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{
    "localId": "486501628",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Military Indications of a Possible Large-Scale Communist Attack in Korea in the Immediate Future, Special Estimate 25",
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{
    "id": "486501628",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501628",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Military Indications of a Possible Large-Scale Communist Attack in Korea in the Immediate Future, Special Estimate 25",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501628",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
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    "naId": 486501628,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1952-04-28",
            "month": 4,
            "year": 1952
        }
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{
    "seq": 5,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-05-005.tif",
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n2\nlogistic capability to maintain the momentum\nsector, has been accepted. The movement of\nof a major offensive for from 5 to 10 days.\nthree other CCF armies toward the western\nDifficulties in connection with the movement\nsector has been reported but is unconfirmed.\nof supplies from forward dumps to the attack-\nb. Reports of PW's and other information\ning units would be the limiting factor.\npoint to the possibility of a forward movement\n6. The capabilities of the Communist Air\nof some armored vehicles from the Wonson\nForce in the Korean area (North Korea, Man-\narea on the east coast. Elements of the 1st\nchuria, and Northeast China) have improved\nand 3rd Armored Divisions are accepted as at-\nsteadily and rapidly. During the armistice\ntached to or in direct support of front-line\nnegotiations, the estimated Communist com-\nunits on the west and west central fronts.\nbat aircraft strength in the Korean area has\nOther elements of these two divisions remain\nincreased from 500 aircraft to the present\nunlocated. During the past several months\ntotal of 1,250 aircraft plus 75 transports, in-\nunconfirmed reports have also referred to the\ncluding an increase from 450 jet fighters to\nsouthward movement of the North Korean V\nthe current 800. There are also 400 combat\nCorps.\naircraft deployed in south and central China\n9. During the past few weeks there have been\nwhich could not be committed in Korea with-\nfour PW reports of a new offensive. Most\nout redeployment. There is a sufficient num-\nPW's, however, have continued to refer\nber of operational airfields in Manchuria from\nto enemy defensive plans, including the\nwhich attacks by the above aircraft could be\nstrengthening of defense fortifications and the\nlaunched against UN forces. An apparently\nrotation of front-line units.\neffective system of air control and warning is\nbelieved operating in North Korea. Commu-\n10. The possibility that the enemy is prepar-\nnist pilots in Manchuria have been engaged in\ning to relieve some front-line units is further\nan intensive training program. The Commu-\nsuggested by PW reports that the CCF 67th\nnists have also demonstrated a significant\nArmy will relieve the 68th Army and that the\ncapability to support logistically a sizeable air\nCCF 26th Army is to be relieved in the imme-\nforce in Manchuria.\ndiate future. There is no confirmation, how-\never, that the relief of any front-line units is\n7. The Communist Air Force in the Korean\nunder way.\narea could launch an air attack which might\ninflict substantial damage upon United Na-\n11. There has been one recent report that\ntions ground forces, naval and air installa-\nNorth Korean guerrilla forces are being\ntions, and lines of communications in Korea.\ntrained to infiltrate UN lines (a tactic which\nInitially, a force of approximately 500 MIG-\nhas preceded previous offensives). This re-\n15's, 150 piston-engined fighters and 150 light\nport receives some substantiation from the\nbombers could be made available, but without\nrecent capture by UN forces of a small num-\nunusual success in countering UN efforts\nber of line-crossers.\nagainst this attack, it is believed it could not\nAir\nbe sustained.\n12. The most significant recent incident with\nIndications of Communist Military\nrespect to enemy air activity was a visual\nAND\nsighting on 13 April of 450 jet aircraft on\nIntentions in Korea\nTatungku airfield and 50 on Antung airfield.\nGround\nThis is approximately twice the number of air-\n8. In recent weeks there have been several\ncraft ever before sighted on these airfields and\nindications, generally unconfirmed, of in-\nvery nearly the total estimated MIG-15\ncreased enemy activity in Korea.\nstrength in Manchuria. Although an error of\na. The movement of two Chinese Commu-\nup to 75 aircraft in this sighting is possible,\nnist armies, one forward towards the western\nthis report is regarded as substantially accu-\nsector and one eastward towards the central\nrate. Subsequent observations during the day\nSECRET"
}