Ask the Scholar
Page 12 of 14
I can add historical knowledge about this page.
Page image
OCR
No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7
SECRET
8
tions would be affected by this threat to the
Korea or mainland China that might success-
security of their coastal border.
fully take pressure off Southeast Asia. In
general, the countries of Southeast Asia
39. In any event, Peiping and Moscow would
would fear that the Chinese Communists
almost certainly react to Nationalist prepara-
would be provoked to attack them, or that
tions by intensifying the tempo and virulence
there might be an expansion of hostilities in
of their present anti-US propaganda, by seek-
the Far East which might develop into gen-
ing to drive a wedge between the US and its
eral war. In addition, widespread distaste
allies, and by conducting a "hard-soft" policy
for the Nationalist regime and a generally
designed to intimidate potential supporters of
low appraisal of Nationalist offensive capa-
the US-Nationalist program and to convince
bilities would contribute to the generally ad-
the world of the Communists' peaceful intent.
verse reaction. These attitudes would prob-
In addition, Communist reactions would prob-
ably be intensified should Nationalist offensive
ably include accelerating preparations for the
preparations be undertaken under conditions
defense of coastal China and seizing the off-
either of a Korean armistice or a US-initiated
shore Nationalist islands. Finally, the CCAF
expansion of the Korean war. If Nationalist
might undertake attacks on Taiwan.
offensive preparations followed substantially
increased Communist operations in Korea,
Reactions of Non-Communist Countries
reactions in Southeast Asia would be less un-
40. Japan. Japan undoubtedly desires to re-
favorable but would remain generally nega-
duce the combined Far Eastern power of Com-
tive, except perhaps in Thailand, the Philip-
munist China and the USSR. However,
pines, and the Associated States of Indochina.
Japan is for the time being almost wholly
42. Australia and New Zealand. General dis-
dependent on the US for its security, and
dain for both the Nationalists and their offen-
moreover is fearful that any extension of hos-
tilities in the Far East would involve Japan
sive capabilities, the desire to avoid the risk
directly. Reaction to a US-Nationalist pro-
of general war, and domestic political pres-
gram - which to the Japanese might seem to
sures from vocal Labor oppositions would mili-
risk serious diversion of US strength from
tate against support for an identifiable US
Japan's defense and an expansion of hostili-
program of preparing the Nationalists for
ties in the Far East - would therefore prob-
offensive operations.
ably be apprehensive if not unfavorable. In
43. South Asia. US-sponsored preparations
the event that Nationalist offensive prepara-
of Nationalist China for offensive operations
tions were undertaken when Korean opera-
against the Chinese Communists would elicit
tions had been substantially increased, either
adverse reactions throughout South Asia, par-
on Communist or US initiative, this Japanese
ticularly in India. Such operations would be
reaction might be appreciably modified, par-
regarded by South Asians as bringing general
ticularly if the Communists suffered major
war nearer and as definite evidence of US
losses. Japanese apprehensions would proba-
aggressiveness. These attitudes would be lit-
bly be increased, on the other hand, if Nation-
tle affected by the course of events in Korea.
alist offensive preparations were undertaken
after an armistice had been reached in Korea.
44, Near East. There is general apathy
throughout the Near East with respect to
41. Southeast Asia. The countries of South-
events in the Far East. These countries,
east Asia would in general react unfavorably
largely neutralist, would probably interpret an
to an identifiable US program of preparing
observable US program of preparing Nation-
the Nationalists for offensive operations.
alist forces for offensive operations as an effort
Reactions would be less adverse, particularly
to expand the war in the Far East. This
in the Philippines, Thailand, and the Associ-
reaction would not be significantly modified
ated States of Indochina, to the prospect of
by events in Korea. However, Turkey would
any employment of Nationalist troops in
probably ultimately support such a program.
