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J. 333305MONO-State
Galley 307
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
interest and amortization charges on a ten billion dollar loan as well as
finance future trade after the initial purchases are made. Moreover,
there is also some question as to the amount of surplus stragetic ma-
terials which the Soviet Union will have available for sale abroad,
and whether they would be willing to bind themselves categorically
to furnish these stragetic materials over a long period. Before making
any proposals of this kind, careful studies must be made to ascertain
the probable amounts of such stragetic materials as might be available.
W[ILLIAM] L. C[LAYTON]
[Attachment]
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM
PROPOSALS MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY TO SECRETARY
OF STATE REGARDING POSTWAR TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION
During the course of the conversation in Mr. Stettinius' office on
January 17, 1945, Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. Harry White of
the Treasury Department outlined the following proposal for postwar
trade with the Soviet Union:
Mr. Morgenthau referred to the long delay which had taken place
in connection with the negotiations for a 3(c) supplementary agree-
ment to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement by which it was proposed
to make available at this time to the Soviet Union certain industrial
plants which have both a wartime and peacetime use. He stated
that he felt it was too bad more than nine months had passed since
negotiations were started and still no agreement had been reached.
He attributed this to the fact that we had endeavored to bargain and
bicker with the Soviet negotiators instead of making a clear-cut, very
favorable proposal which would be considered by the Soviet Govern-
ment as a concrete gesture of our good will. He added that he did
not agree with Ambassador Harriman's suggestions in his telegram
no. 61 of January 6, 1945,3 which recommended that we remain firm
3 Ante, p.-.
in the stand that we have already taken in regard to the 3-(c) negotia-
tions and indicate to the Soviet Government that this continues to be
the most favorable offer we could make.
Instead of this course of action, Mr. Morgenthau stated that
Treasury experts have been giving consideration to this entire question
and have come to the conclusion that we should make new proposals
for the 3-(c) agreement which would offer to the Soviet Union the
same amount of goods on approximately the same terms except that
we should charge them no interest on the credit extended, but on the
other hand we should not accept any reduction in cost as proposed by
the Soviet*Government.
Because of the position we had taken with the Soviet representatives
in the 3(c) negotiations, which was to the effect that we could not
accept a rate of interest lower than that at which the United States
Government could borrow money, and because of the fact that the
delays in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government on this
question had been due primarily to the Soviet Government's reluctance
to accept the terms offered, Mr. Acheson pointed out the following
facts in regard to these negotiations:
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"ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley 307\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\ninterest and amortization charges on a ten billion dollar loan as well as\nfinance future trade after the initial purchases are made. Moreover,\nthere is also some question as to the amount of surplus stragetic ma-\nterials which the Soviet Union will have available for sale abroad,\nand whether they would be willing to bind themselves categorically\nto furnish these stragetic materials over a long period. Before making\nany proposals of this kind, careful studies must be made to ascertain\nthe probable amounts of such stragetic materials as might be available.\nW[ILLIAM] L. C[LAYTON]\n[Attachment]\nTOP SECRET\nMEMORANDUM\nPROPOSALS MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF TREASURY TO SECRETARY\nOF STATE REGARDING POSTWAR TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION\nDuring the course of the conversation in Mr. Stettinius' office on\nJanuary 17, 1945, Secretary Morgenthau and Mr. Harry White of\nthe Treasury Department outlined the following proposal for postwar\ntrade with the Soviet Union:\nMr. Morgenthau referred to the long delay which had taken place\nin connection with the negotiations for a 3(c) supplementary agree-\nment to the Master Lend-Lease Agreement by which it was proposed\nto make available at this time to the Soviet Union certain industrial\nplants which have both a wartime and peacetime use. He stated\nthat he felt it was too bad more than nine months had passed since\nnegotiations were started and still no agreement had been reached.\nHe attributed this to the fact that we had endeavored to bargain and\nbicker with the Soviet negotiators instead of making a clear-cut, very\nfavorable proposal which would be considered by the Soviet Govern-\nment as a concrete gesture of our good will. He added that he did\nnot agree with Ambassador Harriman's suggestions in his telegram\nno. 61 of January 6, 1945,3 which recommended that we remain firm\n3 Ante, p.-.\nin the stand that we have already taken in regard to the 3-(c) negotia-\ntions and indicate to the Soviet Government that this continues to be\nthe most favorable offer we could make.\nInstead of this course of action, Mr. Morgenthau stated that\nTreasury experts have been giving consideration to this entire question\nand have come to the conclusion that we should make new proposals\nfor the 3-(c) agreement which would offer to the Soviet Union the\nsame amount of goods on approximately the same terms except that\nwe should charge them no interest on the credit extended, but on the\nother hand we should not accept any reduction in cost as proposed by\nthe Soviet*Government.\nBecause of the position we had taken with the Soviet representatives\nin the 3(c) negotiations, which was to the effect that we could not\naccept a rate of interest lower than that at which the United States\nGovernment could borrow money, and because of the fact that the\ndelays in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Government on this\nquestion had been due primarily to the Soviet Government's reluctance\nto accept the terms offered, Mr. Acheson pointed out the following\nfacts in regard to these negotiations:"
}