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CONT IDENT IAL TRUNAN MATIONAL -45- ARCHIVES of China, he said: "Governor, if anybody asks you what will happen in China, don't answer him. There is a lot to that kind of advice. Nobody can draw a blueprint. I do know that in some respects the Communist advance through south China has been slower than it was estimated; the advance up in northwest China is faster than it was estimated. Ve are inclined to think, from our standpoint, the withdrawal of forces shows weaknesses, but if you are facing a million men with 250 thousand men and with the lack of morale, maybe the best thing you can do is try to keep your men intact and keep on withdrawing until you get to the very nethermost areas of your country. I mean China is so different that you shouldn't attempt to change it, from our standpoint. I think there is every indication that if we have the basic policy of opposition to the Communist advance and the Communist consolidation of Asia that we should play out every card of opposition, and that, of course, means that it would be unthinkable to recognize the Communist government in China and to withdraw recog- nition from the Nationalist government. But even though the last vestige of military opposition disappears, in my feeling, very strongly, a number of years should still go by before we recognize that new government, remembering that the recognition of the new government would have a tremendous impact throughout Asia toward placing the new government with a seat on the Security Counci 1 of the United Nations, with full veto power, and in my judgment it would be one of the most tragic moves we could make in the long=term world strategy. So I feel very strongly that we should not recognize the Communist government in China even though they go on and consolidate the remaining area, and that may still be a long way off in the very rugged terrain of the south of China, thinking again from an Asiatic and a world-wide policy. On the other side of military aspects, I am inclined to feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for our own outer perimeter. Here agein the military judgment should carry. There are excellent airfields in Formosa. If antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa you have quite effectively severed the Philippine Islands and Japan from each other. They are immediately astride that airway or direct seaway. So that having in mind also the psychologi- cal effect of some firm position, I feel we ought to evaluate with the fact that Formosa is still not returned to China as a part of China; Formosa is still in an un- certain legal position. Then the war ended, China was given the Nationalist government. Then China was given the

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    "ocrText": "CONT IDENT IAL\nTRUNAN\nMATIONAL\n-45-\nARCHIVES\nof\nChina, he said: \"Governor, if anybody asks you what will\nhappen in China, don't answer him. There is a lot to\nthat kind of advice. Nobody can draw a blueprint.\nI do know that in some respects the Communist advance\nthrough south China has been slower than it was estimated;\nthe advance up in northwest China is faster than it was\nestimated. Ve are inclined to think, from our standpoint,\nthe withdrawal of forces shows weaknesses, but if you are\nfacing a million men with 250 thousand men and with the\nlack of morale, maybe the best thing you can do is try to\nkeep your men intact and keep on withdrawing until you get\nto the very nethermost areas of your country. I mean\nChina is so different that you shouldn't attempt to change\nit, from our standpoint. I think there is every indication\nthat if we have the basic policy of opposition to the\nCommunist advance and the Communist consolidation of Asia\nthat we should play out every card of opposition, and that,\nof course, means that it would be unthinkable to recognize\nthe Communist government in China and to withdraw recog-\nnition from the Nationalist government. But even though\nthe last vestige of military opposition disappears, in my\nfeeling, very strongly, a number of years should still go\nby before we recognize that new government, remembering\nthat the recognition of the new government would have a\ntremendous impact throughout Asia toward placing the new\ngovernment with a seat on the Security Counci 1 of the\nUnited Nations, with full veto power, and in my judgment\nit would be one of the most tragic moves we could make in\nthe long=term world strategy. So I feel very strongly\nthat we should not recognize the Communist government in\nChina even though they go on and consolidate the remaining\narea, and that may still be a long way off in the very\nrugged terrain of the south of China, thinking again from\nan Asiatic and a world-wide policy.\nOn the other side of military aspects, I am inclined\nto feel that Formosa is an important strategic area for\nour own outer perimeter. Here agein the military judgment\nshould carry. There are excellent airfields in Formosa.\nIf antagonistic air bases exist on Formosa you have quite\neffectively severed the Philippine Islands and Japan from\neach other. They are immediately astride that airway or\ndirect seaway. So that having in mind also the psychologi-\ncal effect of some firm position, I feel we ought to\nevaluate with the fact that Formosa is still not returned\nto China as a part of China; Formosa is still in an un-\ncertain legal position. Then the war ended, China was\ngiven the Nationalist government. Then China was given\nthe"
}