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they are not susceptible of violation without detection
and the possibility of effective
This further suggests that we will have to consider
carefully the order in which agreements can be concluded.
Agreement on the control of atomic energy would result in
a relatively greater disarmament of the United States than
of the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress
in building up the strength of the free world in conventional
forces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet
Union as part of a deliberate design to move against Western
Europe and other areas of strategic importance with conven-
tional forces and weapons. In this event, the United
States would find itself at war, having previously disarmed
itself in its most important weapon, and would be engaged in
a race to redevelop atomic weapons.
This seems to indicate that for the time being the
United States and other free countries would have to insist
on concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic forces
and weapons and perhaps on the other elements of a general
settlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and
Japan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satel-
lites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union
should accept agreements promising effective control of
atomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other
changes in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very
carefully whether we could accept such agreements. It is
unlikely that this problem will arise,
To the
ARCHIVES RECORDE `NATIONAL AND
=
SERVICE*
to
IOP SECRET
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n-6-\nthey are not susceptible of violation without detection\nand the possibility of effective\nThis further suggests that we will have to consider\ncarefully the order in which agreements can be concluded.\nAgreement on the control of atomic energy would result in\na relatively greater disarmament of the United States than\nof the Soviet Union, even assuming considerable progress\nin building up the strength of the free world in conventional\nforces and weapons. It might be accepted by the Soviet\nUnion as part of a deliberate design to move against Western\nEurope and other areas of strategic importance with conven-\ntional forces and weapons. In this event, the United\nStates would find itself at war, having previously disarmed\nitself in its most important weapon, and would be engaged in\na race to redevelop atomic weapons.\nThis seems to indicate that for the time being the\nUnited States and other free countries would have to insist\non concurrent agreement on the control of non-atomic forces\nand weapons and perhaps on the other elements of a general\nsettlement, notably peace treaties with Germany, Austria, and\nJapan and the withdrawal of Soviet influence from the satel-\nlites. If, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union\nshould accept agreements promising effective control of\natomic energy and conventional armaments, without any other\nchanges in Soviet policies, we would have to consider very\ncarefully whether we could accept such agreements. It is\nunlikely that this problem will arise,\nTo the\nARCHIVES RECORDE `NATIONAL AND\n=\nSERVICE*\nto\nIOP SECRET"
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