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11
in Guatemala is dependent, in the last analy-
Colonel Arbenz) could obtain the support of
sis, upon the support of the leaders of the
an effective group within the army in combi-
armed forces-or, at least, upon their non-
nation with the support of labor and the po-
intervention on behalf of the opposition.
lice, his chances of success would be greatly
Though relegated to a non-political role un-
enhanced.
der the Constitution, the traditional role of
Although the Catholic Church in Guate-
the army as the most powerful potential po-
mala, as in all Latin American countries, ex-
litical force in the country is still generally
erts a strong moral force in the community,
recognized. During the Arévalo regime, its
its influence in politics has been weak and in-
leaders have, in general, shown sympathy for
direct since the anti-clerical reforms of Bar-
the moderate and conservative political fac-
rios, who came to power in 1873. The sym-
tors.
pathies of the church tend to coincide with
Other organizations representing physical
those of the conservative, propertied classes
force and the threat of violence are influential
and are opposed to those of liberals who ad-
in proportion to their strength and composi-
vocate social reforms. In consequence, under
tion. The national police force (the Guardia
the present regime, the church has been
Civil) has confined itself to a "non-political"
rather effectively prevented from expressing
role since the overthrow of Ubico in 1944. Al-
its political sympathies through public media.
though it could not effectively oppose the
The pro-Catholic radio station, PAX, was ar-
army, it is more responsive to the President,
bitrarily closed in 1948 for broadcasting "Fa-
comprises a rather select group oriented in
langist" propaganda. From the pulpit, the
favor of the PAR, and could be used as a
clergy has been able to denounce Communism
threat in political maneuvering or to enforce
and to encourage voting for anti-Communist
minor partisan policies. It is currently under
political candidates belonging to the conserva-
the direction of Colonel Victor M. Sandoval,
tive opposition parties. Church approval
brother-in-law of President Arévalo.
possibly aided in the election of a conserva-
In addition to the army and the police, the
tive as mayor of Guatemala City in 1948, but
Indian laborers also represent an element of
Church influence in political affairs has, in
force in Guatemalan politics traditionally used
general, been slight. Should the Arévalo re-
to support partisan policies. Since 1944, they
gime be followed by a more conservative one,
have been consolidated and organized into
the political influence of the church may be
labor unions which, in general, support the
expected to increase, though it is probable
radical policies of the PAR. The most impor-
that the church would continue to avoid di-
tant of these unions are the CTG (Confedera-
rect involvement in politics or a close alliance
ción de Trabajadores de Guatemala) which
with any single political party.
includes the agricultural unions, and the FSG
5. Current Issues.
(Federación Sindical de Guatemala) which
includes industrial and railway unions. These
The current issues of Guatemalan politics
two federations support a political action
have arisen largely as the result of an at-
committee, the CPNT (Comité Politico Na-
tempt, by the Arévalo government, to put into
cional de los Trabajadores). There is evi-
practice certain revolutionary ideals that in-
dence that the PAR, with the knowledge and
evitably conflict with the interests and tradi-
possible support of Minister of Defense Ar-
tions of the wealthy, conservative elements in
benz, distributed arms to the unions, and the
the society, particularly those engaged in
15,000 laborers who take part in the annual
business and large-scale agriculture. The ad-
May Day demonstration represent the poten-
ministration program has been favored, and
tial force which the PAR has at its disposal.
conflict somewhat minimized, however, by a
If the army remains united, it might be able
period of postwar prosperity and additional
to dictate the result of the coming presiden-
revenue obtained from government operation
tial election. And even if the army were di-
of the expropriated German coffee fincas-
vided, if any candidate (such as Lieutenant
factors which have helped to support the ex-
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n11\nin Guatemala is dependent, in the last analy-\nColonel Arbenz) could obtain the support of\nsis, upon the support of the leaders of the\nan effective group within the army in combi-\narmed forces-or, at least, upon their non-\nnation with the support of labor and the po-\nintervention on behalf of the opposition.\nlice, his chances of success would be greatly\nThough relegated to a non-political role un-\nenhanced.\nder the Constitution, the traditional role of\nAlthough the Catholic Church in Guate-\nthe army as the most powerful potential po-\nmala, as in all Latin American countries, ex-\nlitical force in the country is still generally\nerts a strong moral force in the community,\nrecognized. During the Arévalo regime, its\nits influence in politics has been weak and in-\nleaders have, in general, shown sympathy for\ndirect since the anti-clerical reforms of Bar-\nthe moderate and conservative political fac-\nrios, who came to power in 1873. The sym-\ntors.\npathies of the church tend to coincide with\nOther organizations representing physical\nthose of the conservative, propertied classes\nforce and the threat of violence are influential\nand are opposed to those of liberals who ad-\nin proportion to their strength and composi-\nvocate social reforms. In consequence, under\ntion. The national police force (the Guardia\nthe present regime, the church has been\nCivil) has confined itself to a \"non-political\"\nrather effectively prevented from expressing\nrole since the overthrow of Ubico in 1944. Al-\nits political sympathies through public media.\nthough it could not effectively oppose the\nThe pro-Catholic radio station, PAX, was ar-\narmy, it is more responsive to the President,\nbitrarily closed in 1948 for broadcasting \"Fa-\ncomprises a rather select group oriented in\nlangist\" propaganda. From the pulpit, the\nfavor of the PAR, and could be used as a\nclergy has been able to denounce Communism\nthreat in political maneuvering or to enforce\nand to encourage voting for anti-Communist\nminor partisan policies. It is currently under\npolitical candidates belonging to the conserva-\nthe direction of Colonel Victor M. Sandoval,\ntive opposition parties. Church approval\nbrother-in-law of President Arévalo.\npossibly aided in the election of a conserva-\nIn addition to the army and the police, the\ntive as mayor of Guatemala City in 1948, but\nIndian laborers also represent an element of\nChurch influence in political affairs has, in\nforce in Guatemalan politics traditionally used\ngeneral, been slight. Should the Arévalo re-\nto support partisan policies. Since 1944, they\ngime be followed by a more conservative one,\nhave been consolidated and organized into\nthe political influence of the church may be\nlabor unions which, in general, support the\nexpected to increase, though it is probable\nradical policies of the PAR. The most impor-\nthat the church would continue to avoid di-\ntant of these unions are the CTG (Confedera-\nrect involvement in politics or a close alliance\nción de Trabajadores de Guatemala) which\nwith any single political party.\nincludes the agricultural unions, and the FSG\n5. Current Issues.\n(Federación Sindical de Guatemala) which\nincludes industrial and railway unions. These\nThe current issues of Guatemalan politics\ntwo federations support a political action\nhave arisen largely as the result of an at-\ncommittee, the CPNT (Comité Politico Na-\ntempt, by the Arévalo government, to put into\ncional de los Trabajadores). There is evi-\npractice certain revolutionary ideals that in-\ndence that the PAR, with the knowledge and\nevitably conflict with the interests and tradi-\npossible support of Minister of Defense Ar-\ntions of the wealthy, conservative elements in\nbenz, distributed arms to the unions, and the\nthe society, particularly those engaged in\n15,000 laborers who take part in the annual\nbusiness and large-scale agriculture. The ad-\nMay Day demonstration represent the poten-\nministration program has been favored, and\ntial force which the PAR has at its disposal.\nconflict somewhat minimized, however, by a\nIf the army remains united, it might be able\nperiod of postwar prosperity and additional\nto dictate the result of the coming presiden-\nrevenue obtained from government operation\ntial election. And even if the army were di-\nof the expropriated German coffee fincas-\nvided, if any candidate (such as Lieutenant\nfactors which have helped to support the ex-"
}