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J. 333305MONO-State
Galley 323
UNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF
bear in mind the special historic interests of the British and Russians
in that country. We should avoid the impression that we stand at
Iran's side as a buffer to restrain other countries or that we have
undertaken a unilateral obligation to defend Iran by armed force.
Toward this end, we should make a special effort to bring the Russians
and British into common allied deliberations regarding Iran and
should seek their active collaboration in carrying out an agreed policy.
Moscow should be requested to instruct the Soviet Ambassador at
Tehran to consult fully with his American and British colleagues on
all questions of mutual interest. The three Ambassadors might
constitute an Allied Advisory Commission in Iran, with a secretariat,
to bring about constant collaboration on matters of mutual concern.
Effort should be made to remove two specific causes for allied fric-
tion in Iran. They are: the oil concession controversy; and the
continuance of allied censorship. Each subject is discussed in a
separate paper.
II The Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran and the Disturbing Effect
recent Negotiations have had on Soviet-Iranian Relations
Soviet displeasure at the action of the Iranian Government in sus-
pending, until after the war, all negotiations for oil concessions is an
ominous development which should be carefully followed.
A brief summary of the immediate background of this matter
follows. American and British oil companies began negotiations with
the Iranian Government in early 1944 for a petroleum concession in
southern Iran. The American and British Embassies in Iran were
aware of these negotiations but regarded them as private commercial
ventures and in no way participated in the negotiations. The nego-
tiations seemed about to terminate successfully in September when a
large Soviet delegation, headed by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze,
appeared in Tehran and demanded that a concession be granted to the
Soviet Government for the five northern provinces of Iran. The
Iranian Government, alarmed by the sweeping Soviet demands, dis-
turbed by Soviet refusal to discuss terms or conditions, and fearful
that Iranian sovereignty would be jeopardized if a foreign government
should obtain such wide and lasting control in the country, announced
that all petroleum negotiations were suspended until the end of the
war.
The United States Government promptly informed the Iranian
Government that, while American companies were disappointed, we
recognized the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions
within its territory. We asked that, when negotiations are resumed,
American companies be informed and be placed in no less favorable
position than granted to any foreign company or government. The
British followed a similar policy although they made no formal state-
ment to the Iranian Government, as far as we are aware. The Rus-
sians showed great annoyance, taking the Iranian action as an affront.
The Soviet press began a strong and concerted attack on Iranian
Prime Minister Saed and his Government, accusing Iranian officials
of being "disloyal" and Fascist-minded. These attacks and the
strong statements of displeasure by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze in
Tehran brought about the resignation of the Saed Government.
The American Embassy in Moscow informed the Soviet Govern-
ment on November 1, 1944² of the attitude we had taken and stated
that our action had been based on the Declaration on Iran signed at
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"ocrText": "J. 333305MONO-State\nGalley 323\nUNCORRECTED GALLEY PROOF\nbear in mind the special historic interests of the British and Russians\nin that country. We should avoid the impression that we stand at\nIran's side as a buffer to restrain other countries or that we have\nundertaken a unilateral obligation to defend Iran by armed force.\nToward this end, we should make a special effort to bring the Russians\nand British into common allied deliberations regarding Iran and\nshould seek their active collaboration in carrying out an agreed policy.\nMoscow should be requested to instruct the Soviet Ambassador at\nTehran to consult fully with his American and British colleagues on\nall questions of mutual interest. The three Ambassadors might\nconstitute an Allied Advisory Commission in Iran, with a secretariat,\nto bring about constant collaboration on matters of mutual concern.\nEffort should be made to remove two specific causes for allied fric-\ntion in Iran. They are: the oil concession controversy; and the\ncontinuance of allied censorship. Each subject is discussed in a\nseparate paper.\nII The Problem of Oil Concessions in Iran and the Disturbing Effect\nrecent Negotiations have had on Soviet-Iranian Relations\nSoviet displeasure at the action of the Iranian Government in sus-\npending, until after the war, all negotiations for oil concessions is an\nominous development which should be carefully followed.\nA brief summary of the immediate background of this matter\nfollows. American and British oil companies began negotiations with\nthe Iranian Government in early 1944 for a petroleum concession in\nsouthern Iran. The American and British Embassies in Iran were\naware of these negotiations but regarded them as private commercial\nventures and in no way participated in the negotiations. The nego-\ntiations seemed about to terminate successfully in September when a\nlarge Soviet delegation, headed by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze,\nappeared in Tehran and demanded that a concession be granted to the\nSoviet Government for the five northern provinces of Iran. The\nIranian Government, alarmed by the sweeping Soviet demands, dis-\nturbed by Soviet refusal to discuss terms or conditions, and fearful\nthat Iranian sovereignty would be jeopardized if a foreign government\nshould obtain such wide and lasting control in the country, announced\nthat all petroleum negotiations were suspended until the end of the\nwar.\nThe United States Government promptly informed the Iranian\nGovernment that, while American companies were disappointed, we\nrecognized the sovereign right of Iran to grant or withhold concessions\nwithin its territory. We asked that, when negotiations are resumed,\nAmerican companies be informed and be placed in no less favorable\nposition than granted to any foreign company or government. The\nBritish followed a similar policy although they made no formal state-\nment to the Iranian Government, as far as we are aware. The Rus-\nsians showed great annoyance, taking the Iranian action as an affront.\nThe Soviet press began a strong and concerted attack on Iranian\nPrime Minister Saed and his Government, accusing Iranian officials\nof being \"disloyal\" and Fascist-minded. These attacks and the\nstrong statements of displeasure by Vice Commissar Kavtaradze in\nTehran brought about the resignation of the Saed Government.\nThe American Embassy in Moscow informed the Soviet Govern-\nment on November 1, 1944² of the attitude we had taken and stated\nthat our action had been based on the Declaration on Iran signed at"
}