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{
    "localId": "486501379",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Implications of a Census and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments, Special Estimate 4",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Intelligence Implications of a Census and Verification of Armed Forces and Armaments, Special Estimate 4",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501379",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 12,
            "logicalDate": "1951-05-12",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1951
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{
    "seq": 13,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-03-013.tif",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n7. In any census and verification, each side would be bound to gain a\ncertain amount of \"collateral\" information (data on general conditions\nin the country, economic conditions, quality of weapons, standards of\ntraining, level of maintenance of equipment, etc.) in fields not directly\ncovered by any census phase. While the USSR, as a police state, could\nmore effectively control the collateral intelligence obtained in the\ncourse of inspection and verification, we believe on balance that the\nUS might gain more in this field. Even assuming Soviet bad faith, the\npaucity of US intelligence on most aspects of the USSR gives a corre-\nspondingly high value to almost any collateral information that might\nbe gleaned, while much of the collateral information available to the\nUSSR could be easily secured in any case.\n8. Inevitably, any phased inspection system will leave, as an after-\nmath, increased internal security problems for the US. The Soviet\ninspection teams will note the places and facilities they are not\nallowed to visit, and some of these facilities will then become targets\nfor intensive covert intelligence exploitation. Since Soviet intelligence\nfacilities in the US are extensive, the internal security problems will\nbecome more serious through such targeting.\nPART II. CENSUS AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES\n9. Any satisfactory census and verification procedure should meet\nfour criteria. It should provide for: (a) comprehensive and detailed\nspecifications for disclosure within agreed phases, thus reducing the\npossible scope of Soviet bad faith; (b) clear documentation of Soviet\nbad faith at any stage, thus providing the best possible case for\ntermination; (c) prompt termination at any stage in event of such bad\nfaith; and (d) protection of the US, insofar as possible, from dis-\nclosure of highly sensitive information, including premature dis-\nclosure in earlier phases of information reserved for later phases.\nScope of Census and Verification\n10. The physical and geographical scope of census and verification\nwould obviously have a great bearing on the overall advantages to\nEast versus West. The USSR has called for Big Four disarmament,\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET"
}