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    "localId": "470154798",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency Report RR 36-50, Neutrality and Third Force Tendencies in Western Europe",
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    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency Report RR 36-50, Neutrality and Third Force Tendencies in Western Europe",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470154798",
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    "seq": 5,
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nNEUTRALITY AND THIRD-FORCE TENDENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPE\n\"NATIO\nARCHIVES\nREGORDS\nSERVICE\nCOTTEN\n1. Definition of the Problem.\n2. The Neutralist Position.\nIn the East-West conflict, it is important to\na. Summary.\ndetermine the extent to which the countries\nNeutralist sentiment in Western Europe has\nof Western Europe are likely, during the ap-\nmany variations, ranging from the sincere\nproximate period 1950-53, to pursue policies\nviews of individuals advocating armed neu-\nindependent of those of the US and the USSR\ntrality along Swiss and Swedish lines to the\nin order to dissociate themselves from the\nattitudes of Communists who exploit the neu-\nEast-West struggle, and to estimate the effects\ntralist line to their own advantage. It is im-\nof this on US security. The security program\npossible to measure the influence of this vague\nof the US is based to a substantial degree upon\nand unorganized popular sentiment. The in-\nthe assistance of a concerted Western Euro-\nfluence of the Third-Force concept, also dif-\npean defense effort. At the present time, this\nficult to assess, is largely espoused by govern-\nassistance is sought by the US through mili-\nmental circles rather than by popular groups\ntary, political, and economic agreements for\nin Western Europe.\njoint action in a strengthened defense. West\nb. Composition and Strength of Support.\nEuropean acceptance and implementation of\nArticulate support of neutrality is found in\nthese agreements will, therefore, affect the\na wide variety of groups in Western Germany,\nprogress of the US defense program.\nFrance, Italy, and Denmark. There is little\nIn weighing the threat to such adherence\nor no overt neutrality in Great Britain, Nor-\nwhich is posed by West European desires for\nway, or the Benelux countries. In Western\na neutral position, or at least a position of\nGermany, the leading champions of neutrality\nmore independence from the US, it is neces-\nare groups of former diplomats, militarists, in-\nsary to eliminate prevailing confusion by de-\ntellectuals, and representatives of special in-\nfining the two different concepts of (a) neu-\nterests. In France, neutralist sentiment is\ntrality and (b) Third-Force, and by accord-\nrepresented by such divergent elements as\ning them separate treatment. The neutrality\nleft-wing intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre\nconcept involves outright dissociation from\nand Claude Bourdet, whose periodical, L'Ob-\nthe East-West conflict and aloofness from the\nservateur, is the chief vehicle of anti-Ameri-\ndiplomatic quarrels and issues which divide\ncan neutrality in Western Europe, and such\nthe two great powers. A majority of the neu-\noutstanding fellow-travelers as Pierre Cot.\ntralists would favor resistance only if their\nThe anti-US policy sometimes followed by Le\ncountries were directly attacked. \"Third-\nMonde, one of the most influential of the in-\nForce\" or \"independence\" sentiment, as it ap-\ndependent Paris dailies, represents a mixed\nplies to the West European countries, favors\nclass of readers, both conservative business-\ntheir freedom of action, so far as is possible,\nmen and intellectual liberals. Organized\nfrom US policies, and often reflects apprehen-\npolitical parties in Italy which have come out\nsion of US encroachment on European in-\nfor neutrality include the pro-Communist\nterests. Its adherents maintain that these\nNenni Socialists, as well as the conservative\ncountries, while not standing aloof from the\nneo-Fascist Italian Social Movement, the\nEast-West conflict or lessening their determi-\nMonarchists, and the remnants of the Uomo\nnation to oppose Soviet aggression, should\nQualunque movement. In Denmark, Social\nnevertheless pursue national or regional poli-\nDemocratic leaders have often expressed their\ncies even though they may conflict with US\nregret that a neutral Scandinavian alliance\nobjectives, or should perhaps become a link\ndid not materialize, and minor elements\nbetween the conflicting US and Soviet points\nwithin the party, as well as the Radical Lib-\nof view.\nerals, generally still harbor neutralist feeling.\nSECRET\n2"
}