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App-9 9. Further Production of Plutonium a. If these Soviet piles are as well designed as the first U. S. piles, some increase in power level will be possible. On the other hand, continuous uninterrupted operation has been assumed which will probably not be the case. Interruptions will undoubtedly occur and would tend to offset increased production from a higher power level. Furthermore, if the Soviets decide to operate will be delayed by several months. Because of these factors, as well as plutonium availability the uncertainty in the assumed initial power level, it is assumed that these piles continue to operate at a power level of the period covered by this estimate. On this basis, plutonium will during be available from them as follows: up until mid-1949 - up until mid-1950 - each year thereafter - b. With the successful operation of their piles in and with the increasing uranium supply, it 18 logical to expect that additional piles would be built. There is indeed information that mav be interpreted, though not unequivocally, as showing that piles were under construction Tentative start-up dates of have been assumed. These new piles would be designed for higher power than earlier ones, and they are assumed to be of output each. Accepting these dates and power levels, plutonium will be available from these piles as follows: up until mid-1951 - up until mid-1952 - each year thereafter - c. The availability of plutonium from the first two piles on this time scale is calculated assuming a plutonium enrichment level of of uranium, as enrichment levels substantially higher than this result In an unacceptably high probability of predetonation in an all-plutonium weapon. However, it is possible to operate a pile with considerably less throughput of uranium by increasing the final enrich- ment level of plutonium by longer expcsure in the pile, and this increase is permissible when composite weapons are to be fabricated from the plutonium. As composite weapons permit a more efficient use of fission- able material, it is assumed that the Soviets will adopt them as soon as - 10 - mn

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    "ocrText": "App-9\n9. Further Production of Plutonium\na. If these\nSoviet piles are as well designed as the first\nU. S. piles, some increase in power level\nwill be\npossible. On the other hand, continuous uninterrupted operation has been\nassumed which will probably not be the case. Interruptions will undoubtedly\noccur and would tend to offset increased production from a higher power\nlevel. Furthermore, if the Soviets decide to operate\nwill be delayed by several months. Because of these factors, as well as\nplutonium availability\nthe uncertainty in the assumed initial power level, it is assumed that\nthese piles continue to operate at a power level of\nthe period covered by this estimate. On this basis, plutonium will during be\navailable from them as follows:\nup until mid-1949 -\nup until mid-1950 -\neach year thereafter -\nb. With the successful operation of their\npiles in\nand with the increasing uranium supply,\nit 18 logical to expect that additional piles would be built. There is\nindeed information that mav be interpreted, though not unequivocally, as\nshowing that\npiles were under construction\nTentative start-up dates of\nhave been\nassumed. These new piles would be designed for higher power than earlier\nones, and they are assumed to be of\noutput each. Accepting\nthese dates and power levels, plutonium will be available from these\npiles as follows:\nup until mid-1951 -\nup until mid-1952 -\neach year thereafter -\nc. The availability of plutonium from the first two piles on this\ntime scale is calculated assuming a plutonium enrichment level of\nof uranium, as enrichment levels substantially higher than\nthis result In an unacceptably high probability of predetonation in an\nall-plutonium weapon.\nHowever, it is possible to operate a pile with\nconsiderably less throughput of uranium by increasing the final enrich-\nment level of plutonium by longer expcsure in the pile, and this increase\nis permissible when composite weapons are to be fabricated from the\nplutonium. As composite weapons permit a more efficient use of fission-\nable material, it is assumed that the Soviets will adopt them as soon as\n- 10 -\nmn"
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