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J. 333305-MONO-State
Galley 112
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
the special position of the permanent members would be amply safe-
guarded in all political decisions calling for action by the Council.
Our discussions with Congressional leaders, with many individuals
and groups thoughout the country and with representatives of the
American Republics and of other United Nations have convinced us
that the unanimity rule needs to be modified at least to this extent.
Otherwise, we run the risk at home of alienating some of our sup-
porters and of providing powerful ammunition for the opponents of
international organization, as well as of getting into trouble with the
Latin American countries and the other United Nations.
As regards the possibility of a dispute between us and Mexico coming
before the Council, we would abstain from casting our vote only in
such decisions as might be involved in the investigation of the dispute,
in calling upon the parties to settle it peacefully, and in making recom-
mendations as regards methods and procedures of settlement. No
decision for action could be made without our affirmative vote.
The President inquired as to what would happen if there developed
a dispute between us and Mexico over oil. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that
the Council would presumably go through the conciliation and peace-
ful settlement procedures without the benefit of our vote, but would
not be able to take any substantive action without our consent. He
recalled the manner in which an oil dispute between Great Britain and
Persia was handled by the Council of the League of Nations.
Reverting to Soviet Russia's position, Mr. Pasvolsky said that in
our opinion her case against the formula is extremely weak. Under
the formula, she would have veto power-just as would we and each
of the other permanent members-in the following decisions of the
Council:
1. Admission, suspension and expulsion of members;
2. Determination of the existence of a threat to the peace or of
a
breach of the peace;
3. Use of force or the application of other measures of enforcement;
4. Approval of agreements for the provision of armed forces;
5. All matters relating to the regulation of armaments;
6. Determination of whether a regional arrangement is consistent
with the purposes and principles of the general organization.
We are, therefore, not really asking much of Soviet Russia, from
the point of view of her interests and desires, when we propose that
the permanent members abstain from voting in the Council's decisions
on peaceful settlement of disputes to which they happen to be parties.
The President then said that he was satisfied that something like
our formula was necessary, and that he would make every effort to
convince the Russians that it was essential from the point of view of
our position. He said that he thought he knew Molotov well enough
to speak plainly to him, and was sure that he could work out with
him a satisfactory solution to take care of our situation.
Mr. Dunn called the President's attention to the fact that the
Russians might be more receptive to our ideas because of what has
just happened on the Polish question, on which there is a split among
the great powers. The President agreed that the provision of oppor-
tunity through constant contact in the new organization to prevent
such an occurrence might emphasize to the Russians the need for an
international organization.
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"ocrText": "J. 333305-MONO-State\nGalley 112\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nthe special position of the permanent members would be amply safe-\nguarded in all political decisions calling for action by the Council.\nOur discussions with Congressional leaders, with many individuals\nand groups thoughout the country and with representatives of the\nAmerican Republics and of other United Nations have convinced us\nthat the unanimity rule needs to be modified at least to this extent.\nOtherwise, we run the risk at home of alienating some of our sup-\nporters and of providing powerful ammunition for the opponents of\ninternational organization, as well as of getting into trouble with the\nLatin American countries and the other United Nations.\nAs regards the possibility of a dispute between us and Mexico coming\nbefore the Council, we would abstain from casting our vote only in\nsuch decisions as might be involved in the investigation of the dispute,\nin calling upon the parties to settle it peacefully, and in making recom-\nmendations as regards methods and procedures of settlement. No\ndecision for action could be made without our affirmative vote.\nThe President inquired as to what would happen if there developed\na dispute between us and Mexico over oil. Mr. Pasvolsky replied that\nthe Council would presumably go through the conciliation and peace-\nful settlement procedures without the benefit of our vote, but would\nnot be able to take any substantive action without our consent. He\nrecalled the manner in which an oil dispute between Great Britain and\nPersia was handled by the Council of the League of Nations.\nReverting to Soviet Russia's position, Mr. Pasvolsky said that in\nour opinion her case against the formula is extremely weak. Under\nthe formula, she would have veto power-just as would we and each\nof the other permanent members-in the following decisions of the\nCouncil:\n1. Admission, suspension and expulsion of members;\n2. Determination of the existence of a threat to the peace or of\na\nbreach of the peace;\n3. Use of force or the application of other measures of enforcement;\n4. Approval of agreements for the provision of armed forces;\n5. All matters relating to the regulation of armaments;\n6. Determination of whether a regional arrangement is consistent\nwith the purposes and principles of the general organization.\nWe are, therefore, not really asking much of Soviet Russia, from\nthe point of view of her interests and desires, when we propose that\nthe permanent members abstain from voting in the Council's decisions\non peaceful settlement of disputes to which they happen to be parties.\nThe President then said that he was satisfied that something like\nour formula was necessary, and that he would make every effort to\nconvince the Russians that it was essential from the point of view of\nour position. He said that he thought he knew Molotov well enough\nto speak plainly to him, and was sure that he could work out with\nhim a satisfactory solution to take care of our situation.\nMr. Dunn called the President's attention to the fact that the\nRussians might be more receptive to our ideas because of what has\njust happened on the Polish question, on which there is a split among\nthe great powers. The President agreed that the provision of oppor-\ntunity through constant contact in the new organization to prevent\nsuch an occurrence might emphasize to the Russians the need for an\ninternational organization."
}