finally, if everything had\nworked out satisfactorily up to that point, include weapons and\nweapon fabrication facilities.\"\n18. The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee recommended\nthat, from an intelligence point of view, disclosure and verifica-\ntion be carried out in a somewhat different sequence because of the\nassumed technological superiority of the U. S. program.\n19. The variance in staging suggested by the AEC and the Joint\nCommittee was based largely on the realization by the Joint Commit-\ntee that bad faith might halt the system at any stage and it would\ntherefore be desirable to avoid the disclosure of any information\nnot now thought to be known by the Soviet Union while at the same\ntime acquiring as much information as possible not now known to\nthe U. S.. The Working Group is not in a position to strike a bal-\nance between the advantages and disadvantages in the somewhat dif-\nferent staging suggested by the Atomic Energy Commission and the\nJoint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, but it does believe\nthat the material submitted to the Working Group supports the view\nthat a phased system of inspection of atomic energy programs is\nfeasible.\nNSC 112\n- 15 -\nSECRET\nSECRET\n20. Apart from the specific advice sought by the Working Group\nwith respect to the inclusion of atomic energy, a number of general\nquestions were submitted to the Central Intelligence Agency with re-\nspect to a system of disclosure and verification of armed forces and\narmaments, including atomic, to determine the accuracy that could be\nachieved and the protection which could be secured against bad faith\nin the course of implementing the system.\n21. It was the view of the Central Intelligence Agency that the\nrelative superiority of Soviet intelligence with respect to the\narmed forces and armaments of the U. S. is such that the U. S., in\na phased system, would secure more valuable information than the\nU.S.S.R. in the initial phases, provided the U.S.S.R. were prevented\nfrom acquiring prematurely information intended to be withheld\ninitially or not to be disclosed at all. It was the advice of the\nCIA that a system of disclosure and verification should include the\nSoviet satellites as well as the U.S.S.R.. It was recommended that\nthe system be so phased that in the initial phases the information\ndisclosed by the U. S. should provide the U.S.S.R. with data which\nis largely known already or at least believed to be available to\nthe U.S.S.R.. The CIA has pointed out that the information already\nin the hands of the Soviet Union will permit them to pinpoint their\ninspection with far greater ease than will be possible for the\nU. S.. Even where the U. S. has information which would assist it\nin an inspection, the source of the information may have to be pro-\ntected and may present us with problems of utilizing the informa-\ntion in our possession. In general, the Central Intelligence Agency\nrecommended that the phased disclosure should progress from general-\nized and less sensitive information to the detailed examination of\nprocesses and weapons, in short from quantitative to qualitative\ndata, and that sensitive aspects of research and development in all\nfields, manufacturing processes and details of new weapons should\nbe excluded entirely. Recognizing the difficulty of achieving in\npractice the desired results, the CIA pointed out that the diffi-\nculties, as well as the possibilities of surmounting them, will re-\nquire extensive further study by the operating and intelligence\nagencies of the U. S. Government.\n22. As a matter of tactics, and as evidence of U. S. good\nfaith, together with its attendant value as propaganda, the Working\nGroup feels that the U. S. should take the position that research\nand development should be included in the very last stage of an\nagreed system or systems of control and inspection undertaken to\nimplement a program for the regulation, limitation and balanced\nreduction of armaments and armed forces. In any event, the United\nStates must be convinced, on the basis of performance in all of the\nearlier stages, of the good faith and complete cooperation of the\nother signatories before any implementation of this stage is under-\ntaken.\nNSC 112\n- 16 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\n23. The Working Group suggests on the basis of present data\nthat such a system should probably begin with a count of police,\nsecurity and para-military forces (including their reserve compo-\nnents) together with the types and amounts of their materiel in\nservice and in reserve, and proceed to inspection of regular army,\nnavy and air forces together with the types and amounts of their\nmateriel in service and reserve. The subsequent stages would in-\nvolve the disclosure and verification of other more sensitive\nfields (such as research and development) covered by the agreement.