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There have been numerous reports that Communist forces in Manchuria
have been supplied and trained with Soviet equipment. If these forces
exist they could be utilized in Korea. In any event, personnel for the
operation of Soviet equipment could be obtained by training Communist
forces presently in Korea, by introducing "volunteers" from Soviet-
Satellite sources, or by introducing organized Soviet units. Unless
the USSR has, in fact, trained and equipped large Communist forces in
Manchuria, we do not believe that the Chinese Communists can defeat
the UN/US forces in Korea in the immediate future merely with the
additional support of advisory, logistical and technical assistance and
rear area participation from the USSR. If Soviet ground and air person-
nel were to be employed in sufficient strength to add decisively to
Chinese Communist capabilities, such personnel would almost certain-
ly come in direct contact with US forces, thereby creating a state of
de facto war between the US and the USSR in Korea. We do not believe
the Soviet Union is willing to accept the risk of such a de facto war,
which might expand into general war, merely to insure an early defeat
or expulsion of UN/US forces.
5. It is more likely that the Kremlin will attempt to prevent an ex-
tension of the area of conflict and, in recognition of internal strains in
Communist China, will endeavor to provide enough logistical and tech-
nical assistance to insure maintenance of Chinese Communist will and
ability to continue military operations in Korea. The Kremlin may
estimate that thereby it could oblige the UN/US to maintain very sub-
stantial forces in Korea indefinitely, at great cost and with continuing
strain on the political and military relations of the participating UN
nations. *
The DI/USAF would add the following consideration at this point:
"However, it is possible that the Chinese Communists would reject
such a plan and demand decisive help from the USSR or decline to
maintain more than a holding force in Korea. Such a course of
action would give them a greater freedom for operations elsewhere."
- 3 -
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\nThere have been numerous reports that Communist forces in Manchuria\nhave been supplied and trained with Soviet equipment. If these forces\nexist they could be utilized in Korea. In any event, personnel for the\noperation of Soviet equipment could be obtained by training Communist\nforces presently in Korea, by introducing \"volunteers\" from Soviet-\nSatellite sources, or by introducing organized Soviet units. Unless\nthe USSR has, in fact, trained and equipped large Communist forces in\nManchuria, we do not believe that the Chinese Communists can defeat\nthe UN/US forces in Korea in the immediate future merely with the\nadditional support of advisory, logistical and technical assistance and\nrear area participation from the USSR. If Soviet ground and air person-\nnel were to be employed in sufficient strength to add decisively to\nChinese Communist capabilities, such personnel would almost certain-\nly come in direct contact with US forces, thereby creating a state of\nde facto war between the US and the USSR in Korea. We do not believe\nthe Soviet Union is willing to accept the risk of such a de facto war,\nwhich might expand into general war, merely to insure an early defeat\nor expulsion of UN/US forces.\n5. It is more likely that the Kremlin will attempt to prevent an ex-\ntension of the area of conflict and, in recognition of internal strains in\nCommunist China, will endeavor to provide enough logistical and tech-\nnical assistance to insure maintenance of Chinese Communist will and\nability to continue military operations in Korea. The Kremlin may\nestimate that thereby it could oblige the UN/US to maintain very sub-\nstantial forces in Korea indefinitely, at great cost and with continuing\nstrain on the political and military relations of the participating UN\nnations. *\nThe DI/USAF would add the following consideration at this point:\n\"However, it is possible that the Chinese Communists would reject\nsuch a plan and demand decisive help from the USSR or decline to\nmaintain more than a holding force in Korea. Such a course of\naction would give them a greater freedom for operations elsewhere.\"\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET"
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