Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "486501401",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Vulnerabilities of Communist China, Special Estimate 5",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401"
}

{
    "id": "486501401",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Vulnerabilities of Communist China, Special Estimate 5",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 18,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501401",
    "naId": 486501401,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 22,
            "logicalDate": "1951-05-22",
            "month": 5,
            "year": 1951
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 9,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875518/875518-04-009.tif",
    "mediaId": "0f2943ef6c127add",
    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n13. In the event of US military involvement in China, the USSR would\nseek to exploit internationally to the fullest extent the issue of aggression\nand the danger of global war. We believe that it puts great store by its\npolitical and psychological potential and would strive to divide us internally,\nestrange us from our allies, promote fear and neutralism, and discredit\nour leadership and desire for peace. The extent and nature of the USSR's\nmilitary reactions in the Far East as discussed in the following paragraphs\nwould, at each stage, undoubtedly be coordinated with its program of inter-\nnational political and psychological exploitation.\n14. If the US should give covert aid to Chinese guerrillas, or if the\nUS should give logistical support on Taiwan sufficient to enable the Chinese\nNationalists to invade the mainland, we believe the USSR would give in-\ncreased aid to the Chinese Communists designed to counter the effects of\nsuch US aid. Since US forces would not be involved in an invasion of the\nmainland supported logistically from Taiwan, the USSR might conclude\nthat its own air and submarine forces could be used to counter the\ninvasion without serious risk of a conflict with the US.\n15. Full US logistical and operational support of a Chinese Nationalist\ninvasion of the mainland would almost certainly be regarded by the USSR\nas a serious threat to its security interests in the Far East. Although we\nare unable, on the basis of intelligence, to determine what measures the\nUSSR would take to meet such a threat, we believe that the USSR would\ntake steps which would increase the risk of general war. So long as the\nKremlin estimated that the existence of the Chinese Communist regime\nwas not in jeopardy, we believe that the USSR, while giving all necessary\nsupport against the invasion, probably would not openly commit its own\nforces against US forces. If, however, the Kremlin estimated that the\nexistence of the regime was in jeopardy, we believe that the USSR,\nwhatever the consequent risks of general war, would do whatever was\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET"
}