Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486501062",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Guatemala, Situation Report 46",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501062"
}

{
    "id": "486501062",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501062",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Guatemala, Situation Report 46",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501062",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875515/875515-01-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875515/875515-01-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875515/875515-01-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 55,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501062",
    "naId": 486501062,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 27,
            "logicalDate": "1950-07-27",
            "month": 7,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 47,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875515/875515-01-047.tif",
    "mediaId": "9f597b08adde5cba",
    "ocrText": "SECRET\n47\nbe difficult and the influence of labor (and\nIn the immediate future, a slightly more con-\nCommunism) would be considerably dimin-\nciliatory attitude toward the US may be ex-\nished. There would, of course, continue to be\npected to result from the replacement of the\na large number of the working class who would\nleftist Muñoz Meany by moderate González\nbe receptive to Communist propaganda, but if\nArévalo as Foreign Minister. There is no in-\nnot adequately led and not favored by a tol-\ndication, however, that the government's an-\nerant government, they could exert little in-\ntagonistic attitude toward US business inter-\nfluence. (4) The increasing indebtedness of\nests will be abandoned, although it may be\nthe government will favor adoption of a pro-\nmodified somewhat. Concentration on the\nUS policy. The United States has offered\npresidential campaign may cause Guatemalan\nfinancial and technical assistance to Guate-\naid to foregn \"democratic\" revolutionary\nmala, and leading Guatemalan officials and\ngroups to diminish, but expressions of sym-\npresidential candidates are aware of the ad-\npathy with \"democratic\" governments and\nvantages of a pro-US policy. No evidence is\npolitical factions will continue. Guatemala's\navailable to indicate that the USSR has offered\nclaim to Belize, supported by conservatives and\ncomparable benefits to Guatemala, or that the\nliberals alike, will continue to be advanced.\ncountry, the government, or high officials of\n5. Military.\nthe government would benefit materially from\nThe growth of a militant labor movement in\na pro-Communist, pro-USSR policy. (5)\nGuatemala will, it is estimated, force the army\nWhereas Arévalo's political idealism has led\nto assume a more active role in political af-\nhim to establish an administration that per-\nfairs-to the advantage of the conservative\nmits the freedom of expression enjoyed by the\nfactions. Although some efforts may be made\nCommunists, there is no evidence to suggest\nunder Major Paz Tejada to improve army\nthat his successor is imbued with a similar\nequipment and training, no great change is to\nidealism. It is likely that all the presidential\ncandidates are less idealistic and more mate-\nbe expected in the capabilities or functions of\nthe armed forces.\nrialistic (or \"practical\") than Arévalo.\n6. Strategic Considerations Affecting US Se-\n3. Economic.\ncurity.\nIn view of prospects for a continued world\nPending the development of possible oil re-\ncoffee shortage, which would assure the sale,\nserves at some time in the unforseeable future,\nat advantageous prices, of Guatemala's pri-\nthe positive contribution which Guatemala can\nmary export, and in view of a continued de-\nmake toward US security will continue to be\nmand for Guatemalan bananas, Guatemala's\neconomic situation should remain favorable.\nslight. Its location within the US defense\nThe development of Guatemalan oil resources\nsphere, however, will continue to make it a\nin the near future is not indicated.\npossible location for US or enemy military and\npropaganda operations. Because Guatemala\n4. Foreign Affairs.\nis incapable of defending itself against a strong\nIn event of a third world war, Guatemala\nenemy, the denial of its facilities and resources\nmay be expected to support the US, provided\n(admittedly limited) to such an enemy is pri-\nits economic security would not be endangered.\nmarily a US responsibility.\nSECRET"
}