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SECRE I
8.
(5) The Communist forces would be denied an
additional operational base against Japan.
(6) In the event that large scale operations against
China become necessary, Korea would be favor-
able for joint UN-US ground operations because:
(a) The superior air and sea power of the UN
forces could be brought to bear effectively
against the numerically superior ground
forces;
(b) Chinese Communist attrition would be
relatively high in the confined battle area
in Korea;
(c) The beachhead would provide an operational
base that would tie down large numbers of
Communist forces, could be used to mount
subsequent operations in Korea, and could be
used to support operations elsewhere in the
Far East in the event of a general war with
China.
b. The maintenance of a beachhead would have the follow-
ing military disadvantages:
(1) A critical proportion of the US Army and substantial
proportion of US naval and air resources would be
committed in the area, thereby reducing immediate
US capabilities for building up forces elsewhere.
(2) A considerable drain on US military resources would
be imposed not only in the support of US forces in
Korea, but also in the complete logistic support for
Republic of Korea forces and the major part of the
logistic support for all other United Nations forces
in Korea.
- 2 -
SECRE'
T
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"ocrText": "SECRE I\n8.\n(5) The Communist forces would be denied an\nadditional operational base against Japan.\n(6) In the event that large scale operations against\nChina become necessary, Korea would be favor-\nable for joint UN-US ground operations because:\n(a) The superior air and sea power of the UN\nforces could be brought to bear effectively\nagainst the numerically superior ground\nforces;\n(b) Chinese Communist attrition would be\nrelatively high in the confined battle area\nin Korea;\n(c) The beachhead would provide an operational\nbase that would tie down large numbers of\nCommunist forces, could be used to mount\nsubsequent operations in Korea, and could be\nused to support operations elsewhere in the\nFar East in the event of a general war with\nChina.\nb. The maintenance of a beachhead would have the follow-\ning military disadvantages:\n(1) A critical proportion of the US Army and substantial\nproportion of US naval and air resources would be\ncommitted in the area, thereby reducing immediate\nUS capabilities for building up forces elsewhere.\n(2) A considerable drain on US military resources would\nbe imposed not only in the support of US forces in\nKorea, but also in the complete logistic support for\nRepublic of Korea forces and the major part of the\nlogistic support for all other United Nations forces\nin Korea.\n- 2 -\nSECRE'\nT"
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