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CONT
ARCHIVES **NATIONAL RECORDS AND
-6-
SERVICE"
Viewed in absolute terms, the greatest danger that
could confront the United States security would be a com-
bination and working together for purposes hostile to us
of the Central European and the Russian military-industria]
potentials. They would really create an entity, the two
of them together, which could overshadow in a strategic
sense even our own power. It is not anything, I think,
which would be as easy of achievement as people often por-
tray it as being. I am not sure the Russians have the
genius for holding all that together. The Germans apparently
didn't. although they tried it. Still, they have the tend-
ency of political thought, of Communist political expansion,
which causes us to concentrate on that problem and do our
best to prevent such a combination in coming about in a
spirit and form which could be hostile to us. That does
create I would point out - a real distinction, from
our standpoint, between the situation of Europe and the
situation of China and of Asia. It was because of that
distinction that we have done what we have done and had,
I think, the political success that we have had in Europe.
When we talk about helping people to resist pressures,
such as those that come from Moscow, it is not something
we can do by our own policy alone. tie can get success
only by inter-action between our policy and what already
exists in the way of natural will and ability to resistance
in other countries. It did happen that in the European
countries there was a strong enough attachment to national
independence as such, a strong enough repugnance to the
sort of thing that was being thrust upon countries by the
Russians, a strong enough will to hold out against that to
enable us with our assistance to be of real political
value there. It was partly because those prerequisites
existed that we have been able to follow a program in
Furope which proved, I think, much more successful and
which looked much more purposeful, much more well-designed
probably than what we have done in Asia, but there is also
the fact that it does seem to us a more serious prospect
that the Russians should get hold of Central Europe from
the sheer military standpoint of national security than
it does that they should get hold of China and Asia.
That does not mean that we underrate the importance
of a Communist advance in Asia. We do not even underrate,
I hope, the military importance of China. We realize that
in some respects the Chinese have formidable military
capabilities, although they seem to us to be ones that
express themselves more in the defensive than anything
that could make up amphibious strength or strength which
could be projected beyond the borders of China.
You
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"ocrText": "CONT\nARCHIVES **NATIONAL RECORDS AND\n-6-\nSERVICE\"\nViewed in absolute terms, the greatest danger that\ncould confront the United States security would be a com-\nbination and working together for purposes hostile to us\nof the Central European and the Russian military-industria]\npotentials. They would really create an entity, the two\nof them together, which could overshadow in a strategic\nsense even our own power. It is not anything, I think,\nwhich would be as easy of achievement as people often por-\ntray it as being. I am not sure the Russians have the\ngenius for holding all that together. The Germans apparently\ndidn't. although they tried it. Still, they have the tend-\nency of political thought, of Communist political expansion,\nwhich causes us to concentrate on that problem and do our\nbest to prevent such a combination in coming about in a\nspirit and form which could be hostile to us. That does\ncreate I would point out - a real distinction, from\nour standpoint, between the situation of Europe and the\nsituation of China and of Asia. It was because of that\ndistinction that we have done what we have done and had,\nI think, the political success that we have had in Europe.\nWhen we talk about helping people to resist pressures,\nsuch as those that come from Moscow, it is not something\nwe can do by our own policy alone. tie can get success\nonly by inter-action between our policy and what already\nexists in the way of natural will and ability to resistance\nin other countries. It did happen that in the European\ncountries there was a strong enough attachment to national\nindependence as such, a strong enough repugnance to the\nsort of thing that was being thrust upon countries by the\nRussians, a strong enough will to hold out against that to\nenable us with our assistance to be of real political\nvalue there. It was partly because those prerequisites\nexisted that we have been able to follow a program in\nFurope which proved, I think, much more successful and\nwhich looked much more purposeful, much more well-designed\nprobably than what we have done in Asia, but there is also\nthe fact that it does seem to us a more serious prospect\nthat the Russians should get hold of Central Europe from\nthe sheer military standpoint of national security than\nit does that they should get hold of China and Asia.\nThat does not mean that we underrate the importance\nof a Communist advance in Asia. We do not even underrate,\nI hope, the military importance of China. We realize that\nin some respects the Chinese have formidable military\ncapabilities, although they seem to us to be ones that\nexpress themselves more in the defensive than anything\nthat could make up amphibious strength or strength which\ncould be projected beyond the borders of China.\nYou"
}