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{
    "localId": "470155312",
    "label": "Report, Foreign Radio Reactions to the President's Statement About an Atomic Explosion in the USSR",
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    "id": "470155312",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Foreign Radio Reactions to the President's Statement About an Atomic Explosion in the USSR",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/470155312",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 7,
            "logicalDate": "1949-10-07",
            "month": 10,
            "year": 1949
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{
    "seq": 2,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875442/875442-06-002.tif",
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    "ocrText": "RESTRICTED\nINTRODUCTION: A review of foreign radio reactions to the new atomic\nsituation, since the President's announcement on 23 September, brings out\ntwo broad conclusions: (1) Non-Soviet reactions outside the United\nStates, like those in the United States, are in general agreement with\ncurrent American policy; and (2) Soviet reactions are cautious, non-\ncommittal on most of the concrete points at issue, and strictly sub-\nordinated to a greatly increased emphasis on the Soviet desire for peace.\nNON-SOVIET REACTIONS: Foreign reactions outside the Soviet sphere\nare in general very similar to those in the United States. There is\nagreement on the urgency of adequate control, but disagreement on its\npossibility. Some predict continued Soviet refusal to permit adequate\ninspection, while others hope that the USSR may now be more amenable to\nnegotiation.\nSOVIET AND SOVIET-CONTROLLED REACTIONS: There is much exultant\nrepetition of the idea that the ruling circles in the West can no longer\n\"blackmail\" or \"intimidate\" the \"democratic\" countries as they have\ndone in the past. Apart from this, however, the most striking fact is\nthe cautiousness displayed in Moscow's own reaction to the event. It\nis shown in several ways:\nSlow reaction. For the first five days after the announcement\nMoscow confined itself almost entirely to distributing the TASS\nstatement and quoting favorable foreign comment. It was not\nuntil nine days after the announcement that the first full-\nlength Soviet commentary on it appeared.\nLimited volume. Apart from news reports (which have been widely\ndistributed), there has been nothing like an all-out propaganda\ncapitalization of the event. Even after the first full-length\ncommentary on it appeared, the bulk of the comment has consisted\nof single sentences or paragraphs embedded in other contexts.\nCalmness of tone. The tone of the original TASS statement has\nbeen maintained. There are rather frequent references, for\nexample, to the idea that the USSR has had the bomb (or the\n\"secret\"--it is not clear which) since 1947.\nDECLASSIFIED\nRESTRICTED\naluthority E.O. 10501"
}