No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7
Page data
- Page
- 12
- Source index
- 0
- Type
- photo
- Media ID
- b8fd3baea6573599
- Size
- unknown
Document data
- ID
- 486501643
- Core
- doc
- Type
- document
DTO data
{
"id": "486501643",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Present and Potential Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to an Identifiable United States Program of Preparing the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, Special Estimate 29",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-001.tif",
"imageCount": 14,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Context sent to Scholar
Document identity
{
"localId": "486501643",
"label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Present and Potential Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to an Identifiable United States Program of Preparing the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, Special Estimate 29",
"core": "doc",
"dtoType": "document",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643"
}
Document source metadata
{
"id": "486501643",
"sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
"contentType": "document",
"title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Present and Potential Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to an Identifiable United States Program of Preparing the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, Special Estimate 29",
"citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
"collections": [
"President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
"Intelligence Files"
],
"iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-001.tif",
"thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-001.tif",
"largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-001.tif",
"imageCount": 14,
"hasImages": true,
"source": "import",
"hasTranscription": false
}
Document source extras
{
"url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
"naId": 486501643,
"levelOfDescription": "item",
"productionDates": [
{
"day": 18,
"logicalDate": "1952-06-18",
"month": 6,
"year": 1952
}
],
"recordType": "description",
"ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}
Page context
{
"seq": 12,
"pageIndex": 0,
"type": "photo",
"url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-012.tif",
"mediaId": "b8fd3baea6573599",
"ocrText": "No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7\nSECRET\n8\ntions would be affected by this threat to the\nKorea or mainland China that might success-\nsecurity of their coastal border.\nfully take pressure off Southeast Asia. In\ngeneral, the countries of Southeast Asia\n39. In any event, Peiping and Moscow would\nwould fear that the Chinese Communists\nalmost certainly react to Nationalist prepara-\nwould be provoked to attack them, or that\ntions by intensifying the tempo and virulence\nthere might be an expansion of hostilities in\nof their present anti-US propaganda, by seek-\nthe Far East which might develop into gen-\ning to drive a wedge between the US and its\neral war. In addition, widespread distaste\nallies, and by conducting a \"hard-soft\" policy\nfor the Nationalist regime and a generally\ndesigned to intimidate potential supporters of\nlow appraisal of Nationalist offensive capa-\nthe US-Nationalist program and to convince\nbilities would contribute to the generally ad-\nthe world of the Communists' peaceful intent.\nverse reaction. These attitudes would prob-\nIn addition, Communist reactions would prob-\nably be intensified should Nationalist offensive\nably include accelerating preparations for the\npreparations be undertaken under conditions\ndefense of coastal China and seizing the off-\neither of a Korean armistice or a US-initiated\nshore Nationalist islands. Finally, the CCAF\nexpansion of the Korean war. If Nationalist\nmight undertake attacks on Taiwan.\noffensive preparations followed substantially\nincreased Communist operations in Korea,\nReactions of Non-Communist Countries\nreactions in Southeast Asia would be less un-\n40. Japan. Japan undoubtedly desires to re-\nfavorable but would remain generally nega-\nduce the combined Far Eastern power of Com-\ntive, except perhaps in Thailand, the Philip-\nmunist China and the USSR. However,\npines, and the Associated States of Indochina.\nJapan is for the time being almost wholly\n42. Australia and New Zealand. General dis-\ndependent on the US for its security, and\ndain for both the Nationalists and their offen-\nmoreover is fearful that any extension of hos-\ntilities in the Far East would involve Japan\nsive capabilities, the desire to avoid the risk\ndirectly. Reaction to a US-Nationalist pro-\nof general war, and domestic political pres-\ngram - which to the Japanese might seem to\nsures from vocal Labor oppositions would mili-\nrisk serious diversion of US strength from\ntate against support for an identifiable US\nJapan's defense and an expansion of hostili-\nprogram of preparing the Nationalists for\nties in the Far East - would therefore prob-\noffensive operations.\nably be apprehensive if not unfavorable. In\n43. South Asia. US-sponsored preparations\nthe event that Nationalist offensive prepara-\nof Nationalist China for offensive operations\ntions were undertaken when Korean opera-\nagainst the Chinese Communists would elicit\ntions had been substantially increased, either\nadverse reactions throughout South Asia, par-\non Communist or US initiative, this Japanese\nticularly in India. Such operations would be\nreaction might be appreciably modified, par-\nregarded by South Asians as bringing general\nticularly if the Communists suffered major\nwar nearer and as definite evidence of US\nlosses. Japanese apprehensions would proba-\naggressiveness. These attitudes would be lit-\nbly be increased, on the other hand, if Nation-\ntle affected by the course of events in Korea.\nalist offensive preparations were undertaken\nafter an armistice had been reached in Korea.\n44, Near East. There is general apathy\nthroughout the Near East with respect to\n41. Southeast Asia. The countries of South-\nevents in the Far East. These countries,\neast Asia would in general react unfavorably\nlargely neutralist, would probably interpret an\nto an identifiable US program of preparing\nobservable US program of preparing Nation-\nthe Nationalists for offensive operations.\nalist forces for offensive operations as an effort\nReactions would be less adverse, particularly\nto expand the war in the Far East. This\nin the Philippines, Thailand, and the Associ-\nreaction would not be significantly modified\nated States of Indochina, to the prospect of\nby events in Korea. However, Turkey would\nany employment of Nationalist troops in\nprobably ultimately support such a program.\nNo Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7"
}