\n24. The Working Group did not secure detailed information con-\ncerning the disclosure and verification of biological and chemical\nwarfare activities. It was advised, however, that it would be prac-\ntically impossible to detect biological warfare activities by an in-\nspection scheme. The Working Group therefore wishes to call atten-\ntion to this preliminary judgment as indicating a problem that would\nrequire detailed study in the event any plan for disclosure and ver-\nification were to be actually negotiated.\n25. The conclusions and recommendations of the Central Intelli-\ngence Agency confirm the view of the Working Group that prolonged\nnegotiations will be required in order to arrive at the precise pro-\nvisions for a system of disclosure and verification in order to as-\nsure the U. S. that disclosure and inspection in any one stage will\nnot involve the disclosure of data intended to be held out until a\nlater stage. These conclusions and recommendations also seem to\nsupport the view of the Working Group that a public proposal for\ndisclosure and verification, including atomic energy, can be made,\nprovided it includes a requirement for carefully phased implementa-\ntion of the plan. The details do not need to be advanced when the\nproposal is made.\n26. The Working Group agrees that further study will be re-\nquired before the details of a phased system of disclosure and veri-\nfication can be determined, and believes that additional working\ngroups should be established, composed of technically competent\nrepresentatives of the intelligence and operating agencies of the\nU. S. Government, to conduct the careful and extensive studies\nwhich will be required for the development of detailed positions\nfor use in any negotiations which may be undertaken in connection\nwith the proposal for a system of disclosure and verification.\nVII. Net Advantage to the U. S. in a System of Inspection\nto Verify Disclosure\n27. The Working Group concludes on the basis of its detailed\nanalysis of the problem and the advice it has secured from the\nAtomic Energy Commission and the Central Intelligence Agency that,\non balance, a system of disclosure and verification of armed forces\nNSC 112\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nand all armaments within the framework of a program for regulation,\nlimitation and balanced reduction would work to the advantage of the\nU. S. provided: (a) agreement could be secured with respect to the\nrights of inspection and the authority and privilege of the inspect-\nors adequate to insure accuracy, and (b) agreement could be secured\non a phased disclosure and verification which would withhold in the\ninitial stages the most sensitive information intended to be dis-\nclosed only in the later stages and which, therefore, would be so\ndevised that in the event of bad faith at any stage no serious harm\nwould result to the U. S. upon the termination of the system. The\nWorking Group concludes that, so long as these safeguards are ex-\nplicitly stated in the principles included in any proposal for a\nsystem of disclosure and verification, the U. S. would be protected\nin the complex negotiations that would be required and in the appli-\ncation of the system itself. The Working Group does not believe\nthat the difficulties of negotiation which will be encountered\nshould prevent the U. S. from advancing a proposal for a continuing\ndisclosure and verification of armed forces and armaments, includ-\ning atomic energy, within the framework of a program for the regula-\ntion, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and arma-\nments. In the unlikely event that the U.S.S.R. should agree to\nnegotiate such a system of disclosure and verification, the Work-\ning Group concludes that the U. S. could develop a detailed system\nacceptable to the U. S..\nIX. The Practical Scope of a Plan for Regulation, Limita-\ntion and Balanced Reduction\n28. The Working Group does not believe that any plan for the\nregulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armaments or the\nenforcement of such a plan should be developed on the assumption\nthat there would be in existence an international force separate\nand apart from the national forces of the parties. The group be-\nlieves it must be recognized that the existing system of sovereign\nstates will continue for the foreseeable future and that in any\nplan devised the U. S. must rely, in the final analysis, on the\nwillingness of the participating nations to continue the plan or\non the capability and willingness of the U. S. and states cooperat-\ning with it to deal with violations if any occur.\nX. The Principles and Elements of a Plan for the Regulation,\nLimitation and Balanced Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments\n29. The Development of a Plan. The Working Group believes that\nit will be impossible to complete the details of a plan for regula-\ntion, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and arma-\nments in advance of initiating the inspection and verification of\nNSC 112\n- 18 -\nOF SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe armed strength of the participants. Any eventual complete plan\nwill have to be negotiated over a long period of time. It is pos-\nsible, however, to suggest the principles on which such negotiations\ncould be conducted and to define a variety of elements and factors\nwhich would affect the provisions for regulation and limitation and\nbalanced reduction.