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    "localId": "486501599",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Consequences of Certain Possible United States Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina, Burma, or Thailand, Special Estimate 22",
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    "id": "486501599",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Consequences of Certain Possible United States Courses of Action with Respect to Indochina, Burma, or Thailand, Special Estimate 22",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501599",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 29,
            "logicalDate": "1952-02-29",
            "month": 2,
            "year": 1952
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    "seq": 4,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-02-004.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nmilitary intervention\" in Southeast Asia would entail\nsubstantial risk of joint military counteraction, and that\nsuch a risk is unwarranted in view of the prospects for\nfurther Communist gains in Southeast Asia without such\nintervention. They may, however, discount this risk,\nestimating that there are differences in policy among the\nfive powers and that these powers may not be able or\nwilling to take timely* and effective military counteraction.\n3.\nThe effectiveness of a joint warning as a deterrent\nwould depend in large measure on Communist conviction that:\na.\nThe five powers were not bluffing, and were\nunited among themselves as to the military\ncounteraction to be taken.\nb.\nThe five powers were actually capable of\ntimely and effective military counteraction.*\nC. The counteraction would be directed against\nCommunist China itself as well as toward\nrepelling the Chinese Communist intervention.\n4.\nIf the Communists were convinced on the foregoing\npoints they would have to recognize that intervention in South-\neast Asia would bring military counteraction, the probable\n*\nThe Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State\nholds the view that the Communists might be seriously con-\ncerned over the prospect of delayed military counteraction,\neven though they believed that timely counteraction need not\nbe feared. He therefore believes that the words \"timely and\"\nshould be omitted.\n- 3 -\nSECRET"
}