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in combination with the USSR, both the West-
(3) The Problem of Berlin.
ern Powers and the satellites.
In the meantime, the problem of Berlin re-
The Western Powers would have great diffi-
mains a source of friction between the West-
culty in meeting such a Soviet approach. A
ern Powers and the USSR. Berlin continues
united Germany is not theirs to give. Their
to be a vulnerable spot in the Western position
main bulwarks of support will be the present
and at the same time a serious obstacle to
German hatred of the USSR, the basic eco-
the attainment of Soviet political objectives
nomic dependence of Germany upon the West,
throughout Germany. Although the West-
and the cultural ties of Germany with West-
ern Powers may be in Berlin by right of con-
ern Europe. But these may be counteracted
quest and by agreement, the division of Ger-
over a period of time by the frictions arising
many and the establishment of a West Ger-
out of Allied control and the increasing free-
man State under exclusive Western Power
dom of action which the West German State
control is likely to make the problem of main-
will acquire as it gains in strength and inde-
taining a Western political outpost in the
pendence. The Germans would enter into a
midst of Soviet-controlled territory an increas-
deal with the USSR only if presented as an
ingly difficult one. The USSR cannot help
alliance between Sovereign States and not as
but regard it as a dangerous observation post
a Communist satellite relationship. Although
within its legitimate sphere and as a major
each side might distrust the ultimate objec-
obstacle to the consolidation of Eastern Ger-
tives of the other, each would probably con-
many as an offset to the West German
sider itself strong enough eventually to coun-
State. While the USSR will be under con-
teract them. In spite of their initial hostility
stant compulsion to try to liquidate the situ-
to the USSR, therefore, there will be a strong
ation as long as Germany remains divided, it
tendency for the Germans to subordinate
is not likely to reinstate the blockade in the
their dislike of Communism to the larger con-
near future.
sideration that only through an alliance with
the USSR can they regain their place in the
2. UK-Labor Government.
sun as a united German nation.
Sir Stafford Cripps, by stating that positive
The only inducement at the disposal of the
new policies were needed, tacitly admitted
Western Powers as an alternative to German
that the Labor Government's economic poli-
unification is to offer a West German State
cies had failed to maintain the UK's gold re-
an important place in the Western Union.
serves. The question is accordingly germane
Here, however, the conflict of interests among
whether the Labor Government retains the
the Western Powers and between the Western
confidence of the country. It seems reason-
Powers and Germany will make it difficult in
ably certain that a majority of the electorate
the long run to offer the Germans a position
is satisfied with the Government's handling
that would in any way compensate for the
of those matters that directly touch people's
abandonment of German unification. Brit-
lives: full employment, the cost of living, the
ish fears of German competition, French con-
welfare state doctrine of "fair shares for all."
cern with security, and US resistance to foot-
The problem of the UK gold reserves does not
ing the bills in Germany stand in the way of
belong to this category of interests, even
a common policy satisfactory both to the
though its consequences will ultimately be
Western Powers and to the Germans. Bas-
felt in things which do closely affect people's
ically, the Western Powers probably cannot
lives. The actions of the Government with
satisfy a resurgent West German State short
respect to this recondite and highly technical
of permitting it to become the dominant pow-
problem are not now a matter of electoral
er in the Western Union. The long-term
confidence. The Government itself, however,
tendencies, therefore, appear to point toward
is aware of the fundamental significance of
the alternatives of a united Germany allied
the problem and of its relation to the political
with the USSR or a Western Union dominated
position of Labor. If the Cabinet is in com-
by a West German State.
plete agreement about a solution, it is prob-
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
C.I.A.
letter,
3:31:27
By
NLT-
NARS
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"ocrText": "6\nin combination with the USSR, both the West-\n(3) The Problem of Berlin.\nern Powers and the satellites.\nIn the meantime, the problem of Berlin re-\nThe Western Powers would have great diffi-\nmains a source of friction between the West-\nculty in meeting such a Soviet approach. A\nern Powers and the USSR. Berlin continues\nunited Germany is not theirs to give. Their\nto be a vulnerable spot in the Western position\nmain bulwarks of support will be the present\nand at the same time a serious obstacle to\nGerman hatred of the USSR, the basic eco-\nthe attainment of Soviet political objectives\nnomic dependence of Germany upon the West,\nthroughout Germany. Although the West-\nand the cultural ties of Germany with West-\nern Powers may be in Berlin by right of con-\nern Europe. But these may be counteracted\nquest and by agreement, the division of Ger-\nover a period of time by the frictions arising\nmany and the establishment of a West Ger-\nout of Allied control and the increasing free-\nman State under exclusive Western Power\ndom of action which the West German State\ncontrol is likely to make the problem of main-\nwill acquire as it gains in strength and inde-\ntaining a Western political outpost in the\npendence. The Germans would enter into a\nmidst of Soviet-controlled territory an increas-\ndeal with the USSR only if presented as an\ningly difficult one. The USSR cannot help\nalliance between Sovereign States and not as\nbut regard it as a dangerous observation post\na Communist satellite relationship. Although\nwithin its legitimate sphere and as a major\neach side might distrust the ultimate objec-\nobstacle to the consolidation of Eastern Ger-\ntives of the other, each would probably con-\nmany as an offset to the West German\nsider itself strong enough eventually to coun-\nState. While the USSR will be under con-\nteract them. In spite of their initial hostility\nstant compulsion to try to liquidate the situ-\nto the USSR, therefore, there will be a strong\nation as long as Germany remains divided, it\ntendency for the Germans to subordinate\nis not likely to reinstate the blockade in the\ntheir dislike of Communism to the larger con-\nnear future.\nsideration that only through an alliance with\nthe USSR can they regain their place in the\n2. UK-Labor Government.\nsun as a united German nation.\nSir Stafford Cripps, by stating that positive\nThe only inducement at the disposal of the\nnew policies were needed, tacitly admitted\nWestern Powers as an alternative to German\nthat the Labor Government's economic poli-\nunification is to offer a West German State\ncies had failed to maintain the UK's gold re-\nan important place in the Western Union.\nserves. The question is accordingly germane\nHere, however, the conflict of interests among\nwhether the Labor Government retains the\nthe Western Powers and between the Western\nconfidence of the country. It seems reason-\nPowers and Germany will make it difficult in\nably certain that a majority of the electorate\nthe long run to offer the Germans a position\nis satisfied with the Government's handling\nthat would in any way compensate for the\nof those matters that directly touch people's\nabandonment of German unification. Brit-\nlives: full employment, the cost of living, the\nish fears of German competition, French con-\nwelfare state doctrine of \"fair shares for all.\"\ncern with security, and US resistance to foot-\nThe problem of the UK gold reserves does not\ning the bills in Germany stand in the way of\nbelong to this category of interests, even\na common policy satisfactory both to the\nthough its consequences will ultimately be\nWestern Powers and to the Germans. Bas-\nfelt in things which do closely affect people's\nically, the Western Powers probably cannot\nlives. The actions of the Government with\nsatisfy a resurgent West German State short\nrespect to this recondite and highly technical\nof permitting it to become the dominant pow-\nproblem are not now a matter of electoral\ner in the Western Union. The long-term\nconfidence. The Government itself, however,\ntendencies, therefore, appear to point toward\nis aware of the fundamental significance of\nthe alternatives of a united Germany allied\nthe problem and of its relation to the political\nwith the USSR or a Western Union dominated\nposition of Labor. If the Cabinet is in com-\nby a West German State.\nplete agreement about a solution, it is prob-\nDECLASSIFIED\nE. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nC.I.A.\nletter,\n3:31:27\nBy\nNLT-\nNARS"
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