\n30. The Soviet Union has advanced a proposal for a flat per-\ncentage reduction of existing armed forces. This proposal is wholly\nunacceptable because it would merely perpetuate the existing dispar-\nity in level of armaments and armed forces, and consequently would\nnot bring about a reduction of the tensions which arise therefrom.\nIn order to deal with the Soviet proposal, it will be necessary to\nsecure public understanding of the complexity of the problem and to\nmake clear that the Soviet proposal avoids the vital question of\nimbalance. The nature of the Soviet proposal makes it essential\nfor the U. S. to speak in terms of a BALANCED reduction. In short,\nbefore any general limitation or reduction can be carried out by\nthe West, the Soviet Union and its satellites will have to reduce\ntheir total armed strength until the level of armaments between East\nand West is more nearly equal or the West will have to bring the ef-\nfectiveness of its armed strength up to the level of the East.\n31. General Principles. The U. N. Commission for Conventional\nArmaments has developed a number of principles applicable to a sys-\ntem of regulation and limitation of armed forces and armaments, but\ninherent in these principles is the idea of utilizing an interna-\ntional force to assure compliance with the program of regulation\nand limitation. As the Working Group has indicated, it believes\nthat, as a practical matter, the existence of sovereign states\nmakes it necessary to devise a program which does not depend upon\nthe use of an international force but which recognizes that the\nonly response to a violation by one of the parties will be the ac-\ntion taken by one or more of the other parties.\n32. The Working Group is firmly of the opinion that a plan for\nregulation, limitation and balanced reduction must be such as to\ngive prompt warning of an actual violation or even a serious threat\nof violation so as to permit other nations to take adequate measures\nfor their self-protection. The safeguards provided must enable na-\ntions to recognize the danger inherent in an actual or threatened\nviolation so that they will have an opportunity to take appropriate\nmeasures, including an increase of their military strength to off-\nset a similar increase on the part of the violator. No system for\nregulation and limitation of armaments can be wholly fool-proof.\nAccordingly, the U. S. must not be lulled into a false sense of\nsecurity, and the national leadership must be determined and vigor-\nous in order to meet the dangers which will exist if a violation\noccurs.\nNSC 112\n- 19 -\nTOD SECRET\nSECRET\n33. The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that we\ncannot expect an international force capable of assuring compliance\nwith a program for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction to\nbe available. Accordingly, the plan developed must not involve for\nthe foreseeable future the balanced reduction of existing armaments\nto that level which the mere maintenance of internal security would\nrequire.\n34. The following are the principles which the Working Group\nbelieves to be essential as the basis for the program of regulation,\nlimitation and balanced reduction which it proposes:\na. The program must be open for adherence to all states\nand initially it must include at least those states whose mili-\ntary resources are so substantial that their absence from the\nprogram would endanger it. In any case, participation could\nnot be limited to the U. S., U.S.S.R., U. K. and France and\nstill provide an adequate degree of national security;\nb. With respect to the control and regulation of atomic\nenergy it would be necessary to secure agreement on the U. N.\nplan, or some no less effective plan;\nc. The limitation of armed forces and armaments must be\ncarried out under an agreed system of regulation and inspec-\ntion, and the implementation must be phased in such a manner\nthat will protect the security of the participating states at\neach stage;\nd. It would be essential to secure agreement on necessary\nsafeguards which would technically be feasible and practical.\nSuch safeguards would have to provide for the prompt detection\nof the occurrence of violations, while at the same time causing\nonly the necessary degree of interference with the various as-\npects of the life of individual nations;\ne. In the case of armed forces and non-atomic weapons,\nthe inspection and other mechanisms required as safeguards\nshould be conducted under an international authority vested\nwith the necessary status, rights and powers; and\nf. With respect to atomic energy, the control and inspec-\ntion required as safeguards would be conducted in accordance\nwith the U. N. plan or a plan no less effective.