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App-9
9. Further Production of Plutonium
a. If these
Soviet piles are as well designed as the first
U. S. piles, some increase in power level
will be
possible. On the other hand, continuous uninterrupted operation has been
assumed which will probably not be the case. Interruptions will undoubtedly
occur and would tend to offset increased production from a higher power
level. Furthermore, if the Soviets decide to operate
will be delayed by several months. Because of these factors, as well as
plutonium availability
the uncertainty in the assumed initial power level, it is assumed that
these piles continue to operate at a power level of
the period covered by this estimate. On this basis, plutonium will during be
available from them as follows:
up until mid-1949 -
up until mid-1950 -
each year thereafter -
b. With the successful operation of their
piles in
and with the increasing uranium supply,
it 18 logical to expect that additional piles would be built. There is
indeed information that mav be interpreted, though not unequivocally, as
showing that
piles were under construction
Tentative start-up dates of
have been
assumed. These new piles would be designed for higher power than earlier
ones, and they are assumed to be of
output each. Accepting
these dates and power levels, plutonium will be available from these
piles as follows:
up until mid-1951 -
up until mid-1952 -
each year thereafter -
c. The availability of plutonium from the first two piles on this
time scale is calculated assuming a plutonium enrichment level of
of uranium, as enrichment levels substantially higher than
this result In an unacceptably high probability of predetonation in an
all-plutonium weapon.
However, it is possible to operate a pile with
considerably less throughput of uranium by increasing the final enrich-
ment level of plutonium by longer expcsure in the pile, and this increase
is permissible when composite weapons are to be fabricated from the
plutonium. As composite weapons permit a more efficient use of fission-
able material, it is assumed that the Soviets will adopt them as soon as
- 10 -
mn
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"ocrText": "App-9\n9. Further Production of Plutonium\na. If these\nSoviet piles are as well designed as the first\nU. S. piles, some increase in power level\nwill be\npossible. On the other hand, continuous uninterrupted operation has been\nassumed which will probably not be the case. Interruptions will undoubtedly\noccur and would tend to offset increased production from a higher power\nlevel. Furthermore, if the Soviets decide to operate\nwill be delayed by several months. Because of these factors, as well as\nplutonium availability\nthe uncertainty in the assumed initial power level, it is assumed that\nthese piles continue to operate at a power level of\nthe period covered by this estimate. On this basis, plutonium will during be\navailable from them as follows:\nup until mid-1949 -\nup until mid-1950 -\neach year thereafter -\nb. With the successful operation of their\npiles in\nand with the increasing uranium supply,\nit 18 logical to expect that additional piles would be built. There is\nindeed information that mav be interpreted, though not unequivocally, as\nshowing that\npiles were under construction\nTentative start-up dates of\nhave been\nassumed. These new piles would be designed for higher power than earlier\nones, and they are assumed to be of\noutput each. Accepting\nthese dates and power levels, plutonium will be available from these\npiles as follows:\nup until mid-1951 -\nup until mid-1952 -\neach year thereafter -\nc. The availability of plutonium from the first two piles on this\ntime scale is calculated assuming a plutonium enrichment level of\nof uranium, as enrichment levels substantially higher than\nthis result In an unacceptably high probability of predetonation in an\nall-plutonium weapon.\nHowever, it is possible to operate a pile with\nconsiderably less throughput of uranium by increasing the final enrich-\nment level of plutonium by longer expcsure in the pile, and this increase\nis permissible when composite weapons are to be fabricated from the\nplutonium. As composite weapons permit a more efficient use of fission-\nable material, it is assumed that the Soviets will adopt them as soon as\n- 10 -\nmn"
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