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REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE
SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
15Nov.1950 Nov.
SUMMARY
1. As a result of the intervention of Chi-
a more serious challenge than that presented
nese Communist troops in Korea, the UN
by the initial invasion of South Korea.
tactical position there has deteriorated
Nevertheless, there are definite signs that the
sharply, and the USSR has regained the in-
international organization has become a more
itiative in its continuing world-wide power-
effective device for curbing aggression than
contest with the US and its allies. The in-
at any time in its history. Although the Chi-
tervention demonstrates that the USSR is
nese Communists may limit their intervention
willing to pursue the experiment in war-by-
to still-to-be-defined local objectives, the grave
proxy despite a considerable risk of vastly
probability exists that a strong UN military
enlarging the area of armed conflict. Neither
reaction against Chinese territory would en-
the beginning of the accelerated North Atlan-
courage the Chinese Communists to attempt
tic Treaty rearmament program nor the new
a large-scale offensive designed to secure
vigor shown by the UN has caused the USSR
Korea.
to change either its strategic objectives or its
4. The situation in Indochina remains one
aggressive tactics. Soviet policy continues to
which the Communists can exploit without
aim at the development and exploitation of
serious fear of early and effective UN counter-
local weaknesses on the periphery of the
action. Both the military and political situ-
non-Communist world.
ations have deteriorated to a critical state,
2. Despite the grave risk that intervention
but so long as the present political context of
in Korea would lead to retaliation and pos-
the war in Indochina continues, it is ex-
sibly global war, both China and the USSR
tremely doubtful that the UN could agree on
stood to gain certain immediate advantages
a basis for initiating effective military action
from it: averting the immediate psychological
against Ho Chi Minh. Containment of Ho's
and political consequences of the North
forces presently depends almost exclusively
Korean defeat; keeping UN forces away from
on US aid, and even with such help (short of
the actual frontiers of China and the USSR;
direct ground, air, and naval support) the
prolonging the commitment of UN forces in
French probably cannot hold northern Indo-
Korea; and keeping open the possibility of a
china for more than six months, nor all of
political settlement. By not formally an-
Indochina for more than eighteen months.
nouncing the objectives of their intervention,
5. The Chinese Communist invasion of
the Chinese Communists have retained full
Tibet has aroused considerable anger and re-
freedom of action, and, depending upon US
sentment within the Indian Government. Al-
and UN reaction, can tailor the precise nature
though a basic change in India's interna-
and extent of their intervention to develop-
tional outlook is not yet apparent, consider-
ments.
able pressure is undoubtedly being placed on
Nehru to have him abandon his moral sup-
3. The introduction of Chinese Communist
port of Communist China. As the threat of
forces into Korea has confronted the UN with
Chinese-dominated Communism in Southeast
Note: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the De-
partments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The review contains information
available to CIA as of 10 November 1950.
DECLASSIFIED
SECRET
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) 3-31-77 and 5(D) or (E)
1
C.I.A.
OSD
letter,
NARS
Date
By
NLT-
NL
4-17-77
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"ocrText": "REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION AS IT RELATES TO THE\nSECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES\n15Nov.1950 Nov.\nSUMMARY\n1. As a result of the intervention of Chi-\na more serious challenge than that presented\nnese Communist troops in Korea, the UN\nby the initial invasion of South Korea.\ntactical position there has deteriorated\nNevertheless, there are definite signs that the\nsharply, and the USSR has regained the in-\ninternational organization has become a more\nitiative in its continuing world-wide power-\neffective device for curbing aggression than\ncontest with the US and its allies. The in-\nat any time in its history. Although the Chi-\ntervention demonstrates that the USSR is\nnese Communists may limit their intervention\nwilling to pursue the experiment in war-by-\nto still-to-be-defined local objectives, the grave\nproxy despite a considerable risk of vastly\nprobability exists that a strong UN military\nenlarging the area of armed conflict. Neither\nreaction against Chinese territory would en-\nthe beginning of the accelerated North Atlan-\ncourage the Chinese Communists to attempt\ntic Treaty rearmament program nor the new\na large-scale offensive designed to secure\nvigor shown by the UN has caused the USSR\nKorea.\nto change either its strategic objectives or its\n4. The situation in Indochina remains one\naggressive tactics. Soviet policy continues to\nwhich the Communists can exploit without\naim at the development and exploitation of\nserious fear of early and effective UN counter-\nlocal weaknesses on the periphery of the\naction. Both the military and political situ-\nnon-Communist world.\nations have deteriorated to a critical state,\n2. Despite the grave risk that intervention\nbut so long as the present political context of\nin Korea would lead to retaliation and pos-\nthe war in Indochina continues, it is ex-\nsibly global war, both China and the USSR\ntremely doubtful that the UN could agree on\nstood to gain certain immediate advantages\na basis for initiating effective military action\nfrom it: averting the immediate psychological\nagainst Ho Chi Minh. Containment of Ho's\nand political consequences of the North\nforces presently depends almost exclusively\nKorean defeat; keeping UN forces away from\non US aid, and even with such help (short of\nthe actual frontiers of China and the USSR;\ndirect ground, air, and naval support) the\nprolonging the commitment of UN forces in\nFrench probably cannot hold northern Indo-\nKorea; and keeping open the possibility of a\nchina for more than six months, nor all of\npolitical settlement. By not formally an-\nIndochina for more than eighteen months.\nnouncing the objectives of their intervention,\n5. The Chinese Communist invasion of\nthe Chinese Communists have retained full\nTibet has aroused considerable anger and re-\nfreedom of action, and, depending upon US\nsentment within the Indian Government. Al-\nand UN reaction, can tailor the precise nature\nthough a basic change in India's interna-\nand extent of their intervention to develop-\ntional outlook is not yet apparent, consider-\nments.\nable pressure is undoubtedly being placed on\nNehru to have him abandon his moral sup-\n3. The introduction of Chinese Communist\nport of Communist China. As the threat of\nforces into Korea has confronted the UN with\nChinese-dominated Communism in Southeast\nNote: This review has not been coordinated with the intelligence organizations of the De-\npartments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force. The review contains information\navailable to CIA as of 10 November 1950.\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nE.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) 3-31-77 and 5(D) or (E)\n1\nC.I.A.\nOSD\nletter,\nNARS\nDate\nBy\nNLT-\nNL\n4-17-77"
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