\n35. Under the foregoing principles the plan developed would\nnot be directed to the end of total national disarmament and would\nnot envisage reliance on an international force to prevent aggres-\nsion. Instead, the plan would be directed toward a reduction in\nNSC 112\n- 20 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nthe existing level of national armed forces and armaments, and\nthereby a reduction in tensions and an improvement in relations\nbetween nations. The plan would call for the limitation and bal-\nanced reduction of armed forces and armaments to a level which would\ndecrease substantially the possibility of a successful initial ag-\ngression and thereby increase the chances that armed aggression\nwould not be resorted to in furtherance of national objectives. If\narmed force can be so limited that resort to its use as an instru-\nment of national policy would be much less likely, the conflict be-\ntween the intentions of the West and the Soviet Orbit might be re-\nsolved through other means.\n36. In its analysis of the problem, the Working Group consid-\nered those elements of national strength which in some degree or\nother contribute to the expression of national power in the form of\narmed forces. Initially, it was thought that a study of these ele-\nments, such as Position, Area, Geography, Length of Seacoasts,\nLength of Borders, Frontiers Protected by Natural Barriers, Agri-\ncultural Base, Population, Natural Resources, Internal Communica-\ntions, Industrial Plant, Technological Skills, University System,\nand many others, might lead to an acceptable formula for negotiat-\ning the limitation of armed forces and armaments. However, since\nnations differ radically in population, size, geographical situa-\ntion, national wealth, national character, and in numerous other\nways, consideration of these elements led to such a maze of complex-\nities that an effort to work out a definite formula had to be aban-\ndoned. Such elements may, however, be appropriate subjects of dis-\ncussion in any negotiations toward an acceptable plan. The Working\nGroup concluded that the exact manner of regulation or the exact\nnature of the limitation which the eventual plan would contain\ncould only be developed through extensive negotiations. Neverthe-\nless, there could be suggested as examples certain specific criteria\nwhich might be found to be acceptable in the course of detailed ne-\ngotiation of the program. Some of the criteria appear to be:\na. Over-all Size of Armed Forces. The size of the armed\nforces to be permitted each country under the plan will have to\nbe agreed on, and size should bear a relationship to population.\nThis factor alone, however, cannot be controlling and if a per-\ncentage of population is adopted, it would also be necessary to\nset a ceiling so that no nation could have a great preponder-\nance. If, for example, the percentage adopted were 1% of the\npopulation but the ceiling for any country were one million, the\nSoviet Union and Communist China would together have two million\nmen in their armed forces and the U. S., U. K. and France would\nhave approximately the same number.\nb. Use of Natural Resources and Industrial Potential. It\nmay be undesirable to permit the unlimited use of resources and\nindustrial potential for military purposes under a plan for\nNSC 112\n- 21 -\nSECRET\nTOP SECRET\nlimitation and balanced reduction. Therefore, it might be ad-\nvisable to restrict the portion of national production which\ncan be so used. The production of armaments should bear a di-\nrect relation to the amount needed for the armed forces permit-\nted under the plan, and it may be that there should also be a\nceiling which it might be possible to express in terms of per-\ncentage of the national product; for example, 5% as contrasted\nwith the much higher percentages today. Such a criterion based\nupon a percentage would require extensive verification because\nof the difficulty of security comparable data.\nc. Mutually Agreed Programs within the Over-all Limita-\ntions. It would not be enough to agree merely on over-all cri-\nteria, since the composition of permitted national armed forces\nand armaments would also have a direct bearing on the effective-\nness of the plan. For example, no nation could reasonably pro-\npose to concentrate its total permitted force in heavily arm-\nored ground divisions or entirely in the form of a strategic\nair force. The requirement of mutually agreed programs within\nthe over-all limitation would provide a means of securing a\nbalanced reduction.\nNSC 112\n- 22 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nANNEX \"B\"\nTHE EXISTING LEVEL OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN RELATION\nTO THE CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IN EUROPE\nAt VE Day, in 1945, the U. S. had ground forces of over six\nmillion men, four million of whom were in the European and Medi-\nterranean Theaters. The French and British ground forces in Eu-\nrope, the Middle East and Africa on VE Day totaled nearly 3-1/2\nmillion. When the war in Europe ended, the U.S.S.R. had five\nmillion men in its ground armies.\nThese massive forces, together with air and naval power, had\naccomplished the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, and a few\nmonths later Japan surrendered. The world looked forward to peace,\nand in the West the nations rapidly demobilized and sought to turn\nagain to peaceful occupations. In the Soviet Union, however, enor-\nmous forces were maintained, and in the first years after World\nWar II these forces, many of them stationed outside the Soviet bor-\nders in Europe, were used by the U.S.S.R. to threaten and dominate\nthe Eastern European nations.\nRepeated efforts were made by the West, both in the United\nNations, in meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and in\nother ways, to secure the adherence of the U.S.S.R. to the provi-\nsions of the U. N. Charter and to the principles which normally\ngovern relations between friendly countries.\nIt became increasingly apparent that the Soviet Union .intended\nto use the threat of overwhelming force to further its political\nand ideological objectives of controlling and subjugating the re-\nmaining free members of the European community, and eventually\nthe world.\nWhen in April 1949, the United States, Canada and nine other\nnations signed the North Atlantic Pact, the danger to the North\nAtlantic Treaty nations from the Soviet's pursuit of its objectives\nby the threat of its armed strength in being was clear and present.\nThe U.S.S.R. had armies of half a million men stationed outside the\nSoviet borders in Europe. It had armies of two million more within\nits borders and another half million of security troops for the\nmaintenance of its system over its own people and those of its sat-\nellites. And, in addition to its own armies, it had available in\nits Eastern European satellites, armies of another million men to\ndo its bidding. The peace treaties with Hungary, Rumania and Bul-\ngaria had been violated to provide these forces, and a marshal of\nthe Soviet army commanded the Polish troops.\nNSC 112\n- 23 -\nTOP SECRET\nTOP SECRET\nIn 1949 there were 600,000 men in the Soviet Air Force, 60,000\nof them stationed at air bases in East Germany and the Eastern Euro-\npean satellites.\nAgainst these massive forces, in 1949, the United Kingdom and\nFrance had ground forces in Europe of only half a million men and\nthe total ground forces of the United States, both at home and\nabroad, consisted of only a little more than another half million.\nIn air forces, the U. S., U. K. and France had 300,000 men (or half\nas many men as the U.S.S.R.) stationed in Europe and the Mediter-\nranean, and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization\n(NATO) countries had air forces totalling only 50,000 men. Under\nthese circumstances, it is absurd to argue that the great, vast\nSoviet Union was under any danger as a result of the level of arma-\nments in the West. In fact, the disparity was so great the other\nway, and this only a short time after the common victory in Europe,\nthat self-defense required the nations of Europe and the United\nStates and Canada to look to their immediate safety. They have\ntried to do so under the North Atlantic Treaty.\nWhen the ruthless aggression occurred in Korea in the summer\nof 1950 the efforts of the West to repair the balance had only be-\ngun. But the very boldness of this action demonstrated to the non-\nSoviet world that it could not afford to delay an increase in its\nown strength. In the past year, the people of the free nations\nhave turned to the task of redressing the balance with vigor and\ndetermination. They will continue to do so until their security\nis protected against the Soviet and European satellite armed forces,\nwhich now total nearly six million men. Of these the U.S.S.R. has\nground forces of 1-1/2 million stationed in the Soviet Union west\nof the Urals and, together with its satellites, another 1-1/2 mil-\nlion in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Air Forces in Western Russia\nand Eastern Europe comprise 600,000 more.\nThe members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have\nless than a million men in their armies on the European continent\nand in the United Kingdom, and, in their air forces in the area,\nhalf as many men as the U.S.S.R..\nIf the Soviet Union would look at the world as it is, rather\nthan as it appears through the distorted lenses with which they\nview it, they would cast aside the groundless pretense that they\nare threatened with aggression from the West. At any time since\nthe end of World War II the Soviet Union has had it in its power to\ndemobilize its huge forces and spare its own people and the rest of\nthe world the burden of huge armaments and armies. No one outside\nthe Kremlin provoked the U.S.S.R. into its present posture of exces-\nsive military strength. Its posture is of its own making, and until\nit decides to forego its desire for world domination and the use of\nmassed, armed might as an instrument of that policy, the free world\nhas no alternative but to meet the challenge by its own defense ef-\nforts.\nNSC 112\n- 24 -\nTOP SECRET\nU.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\n3545-STATE-1949\nNSC mr. #97"
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